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PREFACE Vll 
PREFACE 
The Korean question is a long historical puzzle which has re-
mained unsolved over four decades. Although, it has been regarded as 
a closed question by many, the Korean people are still suffering this 
national tragedy imposed by outside powers. The situation is analo-
gous to having family members out of touch, sight, and sound on the 
opposite bank of a river. Almost all of the Korean people have some 
family members or friends on the other side. Furthermore, the Ko-
rean division is still the source of bitter troubles and tensions since it 
greatly hampers the development of the Korean nation. It thus re-
mains a plaguing problem to the Korean people. 
Voluminous books and articles on the Korean question have been 
published. Many of them concentrate on describing the expressed pol-
icies of South and North Korea. Many objective observes fail, how-
ever, to offer positive suggestions for unification, or a legal analysis for 
unification planning. 
This book was not written by an objective observer, but by a Ko-
rean who is also suffering the national tragedy and who is determined 
to devote his whole life to the task of unification. Thus, this book stud-
ies feasible ways for Korean unification through the legal analysis of 
the various relations and facts connected to the Korean question. The 
book consists of three chapters. Chapter One analyzes under the prin-
ciples of international law the status of the parties to the Korean Ar-
mistice Agreement, and South Korea's status in the Agreement. 
Chapter Two deals with the de facto dissolution of the United Nations 
Command in Korea and the peace-keeping mechanisms in Korea 
without the Command. Chapter Three offers workable solutions and 
concrete means for Korean unification. 
I am greatly indebted to Korea University and the Korean Minis-
try of Education for supporting my stay in the United States for one 
year, and to the Law School of the University of Maryland for receiv-
ing me as a visiting scholar. I am very grateful to Professor Hungdah 
Chiu for his kind arrangement for my stay in the United States and his 
assistance in this publication. I am also grateful to Professors Pak Zai-
Sup and Park Choon-Ho, Former Agriculture Minister Chang Duk-
Chin, Mr. Park Kye-Dong, Mr. Kim Hyung-Soo, Mr. Lee Sang-Hap 
and Mr. Roh Kun-Woo for their assistance to me during my stay in 
the United States. I would also like to extend my gratitude to several 
persons who edited and corrected this book, particularly Mr. Mitchell 
(vii) 
Vlll CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
A. Silk. Finally, I am particularly appreciative of my wife, Kim Nae-
Hyun, for her great patience in allowing her husband to spend all his 
time in the office. · 
Lyou, Byung-Hwa 
PEACE AND UNIFICATION IN KOREA AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Lyou, Byung-Hwa 
CHAPTER ONE. THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The international legal problems stemming from the Korean Ar-
mistice Agreement are principally related to the definition of the legal 
parties to the agreement. The complex composition of the legal parties 
confuses the legal situation of the agreement. As is well known, South 
Korea opposed in vain, after much sacrifice, the conclusion of the Ko-
rean Armistice Agreement, which did not solve the problem of the 
division of Korea. As a result, the question whether South Korea is a 
legal party to the Korean Armistice Agreement or not has been sub-
ject to much dispute. 1 The answer would be a decisive factor in legal 
interpretation and a future solution of the Korean problem. 
This study concentrates on analyzing the legal reality of this 
problem, based on the concrete situation and historical facts of the 
Korean problem, and tries to offer a reasonable solution to this deli-
cate problem. 
Section A. Conclusion Of The Korean Armistice Agreement 
1. Negotiations between the United Nations Command and the 
Communist Side 
Just after the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, 
1950, the United Nations demanded that North Korea halt its attack 
and withdraw its troops to the north of the 38th Parallel. 2 Given its 
strategically favorable position, it would have been out of the question 
for North Korea to agree. Negotiations became possible only after the 
United Nations Forces' victorious amphibious operation of Inchon on 
September 15, 1950 and the North Korean retreat to the north of the 
38th Parallel. The question whether the United Nations Forces might 
cross the 38th Parallel or simply conclude an armistice agreement 
I. Lyou Byung-Hwa, Le Commandement des Nations Unies en Coree et Ses Problemes 
Juridiques, Seoul: 1980, pp. 74-93. 
2. UN Security Council Resolution 82, 25 June 1950, UN Document S/1501, in Re-
public of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Resolutions of the United Nations Prin-
cipal Organs Relating to Korea (1947-1976), Seoul, 1976, pp. 132-133. 
(1) 
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arose among the states composing the United Nations Forces. From a 
political and military viewpoint, crossing the 38th Parallel and de-
stroying North Korean forces was the most certain way of guarantee-
ing peace on the Korean peninsula; but, on the other hand, that would 
risk triggering Communist Chinese3 intervention in the War.4 After 
some discussion and hesitation, the United Nations Command under 
the leadership of United States finally decided to cross the 38th Paral-
lel and destroy North Korean forces. At the same time, the Command 
tried to persuade Communist China not to intervene, explaining that 
the United Nations Command would not encroach on Chinese inter-
ests. Although Communist China repeated warnings that it would not 
tolerate the United Nations Command crossing the 38th Parallel, 5 on 
October 7, 1950, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
Resolution which confirmed the United Nations Command's decision 
to cross the 38th Parallel.6 Then on October 26, 1950, Communist 
China intervened "unofficially" en masse in the Korean war, changing 
the war radically. 
Confronted with this new development, the Commander-in-Chief 
of the United Nations Command requested authorization to extend 
the combat area outside the Korean peninsula to prevent the continu-
ing participation of Communist Chinese forces. He also asked for re-
inforcement of the UN Forces in order to defeat the massive Chinese 
forces. The Allied Nations feared the expansion of war, and limited 
the military operation to the Korean Peninsula. 7 Furthermore, they 
hesitated in condemning the intervention of Communist China and 
tried to induce the Chinese to negotiate an armistice. 
In October 1950, the UN General Assembly held a meeting to 
discuss the possibility of an armistice. In the First Committee of the 
General Assembly, thirteen Arab-Asian nations proposed to establish 
the Group of Three, composed of India, Iran, and Canada. The 
3. In the early 1950s, only a small number of countries recognized the People's Re-
public of China. It was generally referred to as Communist China. Thus, in Chapter I 
"Communist China" is used, while in Chapters II and III the "People's Republic of China" 
is used. 
4. U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (1950), (hereinafter re-
ferred to as FRUS) VII (Korea), Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO), 
1976, pp. 813-816. 
5. Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations, New 
York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1956, reprint 1972, pp. 136-139. 
6. U.N.G.A. Res. 376(V) (Oct. 7, 1950), no. 16. 
7. Courtney Whitney, "The War McArthur Was Not Allowed to Win," Life, Sept. 5, 
1955, p. 68; U.S. Dept. of State, FRUS (1951), vol. VII, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983, 
pp. 41-60. 
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Group of Three discussed an armistice with the United Nations Com-
mand, while the United States proposed basic conditions for an armi-
stice: a complete cessation of hostilities in the Korean peninsula; the 
establishment of a demilitarized zone about 20 miles in width; the dis-
position of armed forces to assure the cease-fire; the supervision of the 
cease-fire by the United Nations Commission; a cessation of the en-
forcement of armed forces; an exchange of prisoners of war; aneta 
confirmation of the cease-fire arrangement by the UN General 
Assembly.8 
The other Allied Nations worried about Communist China and 
urged the United States not to expand the war outside Korea, and to 
seek all available means to achieve the armistice. One of the Group of 
Three, the Canadian, Pearson, supported by the British Common-
wealth, proposed the so-called Five Principles, which even included 
elements of appeasement: an immediate cease-fire; the pursuit of fur-
ther steps toward peace; the gradual withdrawal of all foreign troops, 
combined with the appropriate arrangements for the establishment of 
a Korean Government in accordance with the principles of the United 
Nations; an appropriate interim arrangement would be made for the 
administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace; after the cease-
fire, the establishment of appropriate committee for the settlement of 
the Far Eastern problem, including the problem of Taiwan and the 
representation of China in the United Nations. 
However, Communist China, being in a favorable strategic posi-
tion, continued to reject all the propositions of armistice, demanding 
unacceptable conditions, such as the withdrawal of all foreign troops 
from Korea, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan, and there-
placement of Nationalist China by the People's Republic in the United 
Nations.9 
Finally, the United States Secretary of State Acheson declared the 
futility of trying to negotiate with Communist China, and proposed a 
resolution of the UN General Assembly condemning Communist 
China as an aggressor. The worries and pressure of other Allied Na-
tions were not quelled. 10 Through long and tiresome efforts, the 
United States persuaded the other Allied Nations and the United Na-
tions General Assembly adopted Resolution 498(V) on February 1, 
1951, which condemned Communist China as an aggressor, and au-
8. Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 159. 
9. UN Bulletin (Jan. 15, 1951), vol. 10; U.N. Doc. A/C 1/653, FRUS, supra note 7, 
pp. 91-92. 
10. U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, Vol. 24 (January 29, 1951), p. 164; FRUS, supra note 
7, pp. 92-93. 
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thorized the necessary additional measures of the Collective Measure 
Committee to repel Chinese forces. The Resolution also expressed the 
Allied Nations desire for a cease-fire in Korea. 11 
Still, however, the attitude of the Allied Nations did not change 
after the adoption of Resolution 498(V). They continued to urge the 
United States to seek a cease-fire. Nevertheless, the Commander-in-
Chief of the United Nations Command, General MacArthur, insisted 
on strong measures against Communist China and after he expressed 
his view directly in the United States Congress through Congressman 
J.W. Martin on April 5, 1951, President Truman replaced him with 
General Ridgway on April 11, 1951.'2 With this unfortunate event, 
the direction of the policy of the United Nations Command changed, 
leaning toward arriving at the negotiation of an armistice with the 
Communist counterpart as soon as possible, rather than attempting to 
solve the Korean question concretely. In other words, the policy of 
the United Nations Command was to get out of the Korean War with-
out damaging its honor. It thus lacked a positive objective, most nota-
bly the reunification of Korea. 
From January of 1951, the war situation began to change in favor 
of the United Nations Command. In March, the United Nations 
Command again faced the problem of recrossing the 38th Parallel. 
However, the Allied Nations were extremely reluctant to do so. They 
intended neither to reinforce the United Nations Forces enough to de-
feat Communist Chinese forces, nor to wage a major attack against the 
enemy. The United States Government instructed the Commander-in-
Chief of the United Nations Command not to cross the 38th Parallel 
without prior consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United 
States. As a matter of fact, it is clear now that they wanted to get out 
of Korea without damaging their honor. 13 
However, the Communists never seemed to pay attention to the 
armistice proposal of the Allied Nations. The Allied Nations thus 
very reluctantly adopted Resolution 500 of the UN General Assembly 
on May 18, 1951, as an additional measure, recommending an em-
bargo on Communist China and North Korea. 14 On the other hand, 
the powerless South Korean Government utilized every effort to per-
suade the United States to continue their military operation until the 
Korean problem was solved. 
11. U.N.G.A. Res. 498(V), A/PV 327, (February 1, 1951). 
12. FRUS, supra note 7, pp. 298-301. 
13. Ibid., pp. 189-194, 320-330, 353-362. 
14. U.N.G.A. Res. 500(V) (18 May 1951). 
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Facing the continued deterioration of the war situation, the Com-
munists began to express hope for an armistice. On June 23, 1951, the 
Soviet Representative to the United Nations, Yakov Malik, expressed 
such hope in a radio broadcast on "The Price of Peace" sponsored by 
the United Nations radio: 
The Soviet people further believe that the most acute prob-
lem of the present day- the problem of the armed conflict 
in Korea - could also be settled. This would require the 
readiness of the Parties to enter on the path of a peaceful 
settlement of the Korean question. The Soviet people believe 
that as a first step discussion should be started between the 
belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the 
mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th Parallel. Can 
such a step be taken? I think it can, provided there is a sin-
cere desire to put an end to the bloody fighting in Korea. 15 
As soon as this broadcast was delivered, the U.S. Department of 
State issued a welcoming statement. The statement said that the Al-
lied Nations were ready, as they had always been, to play their part in 
bringing an end to hostilities and in preventing their resumption, if the 
Communists were willing to end the aggression in Korea. Two days 
later, President Truman also made a similar statement. 16 
Communist China's official newspaper, the People's Daily, on 
June 25, 1951, endorsed the armistice proposal of MalikY On June 
27, the Soviet Union's Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko also con-
firmed this idea to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Kirk, but 
also indicated that the arrangement would have a purely military dis-
position without involving any political or territorial matters. 18 
Finally, at the United States Government's instruction, the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, General Ridgway, 
broadcast a concrete proposal for the negotiation of an armistice 
through the United Nations Forces Radio on June 30, 1951. Accord-
ing to the proposal, if the Communist side desired a meeting to discuss 
an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities, with adequate 
guarantees for the maintenance of such an armistice, the United Na-
tions Command would be prepared to name its representative. This 
proposal also suggested a Danish hospital ship, Jutlandia in Wonsan 
15. FRUS, supra note 7, p. 547. . 
16. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (July 9, 1951), p. 45; Harry S. Truman: Public Papers 
of the President of the United States, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951, pp. 362-363. 
17. Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 183. 
18. FRUS, supra note 7, p. 561. 
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Harbor, as a place of meeting. 19 
The Communist side responded quickly to the proposal of the 
United Nations Command, and confirmed their willingness to negoti-
ate an armistice. The Communist side proposed that such a meeting 
should be held in Kaesong on the 38th Parallel. They also suggested 
that they would be prepared to meet the delegates of the United Na-
tions Command between 10 and 15 July, 1951,2° 
After the exchange of several messages between the commanders 
of both sides, 21 they decided that the preliminary meeting would be 
held in Kaesong22 on July 8.23 They also agreed that each delegation 
would be composed of three liaison officers and two interpreters 
respectively.24 
The first meeting of liaison officers of both sides took place in 
Kaesong on July 8. They agreed to open- and did in fact hold- the 
first conference in Kaesong on July 10, 195I.25 The Communist dele-
gation, under the North Korean General Nam II, was composed of 
North Korean and Communist Chinese Generals. The United Na-
tions delegation, whose head was Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, was 
composed of American Generals and one South Korean General, Paik 
Sun-Yup. The other nations contributing forces to the United Nations 
Command did not participate in this negotiation. 
Conflicts arose at the onset. There were difficulties even in adopt-
ing the agenda of the conference.26 The Communist side insisted that 
certain political questions such as withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Korea should be included in the agenda, while the United Nations 
Command tried to limit the agenda to military questions. The Com-
munist side also insisted that the establishment of the 38th Parallel as 
the military demarcation line between both sides should be pre-deter-
mined and included in the agenda.27 In addition, the Communist side 
hampered the participation of the newsmen of the UN side at the con-
ference. However, after some patient negotiations, both sides agreed 
to adopt the following agenda:28 
19. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 25 (July 9, 1951), p. 43. 
20. FRUS, supra note 7, p. 609. 
21. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (July 9, 1951), p. 43. 
22. Ibid., p. 44. 
23. FRUS, supra note 7, p. 623. 
24. Ibid., p. 624. 
25. Ibid., p. 652. 
26. Ibid., pp. 652-653. 
27. Ibid., p. 653. 
28. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (August 6, 1951), pp. 231-232. 
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1. adoption of the agenda 
u. fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so 
as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition 
for a cessation of hostilities in Korea 
111. concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire 
and an armistice in Korea, including the composition, 
authority and functions of a supervising organization 
for carrying out the terms of a cease-fire and armistice 
1v. arrangements relating to prisoners of war 
v. recommendations to the governments of the countries 
concerned on both sides. 
Among the major differences between the two sides on the negoti-
ation of the armistice, the first major obstacle was the location of the 
demarcation line. 29 The Communists insisted that the demarcation 
line should be based on the 38th Parallel because the war broke out at 
the 38th Parallel, and this was an historical fact that both sides had to 
respect. On the other hand, the United Nations Command proposed 
that the actual military battle line should be the demarcation line, on 
the grounds that it would reflect a military reality and it would be a 
more defensible line. Furthermore, the 38th Parallel would be only an 
imaginary line from a military viewpoint, because it did not reflect any 
physical conditions of the territory, and the Communists already had 
violated it. 
Painful negotiations lasted for more than three months. The 
heated oral disputes were interrupted two times in August, and re-
sulted in a long recess until October. 
From the onset, the South Korean Government made it clear that 
it was ardently opposed to the demarcation line around the 38th Paral-
lel. While the United States attempted to assure them of its inevitabil-
ity, all stratas of Korean society still expressed an emotional shock 
over the idea of stabilizing the demarcation line, despite the fact that 
the war situation favored the United Nations Command. The United 
States Government explained that a major advance to the north of the 
38th Parallel would risk a third world war which would bring disaster 
even to Korea. The Korean Government, however, insisted that an 
armistice without solving the Korean division would result in surren-
dering Korea and the defeat of the United Nations side. The end re-
sult was a stalemate. 30 
The difficulty of the conference was in part due to its location -
29. FRUS, supra note 7, pp. 694, 710, 738, 763, 774. 
30. Ibid., pp. 737, 740-745. 
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Kaesong - because the Kaesong area belonged to the Communist 
zone. Therefore, both sides agreed to a move from Kaesong to 
Panmunjom, which was an adjacent areaY 
This long, fruitless discussion tired both sides, and the United 
Nations Command proposed a new concrete proposal, which embod-
ied the following points: 
- The present line of contact as jointly determined by 
the sub-delegations will constitute a provisional military de-
marcation line, and two lines, 2 km from the demarcation 
lines, will constitute the southern and northern boundaries of 
a provisional demilitarized zone. 
- The above provisional military demarcation line and 
the above provisional demilitarized zone based upon the 
present line of contact shall become effective with any armi-
stice agreement signed within 30 days after this agreement is 
accepted by the two delegations in plenary session. 
- If an armistice agreement is not signed by the end of 
the 30 day period, the then existing line of contact will be 
determined jointly by the sub-delegations, and will constitute 
a new provisional military demarcation line which will be 
the median line of a new provisional demilitarized zone, to 
be effective under such conditions as will be at the time gen-
erally agreed to by the delegations of both sides. 32 
The reaction of the Communist delegation to this proposal was 
comparatively favorable. Thus, after some minor modifications, both 
sides agreed to these principles, and concentrated on determining the 
actual line of contact, which was agreed on November 26, 1951.33 
The second major difference in the armistice negotiations con-
cerned the power and function of the supervisory organ which would 
carry out the terms of the armistice agreement. The Communists were 
opposed to a strong supervisory organ. They viewed a supervisory or-
gan empowered to inspect and have access to North Korean territory 
as an interference in internal affairs. The United Nations Command 
insisted, however, that the effective function and free access of the su-
pervisory organ were necessary to ensure the fragile peace of this re-
gion after the conclusion of the armistice agreement. The two sides 
finally compromised, agreeing to install inspection teams at five ports 
on each side, and establish several mobile inspection units to investi-
31. Ibid., pp. 848-854. 
32. Ibid., p. 1147. 
33. Ibid., p. 1186. 
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gate alleged violations of the armistice agreement. " 34 
The third difference between the two sides involved the western 
coastal islands under the control of the United Nations Command. 
These five coastal islands were located substantially north of the gen-
eral line of contact between the two sides. The Communists de-
manded that United Nations Forces withdraw from the coastal islands 
in accordance with the demarcation line on the mainland, while the 
United Nations Command sought to retain the islands unless suitable 
adjustments were made elsewhere. The Communists refused to accept 
the position of the United Nations Command and so the United Na-
tions Command continued to occupy the islands. 35 
The fourth and most divisive difference concerned prisoners of 
war. First of all, the Communist count of prisoners of war differed 
greatly from the number claimed earlier. The total number listed by 
the Communists was only 11,559 prisoners, composed of 7,142 South 
Korean soldiers and 4,417 United Nations soldiers, while the total 
number claimed earlier exceeded 65,000. On the other hand, the 
number of the POWs listed by the United Nations Command totalled 
132,000, with another 37,000 having been recently reclassified as civil-
ian internees. The 132,000 POWs held by the United Nations Com-
mand were composed of 95,531 North Koreans, 20,700 Chinese and 
16,243 South Koreans. The 16,243 South Koreans had been domi-
ciled in South Korea before June 25, 1950, and a large number of them 
had been forced to fight against South Korean forces after June 25 by 
North Korean forces. 36 It appeared that there were many United Na-
tions POWs alive but not included on the Communist list because the 
POW camps identified by the Communists comprised only a portion 
of the POW camps located in North Korea and omitted all POW 
camps located in Communist China.37 Moreover, the South Korean 
Government pressured the United States Government to secure the 
release of more than 20,000 South Korean civilians kidnapped by the 
Communist occupation in 1950.38 
The most difficult problem was how to exchange the prisoners of 
war. The Communists insisted on the unconditional exchange of all 
POWs they held, for all POWs held by the United Nations Command. 
The United Nations Command, however, proposed the exchange of 
34. Ibid., pp. 1187-1193. 
35. Ibid., pp. 1216-1221. 
36. Walter G. Hermes, United States Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fight-
ing Front, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1966, p. 141. 
37. FRUS, supra note 7, p. 1399. 
38. Ibid., p. 1252. 
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prisoners of war on an individual basis, according to the wishes of 
individual prisoners. In other words, the Communists insisted on an 
involuntary repatriation in which all prisoners of war would be re-
turned to the side for which they were fighting at the time of capture. 
On the other hand, the United Nations Command refused the forced 
repatriation of prisoners against their own will. 39 
Several months passed without any progress. The reason why 
this problem was difficult to resolve was that many prisoners of war 
who had suffered so much under the Communist regime forcibly re-
sisted their return to North Korea, even at the risk of seeing their 
families separated. The first global screening showed that among the 
132,000 Communist prisoners of war and 37,000 civil internees held 
by the United Nations Command, as many as half of them resisted 
return to the Communist side. The Communists, knowing this fact, 
would not agree to the voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. On 
the one hand, they would be in desperate need of human resources 
after the drastic reduction of population during the war. Yet, on the 
other hand, there would be a disastrous effect on public opinion due to 
the fact that as many as half of the Communist prisoners of war re-
fused to return. Thus the Communists worried about the possible re-
sult of normal negotiations. They instigated several violent riots in the 
United Nations Command POW camps, with prisoners resisting and 
obstructing the screening operation. As a result, several prisoners and 
guards were killed and wounded. 40 The Communists also criticized 
the United Nations Command, claiming major violations of the inter-
national law of war, including the bombing of civilians, and the use of 
bacteriological weapons. 41 
Considering these facts, the United Nations Command did its 
best to reduce the number of prisoners of war resisting return to the 
Communist side. First, the United Nations Command informed the 
POWs of Communist broadcasts seeking to persuade the prisoners to 
return to the Communist side. Second, the questions in screening in-
terviews were designed to encourage the maximum number of prison-
ers to return to the Communist side. Only the prisoners who 
expressed the strongest resistance, such as committing suicide or fight-
ing to die in cases of forced repatriation, were excluded on the list for 
39. Ibid., p. 1417. 
40. FRUS (1952-1954), vol. XV (Korea), pt. 1, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984, p. 153. 
41. Rosalin Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, vol. II, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1970, pp. 188-191. 
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repatriation.42 As a result of such interviews, 753 prisoners of war 
reversed their initial decisions and decided to return to the Communist 
side. But still the number of 753 prisoners was not enough to mitigate 
the strong opposition of the Communist side.43 Thus, the negotiations 
continued in a deadlock. 
In an effort to end the war quickly, the United Nations Command 
proposed an overall settlement of remaining issues. The contents of 
the so-called "package proposal" were: (1) the United Nations Com-
mand would accept the Communist position on air-field reconstruc-
tion; (2) the Communist side would accept the United Nations 
Command's position excluding the Soviet Union from the Military 
Armistice commission; (3) the Communist side would accept volun-
tary repatriation of prisoners of war. However, the voluntary repatria-
tion of prisoners of war was such an important concession to the 
Communist side that they categorically rejected the United Nations 
Command's proposal.44 
Over the next several months the negotiations remained in a 
deadlock. Since the stalemate showed no sign of improvement, the 
problem was brought to the United Nations General Assembly in Oc-
tober.45 The United States proposed a draft resolution endorsing the 
position of the United Nations Command and called on the Commu-
nist side to accept the voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. 
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union proposed a draft resolution supporting 
involuntary repatriation of all prisoners of war. In an effort to find a 
compromise between the two extreme positions, India submitted an 
intermediate draft resolution which, while confirming that the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 did not permit the use of force in the repatriation 
of prisoners of war, proposed that all prisoners of war be turned over 
to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which would handle 
the problem of prisoners of war in accordance with an agreement con-
cluded thereafter between the two sides. After making some modifica-
tions to assure the effective function of the Repatriation Commission, 
and including guarantees for prisoners of war refusing repatriation not 
to be detained indefinitely, the United States supported this resolution. 
It was adopted on December 3, 1952, by a vote of 54 to 5 with 1 
abstention. This Resolution 610(VII) was, however, rejected by the 
42. "44th Report of the United Nations Command in Korea," UN Doc. S/2700 (July 
14, 1952); FRUS, supra note 40, p. 162. 
43. FRUS, supra note 40, p. 183. 
44. Ibid., pp. 82-97, 179-10; Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 192. 
45. FR US, supra note 40, p. 588. 
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Communist side. 46 
The United States presidential election on November 4, 1952 also 
delayed the conclusion of an armistice agreement. Republican candi-
date Dwight Eisenhower pledged that, if elected, he would go at once 
to Korea to try to end the war. President-Elect Eisenhower visited 
Korea in early December, and concluded that an honorable armistice 
should be secured.47 The Communist side may have wanted to delay 
the conclusion, hoping that a change in United States leadership 
would alter the odds, but that hope would be in vain. The new admin-
istration sought a new approach to break out of the deadlock. John 
Foster Dulles, who was designated as Secretary of State in the new 
administration, reported to Eisenhower that the dominant factor in 
the Korean War was the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Union 
would encourage the present armistice stalemate, as long as it could 
obtain certain advantages without the expansion of war or military 
defeat. The advantages of the stalemate of war were: (1) tying down a 
large number of United States forces in the Far East and thereby 
weakening the American position in other actual or potential areas of 
conflict; (2) the absorbtion of a large amount of military equipment in 
Korea, slowing down the rearmament of Western Europe and other 
areas; (3) the generation of friction between the United States and the 
other NATO members. On the other hand, Dulles understood that 
the prisoner of war issue was important to the Communists beyond 
Korea and for the future. That is, voluntary repatriation might en-
courage defections elsewhere, whereas enforced repatriation would de-
ter future desertions.48 
In this situation, the new United States administration believed 
that the only way to break out of the deadlock was to threaten to 
expand the war to the outside of Korea. In his State of the Union 
Message of February 2, 1953, President Eisenhower stated that he was 
reversing the June 1950 decision ordering the Seventh Fleet to prevent 
an attack on Taiwan while ensuring that Taiwan would not be used as 
a base of operation against the mainland. He issued instructions that 
the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China 
because Communist China had invaded Korea and refused the United 
Nations proposals.49 
46. U.N. Doc. A/PV 399 (December 3, 1952); FRUS, supra note 40, p. 702; Higgins, 
supra note 41, p. 281. 
47. FRUS, supra note 40, p. 578; Higgins, supra note 41, p. 281. 
48. FR US, supra note 40, pp. 692-693. 
49. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the President of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C.: GPO, 1953, pp. 16-17. 
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At the 131st meeting of the National Security Council on Febru-
ary 11, 1953, President Eisenhower suggested that the United States 
should consider placing tactical atomic weapons in Korea in order to 
end the war expeditiously.50 Previously, the National Security Coun-
cil on several occasions discussed the possibility of using atomic weap-
ons in Korea. 51 
After Stalin died on March 5, 1953, the new leadership of the 
Soviet Union was beset with the succession problem.52 Therefore, the 
Communists became more anxious to conclude an armistice agree-
ment. They responded to the United Nations Command's proposal on 
February 19, 1953 concerning the exchange of sick and wounded pris-
oners of war in accordance with appropriate articles of the Geneva 
Convention and the Resolution of the Executive Committee of the 
League of Red Cross Societies (December 13, 1952). The Communist 
liaison officers informed the United Nations Command on March 28, 
1953 that they were ready to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of 
war in accordance with the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva 
Convention and to resume armistice negotiations at Panmunjom. Fur-
thermore, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai broadcasted a statement and 
also sent a corresponding cablegram to the United Nations General 
Assembly proposing that negotiations should begin immediately on 
the exchange of sick and wounded, and that this would hopefully lead 
to an overall settlement of the prisoner of war question. He added that 
all prisoners of war insisting upon repatriation should be exchanged 
immediately following the cease-fire and that the remaining prisoners 
of war be handed over to a neutral state to ensure a just solution to the 
question of their repatriation. 53 This position conformed, as a whole, 
to the United Nations Command's position. As a result, an agreement 
for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war was signed on 
April 11. It set April 20, 1953 as the date for the beginning of the 
exchange. According to the agreement, the Communist side would 
deliver a total of 600 United Nations Command personnel at the rate 
of 100 per day, while the United Nations Command would deliver 
5,800 North Korean and Chinese personnel in numbers of 500 per 
day.s4 
At 11:00 a.m., April 25, 1953 (Seoul time), full negotiations re-
sumed, and the discussions centered on the neutral nations assuming 
50. FR US, supra note 40, p. 770. 
51. Ibid., pp. 845-850. 
52. Ibid., p. 898. 
53. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (April 13, 1953), pp. 526-572. 
54. FRUS, supra note 40, pp. 902, 919. 
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custody of the non-repatriate POWs, the place of custody, the dura-
tion of custody, and the ways and organs responsible for the ultimate 
decision on the fate of non-patriate POWs.55 After patient negotiat-
ing, on June 8, 1953, United Nations' Representative William K. Har-
rison and Communist Representative Nam 11 finally signed an 
agreement on the "Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repa-
triation Commission," concluding the final agreement on the last and 
most difficult subject of the armistice talks. 56 
2. Negotiations between the United States and South Korea 
Before signing the armistice agreement, the United Nations faced 
one remaining obstacle: assurance of the agreement and cooperation 
of the South Korean Government. This was, in a sense, the most com-
plicated and difficult problem. The South Korean Government was 
opposed from the first to an armistice without a solution to the Korean 
division. The internal political crisis of South Korea during the 
months following May 1952 further complicated the situation. Presi-
dent Rhee's thirst for power resulted in the massive arrest of members 
of the National Assembly under martial law to stifle all opposition. 
He enacted a constitutional amendment consolidating his power, and 
created considerable consternation in the United States Government, 
which even considered his removal. 57 Thereafter, the South Korean 
Government continued to oppose an armistice without any solution to 
the problem of Korea's division. As the armistice negotiations 
progressed and prospects for conclusion became more certain, the op-
position of the anxious South Korean Government grew stronger. On 
November 3, 1952, South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun Yung-Tai 
delivered a powerful speech before the First Committee of the United 
Nations General Assembly. He blamed the Soviet Union for support-
ing the Korean invasion, and opposed any armistice which left his 
country divided. In addition, the South Korean delegation to the 
United Nations General Assembly circulated a 46 page pamphlet de-
manding arms for two million men for the purpose of unifying Korea. 
Foreign Minister Pyun condemned the armistice negotiations as a 
Communist hoax and plot. 58 
On April 8, 1953, the Korean Ambassador to the United States, 
Yang You-Chan, met the United States Secretary of State, John F. 
55. Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 195; FR US, supra note 40, p. 920. 
56. FR US, supra note 40, p. 1151. 
57. Ibid., pp. 242-376, 402-404. 
58. Ibid., p. 626; UN Doc. A/C 1/SR 518 (November, 1952). 
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Dulles, and communicated the South Korean Government's position 
relating to the armistice. He proposed the following preconditions for 
the conclusion of an armistice: (1)all of Korea must be reunited; (2) 
all Chinese forces must vacate Korean territory; (3)North Korean 
forces must be disarmed; (4) any third party must be prevented from 
providing arms to the Communists in Korea; and (5) the sovereignty 
of the Republic of Korea must be guaranteed and its voice in interna-
tional discussion on the future of Korea must be guaranteed. 59 
In his letter to President Eisenhower on April 9, 1953, President 
Rhee expressed his strong opposition to the armistice. He said that he 
knew of President Eisenhower's determination to end the Korean War 
with honor as soon as possible, and he also knew of the strong opposi-
tion of foreign powers and some circles of the American administra-
tion against the policy of President Eisenhower. Under such 
circumstances, he said, the Korean people would again suffer disap-
pointment. President Rhee expressed strong emotional protest: "At 
all events, either as a result of the Indian resolution or of the Commu-
nists' recent offer of peace negotiations, if they [some UN members] 
arrange a peace agreement allowing the Chinese to remain in Korea, 
we have to ask all the friendly nations whose armed forces are now 
fighting in Korea and who do not desire to join us in our determina-
tion to defeat aggressive communism and drive up to the Yalu River, 
to withdraw from Korea . . . we will not move one step beyond our 
age-old national boundary line without your request . . ."60 
Furthermore, the South Korean Government supported mass ral-
lies against the armistice in several principal cities in Korea. The 
United States Government worried about possible unilateral action, 
such as the withdrawal of South Korean forces from the United Na-
tions Command or military use of South Korean forces. 61 In his an-
swer to President Rhee, President Eisenhower also expressed his firm 
determination on April 23: " ... the action taken by the United Na-
tions in Korea was to assist your valiant country in repelling the 
armed attack directed against it, initially by the North Korean regime 
and subsequently by the Chinese Communists. This has successfully 
been accomplished ... The United States and the United Nations 
have consistently supported the unification of Korea under conditions 
which would assure its freedom and independence. Neither the 
United States nor the United Nations has ever committed itself tore-
59. FR US, supra note 40, p. 897. 
60. Ibid., pp. 902-903. 
61. Ibid., p. 906. 
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sort to war to achieve this objective . . . " 62 
On April 24, 1953, South Korean Ambassador Yang You-Chan 
handed an Aide-Memoire from his Government to the United States 
Department of State, informing the President that President Rhee was 
preparing to withdraw South Korean forces from the United Nations 
Command when and if the United Nations would conclude any agree-
ment with the Communist aggressors, allowing Chinese Communists 
to remain south of the Yalu River after a cease-fire agreement. The 
Aid-Memoire also said that South Korean forces, in this eventuality, 
would have to fight it out alone, either to win or lose, if necessary, but 
in either event, with honor as free men. 63 
After receiving this Aide-Memoire, the United States Govern-
ment was very embarrassed. The United Nations Command prepared 
a contingency plan, if necessary, to replace President Rhee. Concur-
rently, however, the United Nations Command tried to clarify the 
conditions and timing under which South Korean forces might be 
withdrawn from the United Nations Command. In his classified tele-
gram to the Chief of Staff of the United States Army on April 26, 
1953, United Nations Commander Clark explained in detail his con-
tingency plan. According to this plan, the United Nations Command 
would carry out drastic actions if one of the following three conditions 
would be fulfilled: (1) if the South Korean troops were not responsive 
to the United Nations Command directives; (2) if the South Korean 
Government and military units, through official announcement, public 
statements and other means, indicated a refusal to carry out the 
United Nations Command directives and manifested a determination 
to proceed along an independent course of action; (3) if the South Ko-
rean Government, military units or people were overtly hostile to the 
United Nations Command troops. The drastic actions covered several 
steps, from the control and limitation of supplies available to the 
South Korean forces, to the establishment of an interim government in 
the event of the breakdown of South Korean Government administra-
tion. The latter case contemplated, as an initial step of placing Presi-
dent Rhee in custody. 64 
Subsequently, Commander Clark met with President Rhee and 
was informed that President Rhee considered withdrawing South Ko-
rean forces from the United Nations Command as a last resort, and 
that he would take such an action only after thorough discussion with 
62. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, 
New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963, pp. 185186. 
63. FRUS, supra note 40, p. 935. 
64. Ibid., pp. 940-943. 
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the United Nations Command.65 
Due, perhaps, to this position of the South Korean Government, 
the United Nations Command had not discussed in advance the con-
tents of armistice negotiations. Considering that South Korea was the 
host country for this event, the United Nations Command's attitude 
was not justified. From time to time, the Korean Member of the 
United Nations Command delegation to the armistice talks learned 
the contents of the negotiations in advance and informed their Gov-
ernment of them. After being informed, the South Korean govern-
ment obstructed the armistice talks. For this reason, the United 
Nations Command tried to keep the Korean Government informed of 
current developments in the armistice negotiations and to discuss prin-
cipal problems with the South Korean Government. 66 
President Rhee preferred the simultaneous withdrawal of both 
the Chinese Communists and the United Nations forces from Korea to 
the prospect of Chinese forces remaining indefinitely. But he adhered 
to the following conditions: (1) a Korean-American mutual defense 
treaty; (2) a buffer zone on the other side of the Korean boundary; (3) 
the continued naval blockade around the Korean coast and air defense 
until peace in East Asia would be firmly established; and (4) United 
States' aid to strengthen South Korean forces, and so on. 67 
Faced with the determination of the United States Government, 
the South Korean Government became more realistic and changed its 
position. South Korea continued to insist on the release of Korean 
non-repatriate prisoners of war and demanded the withdrawal of Chi-
nese Communists with a guarantee against their reintervention. South 
Korea also asked the United States to strengthen South Korean forces, 
and to conclude a mutual defense treaty and increase economic aid. 
At the same time President Rhee asked the Commander-in-Chief of 
the United Nations Command to increase South Korean participation 
in the armistice talks. 
As to the withdrawal of the Chinese Communists, the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command tried to make Presi-
dent Rhee understand that this subject should be addressed at a 
political conference and not in the military armistice. In order to in-
crease South Korean participation in the armistice talks, he promised 
to increase the number of administrative assistants for the South Ko-
rean delegation. The United States authorized the Commander-in-
65. Ibid., pp. 947-950. 
66. Ibid., pp. 955-956. 
67. Ibid., pp. 1007-1010. 
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Chief of the United Nations Command to activate additional South 
Korean divisions from the sixteen already activated to a total of 
twenty. They also agreed to some increase of personnel in the South 
Korean Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force.68 However, the United 
States Government was reluctant to commit itself to a mutual defense 
treaty. Instead, the United States considered a comprehensive agree-
ment on military assistance and other related matters.69 In addition, 
the United States emphasized the so-called "Greater Sanction State-
ment," which was to be issued by the United States and the other 
Allied Nations immediately upon conclusion of the armistice agree-
ment. According to the Statement, in the event of an armed attack 
against South Korea, the sixteen nations should again be united to 
resist it, and, furthermore, they would not confine the hostilities 
within Korea.70 As to Korean non-repatriate prisoners of war, the 
United States tended to agree with the South Korean position, but the 
other Allied Nations insisted that the United Nations Command's po-
sition should be as close as possible to the Indian initiated Resolution 
of the United Nations General Assembly, December 3, 1952.71 
The United States Government made it clear to President Rhee 
that it would take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the 
United Nations forces in the event that South Korea took unilateral 
military action and withdrew its forces from the United Nations Com-
mand.72 In this way, the United States tried to ensure that South Ko-
rea would refrain from opposition and agitation against the armistice 
negotiations. The United States also persuaded the South Korean 
Government to use its influence to restrain all strata of South Korean 
society from agitating against the armistice negotiations. They also 
tried to ensure that South Korea would cooperate fully in implement-
ing the armistice agreement, and that South Korean forces would re-
main under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
United Nations Command until the governments of the United States 
and South Korea mutually agreed it was no longer necessary. The 
United States Government also hoped that President Rhee would 
make a public declaration that the South Korean Government would 
fully cooperate with the United States and the United Nations.73 
However, South Korea was determined to maintain its position 
68. Ibid., pp. 1010-1017. 
69. Ibid., p. 1030. 
70. Ibid., pp. 14, 1031. 
71. Ibid., p. 1047. 
72. Ibid., p. 1032. 
73. Ibid., p. 1088. 
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on the withdrawal of the Chinese Communists and the release of the 
non-repatriate Korean prisoners of war.74 President Rhee refused to 
give the assurances that the United States Government had requested. 
In his letter to President Eisenhower on May 30, 1953, President Rhee 
once again confirmed his initial position. He was extremely worried 
about the possible continued presence of the Chinese forces in Korea 
after the armistice. He stated: 
. . . [W]e are fearfully aware . . . . that to accept any armi-
stice arrangement which would allow the Chinese Commu-
nists to remain in Korea would mean to the Korean nation, 
in terms of eventualities, an acceptance of a death sentence 
without protest. It is a hard thing for a nation to do. Fur-
thermore, even if I personally agree to such an arrangement, 
it will not help the matter very much, as subsequent develop-
ments, I fear, will show.75 
In the same letter, President Rhee put forth a South Korean proposal 
for the armistice. The main points of the proposal were the following: 
(1) a simultaneous withdrawal of both the Communist and United Na-
tions forces from Korea; (2) a mutual defense treaty between the 
United States and South Korea; (3) the strengthening of South Korean 
forces; and ( 4) the United States air and naval forces' continuing sup-
port for South Korea. President Rhee's letter came to a significant 
conclusion: 
Our first choice, if we are allowed to make it, is still to have 
our allies by our side to actively help us fight out our com-
mon issue. But, if that is no longer possible, we would rather 
wish to have the right of self-determination to decide the is-
sue ourselves conclusively one way or the other. Anyway, it 
is beyond question that we cannot any longer survive a stale-
mate of division. 
The United States continued to try to persuade South Korea, of-
fering a mutual defense treaty and economic aid. The United States 
also prepared a contingency plan to replace President Rhee if neces-
sary. This was the so-called "Plan Everready." This extreme step 
never, however, came to fruition. 76 
As the armistice negotiations approached their conclusion, con-
crete actions defined the South Korean attitude. As President Rhee 
74. Ibid., p. 1098. 
75. Ibid., pp. 1124-1126. 
76. Ibid., pp. 965, 1114-1119, 1122-1124, 1132, 1134, 1144, 1148, 1151. 
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mentioned in his letter to President Eisenhower, the South Korean 
Government insisted on proposing its own armistice terms. Further, 
the South Korean Government recalled its delegate to the armistice 
negotiations, the plenary sessions of which it had been boycotting 
since May 15, 1953, on June 7, 1953.77 Finally, President Rhee 
warned the United States that South Korea would fight on, even if it 
meant suicide. 78 
In spite of the stubborn opposition of South Korea to the armi-
stice terms, the United Nations Command and the Communist side 
signed an agreement on the terms of prisoners of war solution on June 
8, 1953.79 The United Nations Command was fully alert to possible 
problems that would have been created by South Korea. 80 
Then, at dawn on June 18, 1953, a surprising event occurred. 
More than 25,000 anti-communist Korean prisoners of war escaped 
from the prisoner of war camps located in South Korea. Undoubt-
edly, they escaped with the help of South Korean guards, who had 
received instructions from their government for the release of prison-
ers of war. This incident resulted in a temporary suspension of work 
on the final details of the armisticeY The United States Government 
and the United Nations Command immediately protested the action 
taken by the South Korean Government. President Eisenhower 
warned President Rhee that unless he accepted the authority of the 
United Nations Command, another arrangement would be neces-
sary.82 At the same time the United Nations Command informed the 
Communist side of this incident, blaming the South Korean Govern-
ment. The Command explained that in spite of its best efforts to re-
capture as many escapees as possible, there was little hope of success 
because they had already been sheltered by Korean civilians. 83 
Among the 35,000 non-repatriate anti-communist prisoners of war, 
only 8,600 remained after this mass escape.84 
After the incident, President Rhee made his position clear in a 
public statement on June 18, 1953. According to this Statement, the 
77. Ibid., p. 1148. 
78. Ibid., p. 1150. 
79. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (June 22, 1953), pp. 866-868. 
80. FR US, supra note 40, pt. 2, pp. 1152-1154. 
81. Higgins, supra note 41, p. 289; FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1196-1197; Mark W. 
Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954, pp. 279-282; 
Hermes, supra note 36, pp. 451-452. 
82. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (June 29, 1953), p. 907; Eisenhower, supra note 62, pp. 
185-186. 
83. U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 82, pp. 905-908; Higgins, supra note 38, p. 289. 
84. FRUS, supra note 80, p. 1233. 
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anti-communist Korean prisoners of war should have been released 
long before, in accordance with the Geneva Convention and human 
rights principles. Since international complications hampered the re-
lease of the prisoners despite the sympathy of most of the Untied Na-
tions authorities, President Rhee said he had ordered the release of the 
anti-communist Korean prisoners. 85 
In his letter dated June 18 to General Clark, President Rhee re-
peated his position and added that the South Korean Army would not 
draw back 2 kilometers from the front line in accordance with the 
armistice agreement. He also implied that South Korean forces might 
be withdrawn from the United Nations Command.86 
Facing such stubborn opposition from South Korea, and out-
raged by the South Korean attitude, the United States Government 
considered withdrawing all its troops from Korea. At the National 
Security Council Meeting on June 18, 1953, President Eisenhower 
suggested that if President Rhee continued in his course, he would 
inform him that the United States would withdraw its troops. 87 On 
the other hand, the United States Government hoped and was pre-
pared to encourage, if necessary, that South Korean forces would take 
action to replace the South Korean Government. 88 Before doing so, 
the United States Government tried every effort to persuade President 
Rhee to alter his position, proposing a mutual defense treaty, U.S. 
$300 million in economic aid and cooperation in achieving reunifica-
tion through a political conference following the conclusion of an ar-
mistice. The United States Government prepared a reconstruction 
plan for the destroyed South Korean economy which would support 
South Korean post-war security. This was the Tasca Report. This 
Report was submitted to President Eisenhower on June 15, 1953. It 
proposed more than $1 billion in aid to South Korea during the three 
years following the armistice. 89 
In order to persuade the South Korean Government to accept the 
armistice terms of the United Nations Command, the United States 
sent Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. 
Robertson to South Korea. He was accompanied by the Chief of Staff, 
General Collins, and several other high ranking officials. 90 He deliv-
85. Ibid., p. 1199. 
86. Ibid., pp. 1197-1198. 
87. Ibid., pp. 1200-1202. 
88. Ibid., pp. 1270-1272, 1287. 
89. Ibid., pp. 1245-1265. 
90. Clark, supra note 81, p. 285; FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1265-1269. 
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ered the Aide-Memoire to President Rhee on June 27, 1953, explain-
ing the United States position: 
1. The South Korean Government will direct its 
armed forces to carry out the orders of the United Nations 
Command in maintaining the security of the remaining Ko-
rean non-repatriate prisoners of war who are now in the cus-
tody of the United Nations Command. The South Korean 
Government will cooperate with the United Nations Com-
mand in moving those prisoners of war to the NNRC (Neu-
tral Nations Repatriation Commission) in accordance with 
agreed terms of reference. 
2. The United States Government cannot impose any 
time limit upon any other governments which may partici-
pate in the political conference following the armistice, but if 
at the end of 90 days after the opening of the political confer-
ence it becomes clear that the conference is not making pro-
gress and is being exploited by the Communists to infiltrate 
and propagandize or otherwise embarrass South Korea, the 
United States Government would be prepared to act in con-
cert with South Korea, retiring jointly with South Korea 
from the political conference. 
3. After signing the armistice agreement, the United 
States Government would be willing to have a high-level 
conference with President Rhee to confer on all aspects of 
common objectives at the political conference to follow 
within 90 days after the effective date of the armistice. 
4. The United States Government is prepared to pro-
vide economic and military assistance to South Korea. 
5. The United States Government is prepared immedi-
ately to begin negotiations with South Korea looking to-
wards conclusion of a mutual defense treaty. 
6. The above assurances from the Government of the 
United States are dependent upon agreement of the South 
Korean Government: 
a. to accept the authority of the United Nations Com-
mand to conduct and conclude the hostilities; 
b. to support the armistice entered into between the 
Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command 
and the commanders of the Communist forces; 
c. South Korean forces will remain under the opera-
tional control of the Commander-in-Chief of the United 
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Nations Command until Governments of the United 
States and South Korea mutually agree that such ar-
rangements are no longer necessary.91 
President Rhee was not, however, ready to give up easily his de-
termination to have a unified Korea under his terms, even if he was 
less insistent. He agreed not to obstruct the armistice, provided the 
United States pledged to support South Korea, if fighting resumed due 
to a failure of the political conference, until Korean unification would 
be achieved.92 However, with the patient persuasion of Special Envoy 
Robertson, President Rhee conceded most of his positions. Thus, the 
United States proposed a draft-treaty of mutual defense in accordance 
with the request of the South Korean Government.93 They agreed to 
move all the anti-communist prisoners of war from their location to 
the demilitarized zone, where they would then be turned over to the 
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in order to eliminate the 
need of bringing Indian armed forces into South Korea since South 
Korea had opposed the presence of Indian soldiers on South Korean 
territory.94 Finally, President Rhee formally agreed not to obstruct 
the armistice. 95 
President Rhee and Special Envoy Robertson issued a joint public 
statement on June 11, 1953: 
During the past two weeks we have had many frank and cor-
dial exchanges of views which have emphasized the deep 
friendship existing between the Republic of Korea and the 
United States and have gone far toward achieving mutual 
understanding of the troubled questions which have arisen in 
connection with arrangements for an armistice, the exchange 
of prisoners, and the forthcoming political conference. 
These discussions have cemented our determination to con-
tinue and extend in the post-armistice period the close col-
laboration for our common objectives, . . . . 96 
This joint statement clearly expressed the South Korean Govern-
ment's agreement to the conclusion of the armistice, a very important 
fact in terms of international law. This internal agreement between 
91. Ibid., pp. 1279-1280. 
92. Ibid., pp. 1292-1295. 
93. "U.S. Draft of Mutual Defense Treaty," FR US, supra note 80, pp. 1339-1340; "Re-
public of Korea Draft," supra note 80, pp. 1359-1361. 
94. FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1351-1354. 
95. Ibid., p. 1362. 
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the members of one group of belligerents (the coalition army) justifies 
the representative authority of the commander of the coalition army 
for the conclusion of an armistice. As a result, if the commander signs 
an armistice agreement, all the members of the coalition army become 
parties to the armistice agreement. This will be further explained in 
Section 3. President Rhee also expressed his agreement not to ob-
struct the armistice in his letter to President Eisenhower on June 11, 
1953: " .... As you know, I have decided not to obstruct, in any 
manner, the implementation of the terms (of the armistice), in defer-
ence to your requests . . . " 97 
This agreement satisfied both the United Nations Command and 
the Communists. The latter had required the assurance that the South 
Korean Government would abide by all the provisions of the armistice 
for the entire period when the armistice would be effective.98 The 
United Nations Command assured the Communist side that the 
United Nations Command, including South Korean forces, would 
carry out the terms of armistice. The United Nations Command em-
phasized that such assurances had been received from the South Ko-
rean Government. 99 
At 10:12 a.m., Seoul Time, on June 27, 1953, Generals Harrison 
and Nam II signed, ad referendum, the armistice documents at 
Panmunjom. The commanders of both sides formally signed the armi-
stice agreement at their respective headquarters. At the United Na-
tions Command's headquarters in Munsan-Ri, the Commander-in-
Chief of the United Nations Command, General Clark, in the presence 
of a representative of South Korea, signed the armistice agreement on 
the same day, under the flags of the United Nations, the United States, 
and South Korea. The fighting stopped on the same day, 100 and the 
Korean Armistice Agreement entered into force. 101 
Section B. The Political Conference In Accordance With Article 4 
Of The Korean Armistice Agreement 
1. Negotiations at Panmunjom 
After the conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the 
two sides attempted to convene a political conference for the solution 
97. FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1368-1369. 
98. Ibid., pp. 1365, 1368, 1380. 
99. Ibid., p. 1382. 
100. Hermes, supra note 36, pp. 489-491. 
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132-140; see also Appendix I. 
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of the Korean division, pursuant to Article 4 of the Armistice Agree-
ment. Article 4, paragraph 60 provides: 
Within three months after the Armistice Agreement is 
signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a 
higher level of both sides be held by representatives ap-
pointed respectively to settle through negotiation the ques-
tions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the 
peaceful settlement of the Korean question . . . 
First, the seventh session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly reconvened to discuss a political conference concerning the Ko-
rean question. Several proposals were submitted for this. The 
member states contributing armed forces in Korea proposed a joint 
draft-resolution providing that they should participate, with the Re-
public of Korea, in the political conference. The Soviet Union submit-
ted a draft-resolution recommending that several Arab-Asian 
countries and Soviet bloc countries should be included in the political 
conference. Australia and New Zealand proposed a joint draft-resolu-
tion recommending that the Soviet Union should participate in the 
political conference if the other side desired it. Australia, New Zea-
land, Canada and the United Kingdom also submitted a joint draft-
resolution recommending that India should participate in the political 
conference. 102 However, the United States maintained that the Ko-
rean Political Conference should represent the two belligerent sides as 
delineated by Paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement, and 
that it should not be a round-table conference involving participation 
of neutral nations. The South Korean Government strongly opposed 
India's participation in this conference. 103 
The United Nations General Assembly finally adopted a resolu-
tion on August 28, 1953, that was in line with the joint proposal of the 
member states contributing armed forces to the United Nations Com-
mand, in addition to the Soviet Union's participation. According to 
this Resolution, the member states contributing armed forces under 
the Unified Command in Korea would participate in the conference, 
together with the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The participating 
governments were to act independently at the conference with full 
freedom of action. The United States Government, after consultation 
with the other participating countries, was to arrange with the Com-
munist side for the political conference to be held not later than Octo-
ber 28, 1953 at a place and on a date satisfactory to both sides. 
102. FRUS, supra note 80, p. 1498; Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 203. 
103. FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1492, 1497·1501. 
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Finally, the Secretary General of the United Nations was, if agreeable 
to both sides, to provide the political conference with such services 
and facilities as deemed necessary. The Soviet Union could participate 
in the conference provided the other side desired it. 104 
The Secretary General of the United Nations informed the Com-
munist side of the United Nations Resolution on August 28, but the 
Communist side insisted on a round-table conference with the partici-
pation of so-called neutral nations. The Communist side even consid-
ered the Soviet Union as a neutral nation. 105 
The United States Government appointed Arthur H. Dean as 
Deputy to the Secretary of State in preparation for the political confer-
ence on September 15, 1953. He arrived in Seoul on October 24, 1953 
for preliminary negotiations with the Communist side concerning the 
preparation of the political conference. At the same time, he was to 
persuade President Rhee not to proceed with unilateral actions in con-
travention of the Korean Armistice Agreement. 106 President Rhee, in 
fact, distrusted the idea of political conference with the Communists. 
He believed the only one way to achieve a free independent and unified 
Korea was by force. 107 
The United Nations Command's Representative Dean began the 
negotiations with North Korean Ki Sok-Pok and Chinese Huang Hua 
on October 26 at Panmunjom. 108 However, the Communist side pro-
posed what was perceived as an unacceptable table agenda, insisting 
on the round-table conference with the participation of so-called neu-
tral nations. Meanwhile the United Nations Command made several 
proposals aimed at by passing the problem of agenda in order to get on 
with more substantive discussions. 109 Considering the long-term diffi-
culties in the armistice negotiations under the heavy pressure of con-
tinued casualties, it was beyond question that the Communist side 
would not easily concede their position in the political conference. 
The preliminary talks at Panmunjom dragged on until middle of De-
cember without any solution to the basic differences between the two 
sides over the conference participants. The Communist side de-
manded that the Soviet Union be designated as a neutral nation. 
South Korea firmly opposed India's participation in the conference. 
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Thus the basic differences on the role of neutral nations hampered the 
opening of the conference. Under such conditions, the United Nations 
Command proposed on December 8, 1953 a package proposal main-
taining a bilateral conference (with participation of the Soviet Union 
as a voting member on the Communist side) and involving limited par-
ticipation of neutral nations. But the Communist side rejected this. 
Thus, the negotiations were completely severed without solution on 
December 12, 1953. The final meeting devolved to an exchange of 
rude charges. 110 
After this, only the liaison meetings continued for one month 
without any positive result. And even these meetings became dead-
locked after the release of the 22,000 anti-communist prisoners of war 
following the expiration of the detention term of the Neutral Nations 
Repatriation Commission (NNRC). The Communists, having lost 
face, intensified their insults and groundless charges against the United 
Nations Command. This resulted in the ultimate deadlock of the 
meeting. 111 
2. The Geneva Political Conference 
At this juncture, the third quadripartite meeting of foreign minis-
ters (France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United 
States) convened in Berlin from January 15 to February 18, 1954. On 
January 27, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov stated that the failure of 
the discussions at Panmunjom was due to the fact that the decision to 
hold the conference was made in spite of objections put forth by the 
Soviet Union and without participation of Communist China and 
North Korea. This implied that the Communist side had decided to 
avoid further discussion at Panmunjom. 112 
On February 18, 1954, the Four Foreign Ministers Meeting in 
Berlin proposed the Geneva Conference on the Korean question to 
work toward the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and 
independent Korea, reducing international tension, and restoring 
peace in other parts of Asia. Representatives of the United States, 
France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Demo-
cratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), and other contribut-
ing countries who desired to attend were to meet in Geneva on April 
26 for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean 
110. Ibid., p. 1656; U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (December 21, 1953), pp. 877-878. 
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question. 113 
There was no provision for neutral nations' participation in this 
conference. Therefore, this proposal was more preferable to the 
United States and South Korea than that proposed by the United Na-
tions on August 28, 1953. Discussion on the restoration of peace in 
Indochina was also included on the agenda. 
South Korea's attitude toward the Geneva Conference was pessi-
mistic from the first. At a press conference, President Rhee stated that 
South Korea would give the United States and the United Nations a 
chance at attaining a peaceful solution of the Korean question, but 
that the Communists would never yield anything in negotiations. He 
also emphasized that force would be the only instrument that the 
Communists would understand. 114 
The United States Government, in consultation with South Korea 
and other Allied Nations, prepared the basic position paper for the 
Geneva Conference. This position paper analyzed the expected posi-
tions of the participant countries and presented the U.S. position. 
This paper also offered three specific plans for Korean unification. 115 
According to the position paper, the general purpose of the 
United States at the Geneva Conference was to seek an agreement to a 
plan for the reunification of Korea which would establish a non-Com-
munist, independent and representative government constituted by in-
dependently supervised elections, and which would provide for the 
orderly, phased withdrawal of foreign troops. For this purpose, the 
United States established general principles concerning the negotia-
tions at the conference: 
1. Maintain a position of strength and stability in free Ko-
rea which will lessen South Korean fear of abandon-
ment, and avoid actions which may weaken South 
Korean public morale; 
2. Affirm that South Korea is the only sovereign, lawful 
government in Korea, and that it must not be equated 
with the North Korean regime; 
3. Seek the unification within the constitutional framework 
of the South Korean State, and in keeping with the spirit 
and purposes of past United Nations resolutions; 
113. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (March 1, 1954), pp. 317-318. 
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4. Maintain a united front at the Conference among the Al-
lies, the United States and South Korea; 
5. Maintain some tactical flexibility, while developing a full 
and common understanding of the basic principles re-
garding unification and withdrawal of foreign troops. 
6. Acknowledge that the United States should assume lead-
ership on the Allied side in close partnership, if possible, 
with South Korea, in view of the heavy sacrifices and 
commitments made by both the United States and South 
Korea to repel Communist aggression in Korea; 
7. Determine whether the Communists will (a) insist on 
controlling parts of or all of Korea, or (b) renounce any 
special position in Korea and agree to set up a unified 
Korea for free Koreans. If the former is the case, recog-
nize that no formula can succeed, and unmask Commu-
nist aggressive intentions. 
According to the position paper, the expected positions of South 
Korea were to: (1) oppose any unification plan violating South Ko-
rean sovereignty and any proposals for a neutralized Korea or a coali-
tion government placing the North Korean regime on an equal basis 
with the Republic of Korea; (2) propose the withdrawal of all Chinese 
forces from Korea, the extension of South Korean sovereignty over 
North Korea, and elections held by South Korea in North Korea to 
fill the seats in the South Korean National Assembly available for rep-
resentatives from the North; and (3) argue against simultaneous elec-
tions in South and North Korea, but possibly acquiesce in such 
elections provided that South Korean sovereignty was preserved. 
Meanwhile the position paper expected that other Allied Nations 
would want a fresh start in Korea to form a new government and 
consequently oppose the incorporation of North Korea into South Ko-
rea without some new constitutional act. 
The position paper also analyzed the expected positions of the 
Communist side, which were to: (1) do their utmost to broaden dis-
cussion on deceptive lines, such as a general Far East security pact; (2) 
oppose any plans that would weaken their control in North Korea; 
and (3) propose (a) a withdrawal of all armed foreign troops in Korea 
so that the "Korean themselves" may bring about their own unifica-
tion, (b) elaborate measures for the establishment of a provisional gov-
ernment over all Korea designed to give the Communists 
predominance in Korea, (c) national elections to take place at some 
indefinite time after the establishment of this provisional government 
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and to be carried out "by the Koreans themselves" without any inter-
national supervision. 
In the light of the situation, the United States proposed to: (1) 
adopt a South Korean constitutional structure and preserve South Ko-
rean sovereignty; and (2) keep with the main points of past United 
Nations resolutions concerning Korean unification - that is, elections 
should be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot and 
the number of representatives should be proportionate to population. 
Such elections should be observed by an international commission 
with freedom to administrate throughout Korea. 
Within the framework of its basic stance, the United States pre-
pared three possible plans for the Korean unification. Plan A was the 
simple incorporation of North Korea into the existing constitutional 
framework of South Korea. For this purpose, Plan A included free 
elections to be held only in North Korea to complete processes carried 
out under the United Nations supervision in 1948 in the area south of 
the 38th Parallel. According to this plan, North Korea was to super-
vise elections under the United Nations Commission for the Unifica-
tion and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), in a manner similar to 
the supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission of 1948 
in South Korea, with regard to conforming North Korean electoral 
conditions to the principles of the General Assembly resolutions of 
1947 and 1950-53 concerning the Korean unification. The United 
States commented that Plan A would meet the requirement for pre-
serving the South Korean constitutional system. Therefore, South 
Korea would endorse it, while the Communists would reject it. Other 
Allied Nations would only reluctantly support this Plan because it 
called for elections in North Korea only. 
Plan B was a modification of Plan A. Under Plan B, free elec-
tions would be held throughout Korea under the South Korean Con-
stitution. UNCURK was responsible for supervising the elections. 
The National Assembly-elect would consider an amendment of the 
South Korean Constitution to provide a form of constitutional govern-
ment satisfactory to all Korean people. The United States commented 
that Plan B was more likely to obtain the approval of both South 
Korea and other Allied Nations. Plan B also reflected the spirit and 
the provision of the General Assembly resolutions concerning the Ko-
rean unification, but the Communists were expected to oppose it. 
Plan C was to hold all Korean elections for the constituent assem-
bly and to form new national government. For this purpose, a new 
commission to supervise elections should be formed and this commis-
sion should establish the conditions for free elections throughout Ko-
PEACE AND UNIFICATION IN KOREA AND INT'L LAW 31 
rea. In addition, international assurances on the territorial integrity 
and political independence of a reunified Korea were to be given. The 
United States commented that Plan C would obtain a favorable reac-
tion of other Allied nations, while South Korea would strongly oppose 
it. The Communists probably would not accept this Plan unless they 
considered it necessary as a precedent for Indo-China. 
The United States planned that at first Plan A would be proposed 
through South Korea, and that after a deadlock they would introduce 
Plan B with full Allied backing. According to the position paper, the 
United States would keep Plan C in reserve possibly for consideration 
if the Communists showed signs of desiring seriously to negotiate the 
peaceful settlement of the Korean question that would provide for the 
independent and unification of a free Korea. 
After some difficult negotiations between the United States and 
South Korea, the Geneva Conference was held on April 26, 1954 ac-
cording to the schedule agreed upon by the Berlin Communique. 
Since President Rhee was pessimistic about the Conference with the 
Communists, he was very reluctant to participate in the Conference. 
The Conference reached an impasse from the first due to the dif-
ferences between the two sides. South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun 
Yung-Tai made an opening statement on April 27, 1954. He empha-
sized that opening North Korea to free elections under the supervision 
of the United Nations would be the only way to complete the United 
Nations task in a manner compatible with the United Nations resolu-
tions.116 His statement was, on the whole, in accordance with the 
above mentioned Plan A. 
North Korean Foreign Minister Nam 11 made a counter proposal 
on the same day. After attacking the United Nations collective action, 
the United States and South Korea, he proposed: (1) the withdrawal 
of all foreign troops within six months, and (2) all Korean elections 
prepared by an all-Korea Commission, the members of which were to 
be selected by each of the National Assemblies of South and North 
Korea, respectively. According to this proposal, this all-Korea Com-
mission would facilitate contact between South and North Korea. 117 
On April 28, the United States Secretary of State Dulles sup-
ported the South Korean position, explaining that in accordance with 
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of October 7, 1950, 
free elections should be held under the supervision in North Korea 
116. U.S. Dept. of State, The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference Apri/16-June 
15, 1954, Washington: GPO, 1954, pp. 34-39. 
117. Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
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where this kind of elections had not yet been held. 118 
The Communist China's Foreign Minister Chou En-lai repeated 
the North Korean proposal, attacking the United Nations, the United 
States and South Korea. 119 The Soviet Union's statement on April 29 
followed the same line as the North Korean statement, focusing on the 
withdrawal of foreign troops. 120 In sum, the Communist side stressed 
the withdrawal of foreign forces, and rejected the authority of the 
United Nations on the grounds that the United Nations was a belliger-
ent party in the Korean war, and that Communist China and North 
Korea were excluded from the United Nations. 121 
Since the Communist side rejected Plan A, the United States pre-
pared a new proposal along the lines of Plan B. The South Korean 
Government strongly opposed Plan B, however, threatening the with-
drawal of its delegation from the Conference. 122 After protracted ne-
gotiations among the Allied Nations, South Korea accepted free 
elections throughout all of South and North Korea but also continued 
to insist on the withdrawal of Chinese forces before these elections. In 
spite of some complaints from some Allied Nations, particularly the 
Commonwealth countries, South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun 
Yung-Tai issued a fourteen-point proposal, somewhat along the line 
Plan B, on May 22, 1954. 123 
ll8. Ibid., pp. 45-53. 
ll9. FRUS, supra note 114, p. 159; British White Paper: Documents Relating to the 
Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference (April 26-June 15, 1954), 
No. 9186, London, 1954, pp. 14-20. 
120. FRUS, supra note 114, p. 159. 
121. Ibid., pp. 176-177. 
122. Ibid., pp. 205-207, 213-217, 226-228, 319-321. 
123. The contents are summarized as follows: 
1. With view to establishing united, independent and democratic Korea, 
free elections shall be carried out under the United Nations supervision in accord-
ance with the previous United Nations resolutions concerning Korean unification; 
2. Free elections shall be held in North Korea and in South Korea in ac-
cordance with the constitutional processes of South Korea; 
3. Elections shall be held within six months from adoption of this proposal; 
4. Local authorities shall aid United Nations personnel connected with 
election supervision in facilitating free elections; 
5. The rights of candidates shall be recognized and protected; 
6. Elections shall be based on the principle of universal adult suffrage and 
conducted by secret ballot; 
7. Representation in a unified Korean legislature shall be directly propor-
tionate to the population patterns of the entire Korean peninsula; 
8. A census shall be taken under U.N. supervision to determine proportion-
ate representation; 
9. The legislature shall convene in Seoul immediately following elections; 
10. The following questions shall be addressed by the new legislature: 
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In sum, the main contents of the South Korean proposal was the 
annexation of North Korea by South Korea, on the one hand, and fear 
and distrust of the North Korean regime on the other hand. The dis-
trust was understandable and partially justified by the past behavior of 
North Korea. From a practical viewpoint, however, if there was any 
chance of success for negotiations leading to the peaceful unification of 
Korea, the South Korean leaders might have been more flexible and 
confident, even though there was little chance of success in negotia-
tions with the Communists at that time. Further, blame for the failure 
of these negotiations should not be borne by the South Korean leaders 
since an analysis of the negotiations before and after the Korean War 
has pointed to the Communists as the frustrating side. However, con-
sidering the fact that the losing chance might have irrevocably dam-
aged the Korean people as a whole, it might be better if the Korean 
leaders had not exhausted all their efforts in search of some positive 
result. 
The Communist side rejected the South Korean proposal and 
continued to insist on their position concerning the withdrawal of for-
eign troops, and the denial of authority of the United Nations and its 
supervision for free elections 124 As a result, the Geneva Conference 
remained deadlocked. Thus, the Allied Nations were convinced that a 
solution was not forthcoming and thus resolved to terminate the con-
ference. 125 It seemed that the Communist side also did not foresee an 
agreeable solution stemming from the conference. The Soviet Union's 
delegate, Molotov, privately expressed such an opinion to the United 
States Delegate Smith, stating that political settlement in Korea would 
come about possibly as a result of some years of living together, and 
that a period of living together and some form of commercial or other 
contact over an extended period might reduce the bitterness and per-
mit some political solution. 126 
(a)the election of a new president for a unified Korea, (b) the amendment of the 
existing South Korean constitution, and (c) disarmament; 
11. The existing constitution of South Korea shall remain effective until it 
is amended by the new legislature; 
12. Chinese troops shall completely withdraw from North Korea one 
month prior to the election date; 
13. Withdrawal of the United Nations forces from South Korea may begin 
before elections but must not be completed until Korea is unified; 
14. The integrity and independence of a unified, independent and demo-
cratic Korea shall be guaranteed by the United Nations. 
See ibid., at pp. 278-79, 313. 
124. Ibid., pp. 348-349. 
125. Ibid., pp. 314-315. 
126. Ibid., pp. 315-316. 
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However, the Communist side continued to put forth unaccept-
able proposals, probably for the purpose of internal propaganda. They 
pretended to outline a rational way for the conference to reach an 
agreement. For example, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov outlined 
some principles on which he said an agreement could be reached. He 
submitted a draft-resolution along the lines of these principles on June 
5, 1954. 127 
The United States' delegate, Smith, criticized the North Korean 
proposal supporting an all-Korean Commission to prepare for elec-
tions in Korea. He pointed out that North Korea would have equal 
representation on such a commission, despite the great disparity in the 
size of populations between South and North Korea (estimated to be 
22-24 million in South Korea and nine million in North Korea). 
North Korea, then, would have a built-in veto on any proposal for a 
genuine free election. He emphasized that genuine free elections in 
Korea could be held only under the supervision of the United Nations. 
He also criticized Chou En-lai's proposal for a Neutral Nations Super-
visory Commission to supervise elections in Korea. Smith cited the 
example of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission agreement 
over the Korean Armistice Agreement. Smith said that this Commis-
sion had been a dismal failure due to Communist trickery and intransi-
gence, denying Chou's claim that the Commission played a successful 
role in the Korean Armistice supervision. 128 
On the other hand, North Korean Foreign Minister Nam 11 said 
the Geneva Conference should reach some agreement leading to peace 
in Korea. He charged South Korea with continuing to threaten re-
sumption of hostilities. Then, he proposed a six-point proposal on 
June 15. The major objective of this proposal was of propagandistic 
value and a lobby for the withdrawal of the United Nations forces 
from South Korea. 129 
127. The contents are summarized as follows: 
1) Free elections shall be held by secret ballot throughout Korea within six 
months of the conclusion of the present agreement. Representation in the new 
legislature will be proportionate to population of Korea as a whole; 
2) An all-Korean body shall be established to facilitate free elections; 
3) All foreign forces shall withdraw from Korea before the elections; 
4) An appropriate international commission shall be established to super-
vise the elections; 
5) The United Nations shall assume responsibility for ensuring the settle-
ment of the Korean unification question; 
See The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, supra note 116, at pp. 143-49. 
128. Ibid., pp. 149-153; UN Press Release No. 3309 (November 23, 1959); ROK Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, Documents on Korea- US Relations 1943-1971, Seoul 1971, p. 173. 
129. The main points of his proposal were: 
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The Soviet Union and the United States were at odds over this 
statement. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov supported the North Ko-
rean proposals and urged the participants to adopt the following decla-
ration: "The States participating in the Geneva Conference have 
agreed that, pending the final settlement of the Korean problem . . . 
no action shall be taken which might constitute a threat to the mainte-
nance of peace in Korea .... " 130 Delegate Smith, however, made a 
statement rejecting Molotov's proposal, with a reminder that an ex-
isting armistice agreement would be a formal definitive arrangement 
with more force than Molotov's declaration. 131 
The Geneva Political Conference ended in failure with the Sixteen 
Nations Declaration of June 15, 1954. Thailand's Delegate Prince 
Wan read the Declaration on behalf of sixteen nations. The Declara-
tion outlined two fundamental principles: (1) the United Nations, 
under its Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective 
action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend 
its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea; and (2) in 
order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genu-
inely free elections should be held under the United Nations supervi-
sion, for representatives in the National Assembly, in which 
representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous popula-
tion in Korea. 132 This Declaration concluded that the Allied Nations 
had earnestly and patiently searched for a solution of Korean unifica-
tion in accordance with these fundamental principles, but the Commu-
nists rejected the authority and competence of the United Nations in 
Korea and refused to accept impartial and effective supervision of free 
elections. 
On November 11, 1954, the Allied Nations submitted their report 
on the Geneva Conference on the Korean question to the ninth session 
1. To recommend the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops; 
2. To reduce within one year the strength of the troops of North and South 
Korea, establishing a limit for each side at 100,000 troops; 
3. To form a North-South commission to negotiate the cessation of hostili-
ties; 
4. To recognize military treaties involving any part of Korea and another 
state as incompatible with peaceful reunification; 
5. To form an all-Korea Committee to establish and develop economic cul-
tural relations between South and North Korea; 
6. To recognize the necessity of the United Nations to insure the peaceful 
development and unification of Korea. See FRUS, supra note 114, pp. 376-377. 
130. Ibid., pp. 377-378. 
131. Ibid., p. 379. 
132. The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, supra note 113, pp. 381, 385-387; 
U.S. Department of State Bulletin (June 28, 1954), pp. 973-974; Documents on Korea-US 
Relations, supra note 125, pp. 149-150. 
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of the United Nations General Assembly. This report reiterated the 
points made in the Sixteen Nation Declaration, but also added that the 
Geneva Conference should be regarded as the political conference re-
ferred to in Article 4 of the Korean Armistice Agreement and in the 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 711 (VII) of August 28, 
1953. Finally, the report made it clear that the failure of the Geneva 
Conference did not prejudice the armistice in Korea. 133 The armistice 
remained in effect in accordance with Article 62 of the Armistice 
Agreement, which provides that: 
The articles and paragraphs of this Armistice Agree-
ment shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either 
by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by 
provision in appropriate agreement for peaceful settlement at 
a political level between both sides. 
The United Nations General Assembly approved the report on 
the Geneva Conference concerning the Korean question by adopting 
Resolution 811 (IX) on December 11, 1954. 134 
Section C. Legal Problems Of The Korean Armistice Agreement 
1. Special Character of an Armistice Agreement in General 
a. Definition 
Under the traditional international law of war, an armistice 
agreement is usually defined as a bilateral agreement concluded be-
tween belligerents, which results in a provisional suspension of the 
conduct of an armed conflict. The term "armistice" originates from 
the Latin arma (arms) and interstitum (interval) and thus means liter-
ally the provisional suspension of armed hostilities. 135 The concrete 
rules of the law of war generally conform to this definition. For exam-
ple, Article 36 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention 
(IV) with respect to the Laws and the Customs of War on Land in 
1907, provides that "an armistice suspends military operations by mu-
tual agreement between the belligerent parties, and that if its duration 
is not defined, the belligerent parties may resume operations at any 
time, provided always that the enemy is warned within the time agreed 
133. U.N. Document A/2786 (December II, 1954). 
134. Ibid., FRUS, supra note 114, pp. 393-394; Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra note 
2, pp. 201-202. 
135. M. Sibert, "L'Armistice," Revue General du Droit International Public, 3eme Serle, 
tome VII, Paris: 1933, p. 657; S. Levie, "Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement," 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 50, No. 4 (October 1956), p. 881. 
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upon, in accordance with the terms of the armistice." Article 135 of 
the 1863 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field prepared by Francis Lieber contains a similar 
concept. 
Such an armistice may apply generally or locally. According to 
Article 37 of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention 
IV, "a general armistice suspends the military operations of the bellig-
erent parties everywhere, while a local armistice suspends the opera-
tions only between certain factions of the belligerent armies and within 
a fixed radius." 136 
To determine the legal nature of the Korean Armistice Agree-
ment, one must first clarify the concept of armistice, and distinguish it 
from similar concepts. First, an armistice is different from a suspen-
sion of arms. A suspension of arms is a military agreement the objec-
tive of which is concrete and unrelated to military operations or 
political purpose, and is only binding for a short duration. For exam-
ple, two belligerent parties may agree to a suspension of arms in order 
to bury the dead. 137 
An armistice is also distinguishable from a traditional peace pre-
liminary (preliminaires de paix). A peace preliminary is a military 
agreement which prepares the basis of future peace between two bellig-
erent parties without suspending the armed conflict. It is a mutual 
promise to conclude a peace treaty. 138 
According to traditional terminology, an armistice agreement 
also differs from a treaty of peace. A treaty of peace resolves the 
causes of war themselves, while an armistice agreement merely sus-
pends armed hostilities between the belligerent parties. An armistice 
agreement thus may or may not eventually result in the conclusion of 
a peace treaty. 139 
Confusion may also arise in the difference between an armistice 
agreement and a capitulation. Superficially speaking, a capitulation is 
very similar to an armistice. Yet where there is a capitulation, the 
winning party merely imposes its terms on the losing party, so there is 
no true agreement between the two sides. 140 Interestingly, recent 
136. A. Roberts and R. Gue1ff, Documents on the Laws of War, London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1982, p. 55. 
137. Dictionaire de Ia Terminologie du Droit International, Paris: Sirey, 1960, p. 59; 
Sibert, supra note 135, p. 657. 
138. Dictionaire de Ia Terminologie, supra note 137, p. 468. 
139. R. Monaco, "Les Conventions entre Belligerents," Recueil des Cours de l'Academie 
de Droit International de LaHaye, tome II, 1949, p. 323; Sibert, supra note 135, p. 664. 
140. Monaco, supra note 139, pp. 314-317. 
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treaty practices illustrate mixture of the two concepts, capitulation 
and armistice. For example, after World War I, Marshal Foch identi-
fied capitulation as an armistice. 141 
In conclusion, the traditional concept of armistice is just a mili-
tary agreement suspending armed hostilities without ending the war, 
while the war itself would be settled only by a peace treaty. This con-
cept and function has, however, developed and consequently changed, 
particularly after World War II. An armistice is no longer merely a 
suspension of war. Now, belligerent parties give up their will of armed 
activities through an armistice. Thus, an armistice results in a de facto 
end of a war. This intention of ending a war is expressed, for example, 
in the concept of a demilitarized zone. A demilitarized zone is estab-
lished in order to prevent recurring war between the opposing sides. 
In order to assure this result, a supervisory organ would be estab-
lished. The Korean Armistice Agreement is a model case of such an 
arrangement. 142 
There is another element that illustrates this change in the con-
cept of armistice. Belligerents rarely conclude peace treaty after the 
conclusion of an armistice agreement. While some cases presuppose 
the conclusion of a peace treaty after the armistice, the parties rarely 
conclude such treaties in reality. Perhaps the only one clear exception 
after World War II is the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt con-
cluded in 1979. 143 Thus, it can be said there is a general tendency not 
to conclude a peace treaty after an armistice, and an armistice results 
in a de facto end of the war, through a long duration without a recur-
rence of war. Under such circumstances, the initial causes of the war 
usually remain without remedy. This effect of an armistice agreement 
may be the result of mutual intentions to maintain the status quo due 
to the inability of either side to change the situation. Thus, the armi-
stice signifies the freeze of the status quo, which, after a long time, 
becomes a legal reality. 
b. Special Character 
An armistice agreement is a kind of treaty. It thus has the legal 
character of an international convention, and should fulfill most of the 
legal conditions as a treaty. An armistice agreement as a military 
agreement between two belligerent parties does, however, possess a 
141. Sibert, supra note 135, p. 664. 
142. Ibid., p. 665; Levie, supra note 135, p. 906; Lyou Byung-Hwa, Le Commandement 
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unique character. This special character stems from the special cir-
cumstances under which the armistice agreement was concluded and 
applied. 
First of all, an armistice agreement is a bilateral treaty between 
belligerents. There are some cases in which several belligerents may 
be involved, perhaps making the armistice resemble a multi-lateral 
treaty. However, even if more than two nations are engaged in a war, 
the armistice agreement is always a bilateral treaty. No matter how 
many nations may be involved, those nations are divided into two op-
posing parties, so that the two opposing parties form one consensual 
bilateral engagement. Therefore, an armistice agreement is a bilateral 
agreement between two belligerents or two groups of belligerents. 144 
One may point out certain particularities with regard to the con-
clusion of an armistice agreement. For example, the principal organ 
of negotiations for conclusion of an armistice agreement is usually the 
military commander. Sometimes, the foreign minister or diplomats, 
who are the ordinary negotiating organs for an international treaty, 
engage in the negotiations of an armistice agreement. However, due to 
the special circumstances of an armistice agreement, the participation 
of military commander is necessary. Since a military commander is 
responsible for the direction of military operation, he might be also 
responsible for the conclusion of an armistice agreement which termi-
nate such military operations. 145 This does not mean that the author-
ity for the conclusion of an armistice agreement rests with the military 
commander. It is a recognized rule of law that the head of state must 
delegate his treaty-making power to negotiate and conclude a military 
armistice agreement to his military commander in accordance with the 
provisions of municipal law. The conclusion of an armistice agree-
ment by a military commander without the authorization of the head 
of state or beyond the authorization delegated to him may give rise to 
complicated problems concerning the legal effects of such an armistice 
agreement. The legal problem of an unlawfully concluded armistice 
agreement is not sui generis to armistice agreement practice, but rather 
is a common problem associated with all kinds of treaties. The solu-
tion is provided in detail by the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969), particularly in Articles 46 and 47 which provide: 
Article 46, 1. A state may not invoke the fact that its con-
sent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation 
of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to 
144. Monaco, supra note 139, pp. 284-285, 327. 
145. Levie, supra note 135, p. 883; Monaco, supra note 139, pp. 326-327. 
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conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that viola-
tion was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of 
fundamental importance. 
2. A violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its 
internal law of fundamental importance. 
Article 47. If the authority of a representative to express 
the consent of a state to be bound by a particular treaty has 
been made subject to a specific restriction, his omission to 
observe that restriction may not be invoked as invalidating 
the consent expressed by him unless the restriction was noti-
fied to the other negotiating status prior to his expressing 
such consent. 
Another major difference between an ordinary treaty and an ar-
mistice agreement is that an armistice must be implemented as soon as 
possible after its conclusion due to the precarious and dangerous char-
acter of military hostilities. For the belligerents to continue military 
hostilities while waiting for the ratification of the armistice agreement 
would result in heavy casualties, and therefore alter substantially the 
war situation on which the conclusion of the armistice agreement was 
based. Therefore, an armistice agreement must be an agreement in 
simplified form by its nature. For the conclusion of an armistice 
agreement, ratification or acceptance or approval is not required. In 
other words, the signature of an armistice agreement means the au-
thentication of its agreement text and at the same time the expression 
of the consent to be bound by the agreement. There is no need for a 
separate step to express the consent to be bound by the treaty which is 
otherwise required in formal treaty. 146 As a matter of fact, the imple-
mentation procedure for an armistice agreement is simple. Usually 
within several hours after the signing of the armistice agreement or at 
the same time as the signing, according to the agreed terms, the armi-
stice agreement should enter into force, and resulting in the cessation 
of armed hostilities. 147 
There is no fixed rule concerning the duration of an armistice 
agreement. Duration depends upon the individual armistice agree-
ments. For example, the Armistice of Shimonoseki in 1895 provided a 
duration of twenty-one days, and the Armistice of Malmoe between 
Prussia and Denmark on August 26, 1848, provided for an armistice 
of seven months with automatic extension unless one month's advance 
146. The Vienna Convention, on The Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 12. 
147. Monaco, supra note 139, pp. 298-299. 
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notice was given by either party. 148 However, armistice agreements 
concluded since World War II, have for the most part provided for 
either an indefinite duration, or contain no provision at all on this 
point. For example, according to the General Armistice Agreement 
between Israel and Lebanon, the agreement shall remain in effect until 
a peaceful settlement between the two parties is achieved. 149 The Ko-
rean Armistice Agreement remains in effect until superceded by an 
appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level be-
tween the two parties. 150 
2. The Korean Armistice Agreement 
a. The Framework of the Korean Armistice Agreement 
The Korean Armistice Agreement consists of a Preamble, five ar-
ticles (63 paragraphs), and two annexes. The formal title of the Agree-
ment is "Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United 
Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of 
the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese Peo-
ple's Volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a Military Armistice 
in Korea." 
The preamble deals with the cessation of hostilities. In the Pre-
amble the Commanders of both sides express the clear intention to end 
the war completely: " .... (the Commander of both sides) ... in 
the interest of stopping the Korean Conflict . . . . and with the objec-
tive of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation 
of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peace-
ful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually 
agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and 
terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs 
" 
Article 1 provides for the Military Demarcation Line and the De-
militarized Zone. This demarcation line was determined on the basis 
of the actual contact line ofboth armed forces. The demilitarized zone 
was established on the basis of the demarcation line, with each side 
withdrawing its forces two kilometers north and south of the demarca-
tion line respectively. Both sides are prohibited from executing any 
hostile acts within, from or against the demilitarized zone. Further, 
no person, military or civil, may be permitted to enter the demilita-
rized zone except persons concerned with civil administration andre-
148. Levie, supra note 135, p. 892. 
149. Ibid., p. 892. 
150. See Appendix I of The Korean Armistice Agreement, Para. 62. 
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lief and persons specifically authorized by the Military Armistice 
Commission. 151 
Article 2 concerns the concrete arrangements for implementing 
the armistice. Both sides are bound to withdraw their military forces 
from the demilitarized zone and cease the introduction into Korea of 
reinforcement military forces and supplementary weapons. In order 
to supervise the implementation of armistice agreement terms, a Mili-
tary Armistice Commission was established. This Commission, head-
quartered at Penmunjom, was composed of ten senior officers, five of 
whom were to be appointed by the United Nations Command and the 
other five by the Communist side. This Commission was to be aided 
by the Joint Observer Teams. Furthermore, in order to assure fair 
supervision by the Military Armistice Commission over the implemen-
tation of the armistice provisions, a Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission was established. This Commission was composed of four 
senior officers of Neutral Nations, two of whom (Swiss and Swedish) 
were to be appointed by the United Nations Command and the other 
two (Polish and Czech) by the Communist side. 
Article 3 and its two Annexes concern arrangements bearing on 
prisoners of war and functions of the Neutral Nations Repatriation 
Commission. 
Article 4 concerns the political conference for the peaceful settle-
ment of the Korean question following the armistice agreement. This 
conference was to be held after the conclusion of the armistice 
agreement. 152 
Article 5 is the final clause providing for the agreement's entry 
into force, the amendment of, and other problems of the agreement 
itself. 
b. Particularities of the Korean Armistice Agreement 
The Korean Armistice Agreement has several particular charac-
teristics not found in other armistices. This is attributable to the fact 
that the Korean War began as a civil war and evolved into a more 
grand regional war. 
First, the legal parties to this armistice are unique in international 
practice. Take as evidence, for example, the title of the armistice: 
"Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Com-
mand, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean 
People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volun-
151. Ibid., Para. 6, 9. 
152. Ibid., Para. 60; see Chapter One, section A on this Conference. 
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teers, on the other hand, concerning a Military Armistice in Korea." 
The signatory of one side is the Commander-in-Chief of the United 
Nations Command and the signatory of the other side is the Com-
mander of the North Korean Army and the Commander of the Chi-
nese Communist forces. Considering the fact that an armistice 
agreement is a bilateral treaty by nature, the Korean Armistice Agree-
ment must be also a bilateral agreement between two groups of bel-
ligerents. The United Nations Command and South Korea compose 
one group of belligerents; North Korea and Communist China, the 
other. However, South Korea is hidden behind the United Nations 
Command, while a separate agreement between South Korea and the 
United Nations Command had to be reached through separate negoti-
ations between South Korea and the United States. Besides, since one 
signatory is the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Com-
mand, the United Nations is involved as a party to the Korean Armi-
stice Agreement. This is one of the important elements that the 
Communist side opposed, the United Nations supervision in all-Ko-
rean elections for Korean unification, at the Geneva Conference in 
1954. At this Conference the Communist side rejected the United Na-
tions as the supervisory agency on the grounds that the United Na-
tions was a belligerent in the Korean War. Instead, they insisted that 
a Neutral Nations Commission should be created for the supervision 
of the elections and that this Commission should be composed of rep-
resentatives from neutral nations. 153 
Second, the Korean Armistice Agreement put a de facto end to 
the Korean War without a concrete solution to remedy the causes of 
this war. That is, the Korean Armistice Agreement, as have many 
armistices since World War II, did not strike at the root of the war--
namely, the division of Korea. Although the demarcation line was 
somewhat different from the 38th Parallel, all the pre-war problems 
still remained and worsened, despite the heavy casualties and dam-
ages. The South Korean Government firmly opposed any armistice 
that failed to solve the Korean division. However, they eventually 
agreed to it, with a guarantee of South Korean security from the 
United States Government, i.e., the Mutual Defense Treaty and eco-
nomic and military assistance. 154 
Article 4 of the Korean Armistice Agreement recommends a high 
level political conference for the Korean unification and as a matter of 
fact this kind of conference was held in Geneva from April 26 to June 
153. FRUS, supra note 114, pp. 300, 350-353. 
154. FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1265-1445. 
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15, 1954. However, the conference failed to reach an agreement. As 
long as the basic circumstances surrounding the Korean question re-
mained unchanged, a drastic solution was not to be expected. 155 
In spite of the failure of the Geneva Conference, both sides made 
clear their intentions of ending the Korean War. North Korean For-
eign Minister Nam 11 offered a six-point proposal ensuring peaceful 
conditions in Korea. 156 The Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov submit-
ted a draft-declaration requesting that peace threatening action be re-
strained pending the final settlement of the Korean question. 157 The 
United States Delegate Smith reiterated that the existing Korean Ar-
mistice Agreement had the legal effect of ending the war. 158 Further-
more, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 811, December 
11, 1954, confirmed this opinion, emphasizing Paragraph 62 of the 
Korean Armistice, in "providing that the Armistice Agreement shall 
remain in effect until expressly superceded by mutually acceptable 
amendment or the appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement be-
tween both sides."159 
In sum, the failure of the Geneva Conference meant a divided 
Korea. Thus, while the Korean War itself was over, the Korean prob-
lem remained unsolved. 
As explained before, in traditional terminology, an armistice 
agreement is a military agreement between belligerent parties simply 
for the suspension of armed hostilities pending the conclusion of a 
peace treaty. However, armistice agreements have evolved to a point 
where they have the tendency to terminate the war itself without solv-
ing the cause of the war. The Korean Armistice Agreement exempli-
fies this modern character of armistice agreements. Both sides agreed 
to a complete cessation of hostilities. They also established a demilita-
rized zone along the demarcation line, and the Military Armistice 
Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. 160 
The Armistice also gave rise to favorable conditions enabling all 
parties in the war - except for North and South Korea - to resume 
diplomatic relations. That is, all nations, except South and North Ko-
rea, which participated in the Korean War, normalized diplomatic re-
lations in the post-war era. Even the United States later normalized 
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (Communist 
155. See section 2 of this volume. 
156. FRUS, supra note ll4, pp. 376-377. 
157. The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, supra note 116, pp. 176-182. 
158. Ibid., p. 182. 
159. Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra note 2, p. 201. 
160. See Korean Armistice Agreement, Article l. 
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China) on January 1, 1979. 161 Additionally, the same People's Repub-
lic of China which had been condemned as an aggressor in Korea be-
came a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. 162 
Some of the Allied Nations such as Australia, New Zealand, and Ethi-
opia normalized their diplomatic relations with North Korea. These 
material developments support the proposition that, for most members 
of the belligerents, the Korean War was formally over. Only relations 
between South and North Korea remained vague. Thus, again, while 
the Korean War came to an end, the cause of the war - the Korean 
division - remained unsolved. 163 
Even North-South Korean relations took on a new form. South 
and North Korea issued a Joint Communique on July 4, 1972 in an 
effort to improve relations. It stated that " .... the two sides, in an 
effort to remove the misunderstanding and mistrust and mitigate in-
creased tension . . . . as a result of long separation, and further to 
expedite unification of the fatherland, have reached full agreement on 
the following point . . . . unification shall be achieved through peace-
ful means, and not through the use of force against each other . . . . 
as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall first be sought, 
transcending differences in ideas, ideologies ... " 164 
In sum, the nature of the Korean Armistice, the state of post-war 
diplomatic relations, and the new nature of North-South Korean rela-
tions all reveal the inefficacy of the Korean Armistice in tackling the 
central issue in dispute - namely, Korean unification. 
3. Legal Parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement 
a. Superficial Parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement 
i. The Signature and the Conclusion of an Armistice 
Agreement 
Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines 
a party to a treaty as a State which has consented to be bound by the 
treaty and for which the treaty is in force. The Vienna Convention 
applies only to a treaty concluded between states; however, it does not 
deny other international legal subjects such as international organiza-
161. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin 79 No. 2022 (Jan. 1979). 
162. U.N.G.A. Res. 498(V) (February 1, 1951). 
163. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, pp. 63-64. 
164. National Unification Board of the ROK, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue 
in Korea, Seoul, 1980, p. 85-86; The Institute for East Asian Studies, Foreign Policy for 
Peace and Unification, Seoul, 1975, pp. 158-159. 
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tions to become parties to international treaties. 165 In fact, the Inter-
national Law Commission, which prepared the Vienna Convention, is 
drafting another convention on the law of treaties governing treaties to 
which international organizations are parties. There has been a surge 
of activity by international organizations participating in the conclu-
sion of treaties. Under such circumstances, the International Court of 
Justice clarified the legal personality of international organizations in 
its advisory opinion on the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Ser-
vice of the United Nations. The Court stated that international orga-
nizations are subjects of international law capable of possessing 
international rights and duties, including the conclusion of interna-
tional treaties and bringing international claims. 166 Thus, all subjects 
of international law are international legal persons, capable of partici-
pating in international treaties even though the nature and scope of the 
rights and capacity of each subject are different. This depends, how-
ever, upon the needs of the community and the development of the 
international society. 
Parties to an armistice agreement are belligerents, who are by ne-
cessity subjects of international law. They include states, international 
organizations and other international legal subjects. Since an armi-
stice agreement is a bilateral agreement in nature, the parties to an 
armistice agreement are two belligerents or two groups of belligerents. 
With regard to the Korean Armistice Agreement, the two opposing 
belligerents are the United Nations side and the Communist side. But 
several persons and organs of the United Nations also appear on each 
side. On the United Nations side, there are two signatures and several 
names of state and organization and organs (i.e., the signatures of 
Mark W. Clark and William K. Harrison, the United Nations Com-
mand, the United Nations and the United States). 
In order to determine party or parties (on the United Nations 
side) to the Korean Armistice Agreement, one must clarify the nature 
and the relation of the two signatures, and determine the composition 
and relation of members of the United Nations' side. 
According to the formalities on treaty conclusion, under the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 22, 1969, the conclu-
sion of a treaty has several steps: negotiation, adoption and 
authentication of the text (i.e., determining the treaty text as final, defi-
nite and authentic by the competent organ), 167 expression of consent 
165. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 3. 
166. International Court of Justice (ICJ) Report (1949), pp. 178-179. 
167. The Vienna Convention, supra note 165, Article 10. 
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to be bound by a treaty, and entry into force. An armistice agreement 
as a treaty should follow all these procedures. However, owing to 
practical considerations, we need not explain all such procedures. 
In concluding a formal treaty, authentication is done by signa-
ture, and expression of consent is achieved by ratification, acceptance, 
or approval. 168 Yet, since an armistice agreement is an agreement in 
simplified form, the signature of an armistice agreement carries the 
force of both the authentication of the text and the expression of the 
consent to be bound by the agreement. Thus, with regard to the Ko-
rean Armistice Agreement, mere signature will bind a party to the 
agreement. 
ii. The United Nations Side 
As far as the Korean Armistice Agreement is concerned, there 
are two signatures on the United Nations side- those of Mark W. 
Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command and 
William K. Harrison, Jr., Senior Delegate of the United Nations Com-
mand. Questions arise as to: (1) the relation between the two signa-
tures; and (2) which signature is the required signature under Article 
12, Paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties -
that is, the expression of the consent to be bound by the agreement. 
First, it is clear that Mark W. Clark possessed competent military au-
thority to conclude the Korean Armistice Agreement on behalf of the 
United Nations since he was the Commander-in-Chief of the United 
Nations Command. He was competent to conclude the armistice 
agreement under international law and in accordance with the instruc-
tions of the United Nations. In fact, the United Nations authorized 
such action under Security Council Resolution 84 in 1950.169 Con-
cretely, the Resolution authorized the United States Government to 
organize a unified command and to operate this unified command 
under the responsibility of the United States Government. The United 
States was required to provide the United Nations with reports on the 
course of action taken under the unified command. 170 The United 
States Government authorized General Clark to conclude the armi-
stice agreement. Furthermore, United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 610 (VII) enumerated detailed instructions to the United 
Nations Command concerning negotiations for the armistice agree-
168. Ibid., Article 14. 
169. U.N.S.C. Res. 84 (July 7, 1950), U.N. Doc. S/1588. 
170. U.N. Security Council Resolution 84, UN Doc. S/1588 (7 July 1950), Resolutions 
Relating to Korea, supra note 2, pp. 135-136. 
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ment. 171 Finally, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 711 
(VII), 28 August 1953, approved the terms of the Korean Armistice 
Agreement negotiated by the United Nations Command under the di-
rection of the United States Government. 172 In accordance with the 
authorization and instructions of the United Nations and the United 
States Government, General Clark concluded the armistice 
agreement. 
In light of this, one is led to inquire as to the effect of the signa-
ture of William Harrison, the Senior Delegate of the United Nations 
Command for the negotiations on the armistice agreement. As ex-
plained before, 173 at 10:12 a.m. (Seoul time) on July 27, 1953, Repre-
sentatives Harrison and Nam 11 signed the text of the Korean 
Armistice Agreement at Panmunjom, and at 13:00 on the same day, 
General Clark signed the text at Munsan-Ri, along with his military 
advisers and a South Korean Representative. General Clark delegated 
his subordinate, Senior Delegate Harrison, to sign the text. The armi-
stice agreement without the signature of General Clark would not 
have been binding since he was the competent military organ to con-
clude the armistice agreement. 
According to Article 12, Paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, the consent to be bound by a treaty in an 
agreement in simplified form can be expressed not only by a signature, 
but also by a initial or a signature ad referendum, if it is confirmed by 
the competent authority afterward. The legal effect of such a signa-
ture becomes effective from the time of the signature ad referendum, 
and not from the time of signature of the competent organ who con-
firms it. Of course, unless the competent organ confirms it, there is no 
legal effect. Harrison's signature is the signature ad referendum, and 
General Clark's is the formal signature, the agreement became binding 
from the time of the signature ad referendum of Senior Delegate Har-
rison, provided that General Clark confirmed it, which he did. 
After having determined when the Armistice came into effect, the 
more difficult question of the proper party to the Agreement arises. 
The discussion below will demonstrate that the United Nations alone, 
as a legal entity, is the proper party to the Armistice. As explained 
above, only legal subjects of international law with international legal 
personality may be a legal party to an international agreement. 174 For 
171. U.N.G.A. Res. 610(VII), UN Doc. A/2228 (December 3, 1952). 
172. U.N.G.A. Res. 711 (VII) (August 28, 1953); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra 
note 2, pp. 175-177. 
173. See the last part of Section I of this volume. 
174. UN Security Council Res. 84, UN Doc. S/1588 (July 7, 1950). 
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this reason, one may dismiss the Security Council, General Assembly, 
the United Nations Command and General Clark as legal parties to 
the Armistice. First, General Clark was the commander-in-chief of 
the U.N. Command. He merely represented the United Nations and 
did not possess the attributes amounting to international legal person-
ality. Second, the U.N. Command was the military command created 
by the Security Council. 175 The Security Council operated the Com-
mand except when deadlocked by Soviet vetoes, 176 at which time the 
General Assembly assumed supervisory power. The United Nations 
Command was therefore a mere subsidiary organ of the United Na-
tions (Article 29 of the UN Charter) and could not have been a proper 
party to the Armistice. Last, since the Security Council and the Gen-
eral Assembly are merely principal organs of an international organi-
zation - the United Nations - and should conduct international 
legal act in the name of the United Nations, not themselves. Thus, no 
matter how important they may be on the international plane, they 
cannot be subjects of international law. The relation between an or-
ganization and its organs would be analogous to the relation between a 
state and its domestic agencies. 177 Therefore, only the United Nations 
possesses sufficient legal personality to be the superficial party to the 
Korean Armistice Agreement. 178 
iii. The Communist Side 
There are three signatures for the Communist side on the Korean 
Armistice Agreement. They are the signatures of Kim 11-Sung, 
Supreme Commander of the North Korean Army, Peng Teh-huai, the 
Commander of "Chinese People's Volunteers" and Nam 11, Senior 
Delegate for armistice negotiations. The signature of Nam 11 is 
equivalent to the signature of the Senior Delegate Harrison of the 
United Nations Command. In accordance with the principles outlined 
above, it is thus signature ad referendum for the Communist side. 
Nam 11's signature must, however, have been confirmed by the signa-
ture of the competent authority on the Communist side, in order to be 
binding. 
A confusing issue arises with regard to the binding effect of the 
signatures of Kim 11 Sung and Peng Teh-huai. Were this agreement a 
175. U.N.G.A. Res. 376(V) (October 7, 1950); U.N.G.A. Res. "Uniting for Peace Reso-
lution," 377(V) (November 3, 1950); U.N.G.A. Res. 498(V) (February 1, 1951). 
176. ICJ Report. supra note 166, p. 178. 
177. Badie Kasme, La Capacite de /'Organisation des Nations Unies de Conc/ure de 
Traites, Paris: L.G.D.J., 1960, p. 175. 
178. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra, note 1, pp. 68-69. 
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multilateral treaty, the issue would be elementary. The question stems 
from the fact that the Korean Armistice Agreement is an armistice 
agreement and therefore a bilateral agreement by nature but is signed 
by two authorities for one party. Since there is no indication of which 
signature represents the competent authority, it is necessary to expand 
on the juridical status of the parties involved. 
The first issue pertains to the Commander of Chinese People's 
Volunteers. Namely, was Peng Teh-huai commanding some Chinese 
who volunteered individually to fight against the United Nations 
Command or the regular army of Communist China. There is suffi-
cient evidence to prove that real Chinese forces and not volunteers, 
were involved. A communique issued on November 6, 1950 by the 
Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Commander, General 
MacArthur, regarding the Chinese intervention in Korea, well ex-
plained the situation: 
The Korean War was brought to a practical end with the 
closing of the trap on enemy elements north of Pyongyang 
and seizure of the east coastal area, resulting in raising the 
number of enemy prisoners of war in our hands to well over 
135,000, which, with other losses amounting to over 200,000, 
brought casualties to 335,000, representing a fair estimate of 
North Korean total military strength. . . . In the face of 
this victory of UN Army, the Communists committed one of 
the most offensive acts of international lawlessness . . . by 
moving without any notice of belligerency. . . . alien Com-
munists forces across the Y alu River into North Korea and 
massing a great concentration of possible reinforcing divi-
sions with adequate supply behind the privileged sanctuary 
of the adjacent Manchuria border ... 179 
Another communique issued on November 28, 1950 by General Mac-
Arthur further clarifies: "Enemy reactions developed in the course of 
our assault operations of the past four days disclose that a major seg-
ment of the Chinese continental armed forces in army, corps and divi-
sional organization of an aggregate strength of over 200,000 men is 
now arrayed against the United Nations forces in North Korea 
,,go 
According to the report from the United Nations Command to 
179. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (November 13, 1950), p. 763. 
180. "Military Situation in the Far East," Hearings before the Committee on Armed 
Services and the Committee on the Foreign Relations, Part 5, 82nd Congress 1st Session 
(August 17, 1951), p. 3495. 
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the Security Council during the period November 24 to December 1, 
1950, the Chinese Communist forces took over direct responsibility for 
the entire front in North Korea, except for short line of contact north 
of Chongjin on the east coast. The Chinese transferred most of the 
North Korean forces to Manchuria for retraining and re-equipping. 
"At present, the only significant military power now confronting UN 
forces in Korea is Communist China." Identified and confirmed Chi-
nese Communist units were as follows: 38th Army (112, 113, 114th 
divisions), 39th Army (115, 116, 117th divisions), 40th Army (118, 
119, 120th divisions), 42nd Army (124, 125, 126th divisions), 50th 
Army (148, 149, 150th divisions), 60th Army (196, 197, 198th divi-
sions), 20th Army (59, 60, 89th divisions). 181 
Before massive intervention by the Communist Chinese forces, 
the Government of Communist China issued several statements saying 
that it would not tolerate the advancement of the United Nations 
forces toward the Yalu River, and accusing the United States of al-
leged air attacks on Communist China. 182 It therefore stands to rea-
son that the so-called "Chinese People's Volunteers" were the regular 
armed forces of Communist China. As a result, Peng Teh-huai stood 
as the military commander of Communist China's regular forces. 
The second issue relates to the legal status of the North Korean 
regime. Before the Korean War, only a few Communist nations recog-
nized the North Korean regime. Most nations and the United Nations 
recognized only the South Korean government, which was established 
under the auspices of the United Nations. Meanwhile the United Na-
tions viewed the North Korean regime as illegal, because the Soviet 
Union rejected the entrance and activities of the United Nations Tem-
porary Commission in Korea, and formed the North Korean regime 
on its own terms. 183 The UN Temporary Commission in Korea was 
established under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 112 
on November 14, 1947 for the purpose of holding general elections to 
form an all-Korean government. United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 195 (III) of December 12, 1948 declared that the South 
Korean Government was the only lawful government in Korea, based 
on free elections under UN supervision and representing the great rna-
181. "The lOth Report of the United Nations Command in Korea," U.N. Doc. S/1953 
(December 28, 1950). 
182. U.N. Doc. S/1583 (July 6, 1950); U.N. Doc. S/1722 (August 28, 1950); Higgins, 
supra note 41, p. 257. 
183. U.N.G.A. Res. 112(11) (November 14, 1947); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra 
note 2, p. 39; U.N.G.A. Res. (February 26, 1948); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra note 
2, p. 57. 
52 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
jority of Korean people. 184 
During the Korean War, both sides declared that they would 
abide by all humanitarian rules of the Geneva Conventions in 1949. 185 
South Korea signed all four Geneva Conventions of 1949, on July 4, 
1950. 186 North Korea replied, on July 15, 1950, to the request of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to apply the humanitarian 
rules during wartime, saying that it was strictly abiding by the princi-
ples of the Geneva Conventions. 187 The United Nations Command 
instructed its forces to observe all the rules of the Geneva Conven-
tions.188 In sum, all participants in the Korean War, including the 
North Korean regime, applied the international law of war. This 
means legally that the participants in the Korean War recognized the 
North Korean regime as a belligerent. 189 Furthermore, the fact that 
the United Nations Command concluded the Korean Armistice 
Agreement with the North Korean regime proved that it recognized 
the North Korean regime as a belligerent. Therefore, the Communist 
side was a group of belligerents composed of North Korea and Com-
munist China. 
Having established the juridical status of North Korea and Com-
munist China, the discussion now turns to each of their authority to 
conclude the Korean Armistice Agreement. Since an armistice agree-
ment is a bilateral treaty by nature, 190 normally one competent au-
thority, representing all the belligerents on each side, signs the 
agreement. The Korean Armistice Agreement bears, however, two 
signatures on the Communist side. Therefore, it is necessary to dis-
cern their representative authority. 
The Korean War began with the North Korean crossing of the 
38th Parallel, and initially was a civil war between North and South 
Korea. Later, the United Nations forces intervened on behalf of South 
Korea. Some months later, Communist China entered the Korean 
War, attacking the United Nations and South Korean forces. The 
principal belligerents were South Korea and North Korea. The 
United Nations supported South Korea, while Communist China as-
184. U.N.G.A. Res. 195(III) (December 12, 1948); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra 
note 2, pp. 58-59. 
185. U.N. Doc. S/1834 (October 5, 1950). 
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sisted North Korea. The cause of the war was the Korean division. 
Thus, the war was directly related to South and North Korea, even 
though the United Nations and Communist China intervened. 191 
In conclusion, North Korea and Communist China were not on 
the same plane in terms of importance in connection with the Korean 
Armistice Agreement. Moreover, an armistice in modern times results 
in the de facto end of war. It is a legal means to guarantee peace in the 
area concerned. In light of this analysis, North Korea assumed the 
principal role for the Communist side, while Communist China took a 
secondary role. The implementation of the armistice agreement fur-
ther supports the leading role of North Korea. Thus, even if one com-
mander of the Communist coalition army had signed the armistice 
agreement, both North Korea and Communist China would become 
parties. In fact, both of two commanders signed the armistice agree-
ment, and this gave rise to confusion in terms of legal practices. 
b. South Korea and the Korean Armistice Agreement 
As discussed above, the South Korean government stubbornly 
opposed the conclusion of an armistice agreement which did not rem-
edy the Korean division. Further, it often took issue with the position 
of the Allied Nations. However, the agreement between South Korea 
and the United States made possible the conclusion and maintenance 
of the Korean Armistice Agreement. From a legal point of view, the 
latter fact is more important. If South Korea had not agreed to the 
conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the Armistice would 
not have been concluded or maintained. Unfortunately, South Korean 
opposition to the conclusion of an armistice agreement which did not 
result in Korean unification has been overemphasized. As a result, 
many contend that South Korea is not a party to the Korean Armi-
stice Agreement. However, from a legal point of view, any armistice 
without participation of South Korea would not have been possible in 
South Korea unless the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea was chal-
lenged. Many do not even recognize this simple legal truth, including 
some South Korean governmental officials. Thus, it is necessary to 
present a legal analysis of this problem. 
191. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note l, p. 74. 
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1. The Necessity of South Korea to be a Legal Party to 
the Korean Armistice Agreement 
(a) South Korea is a Principal Belligerent 
Upon careful analysis of the history of the Korean War, one can 
easily determine that the Korean War was divided into two periods -
that of pre- and post- U.N. intervention. First, the Korean War began 
with the surprise attack by North Korean forces, which crossed the 
38th Parallel at dawn on Sunday, June 25, 1950. 192 The North Ko-
rean forces advanced as far as in Seoul within three days and contin-
ued their drive southward. This unexpected event embarrassed the 
United States Government, which hurried to convene the United Na-
tions Security Council and organize the United Nations Command 
under its direction. The United Nations forces arrived in Korea in the 
beginning of July, 1950. North Korea forces already held a large part 
of South Korean territory. During this period, only North and South 
Korean forces were engaged in the civil war. This first period of the 
Korean War is important in analyzing the complicated composition of 
the belligerent parties and clarifying the principal position of South 
Korea. 
After the intervention of the United Nations, the composition of 
belligerents on the United Nations side became very complex. Under 
the United Nations Command, the armed forces of sixteen nations 
were unified. South Korean forces joined the United Nations Com-
mand. The Security Council of the United Nations, after condemning 
the North Korea invasion as a breach of peace and calling upon North 
Korea to withdraw its forces by Resolution 82 of June 25, 1950, 193 
recommended that members of the United Nations furnish such assis-
tances to South Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack, 
by Resolution 83 of June 27, 1950. 194 Following the recommendations 
of the Security Council, most nations offered military or humanitarian 
assistance to South Korea. In order to organize effective assistance, 
the Security Council, with the initiative of the United States, estab-
lished a unified command by adopting Resolution 84 on July 7, 1950. 
The Security Council: 
" ... -recommended that all Members providing mil-
itary forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid 
Security Council resolutions make such forces and other 
192. U.S. Dept. of State, FRUS, 1950, vol. VII (Korea), Washington: GPO, 1976, pp. 
125-127. 
193. U.N. Doc. S/1501 (June 25, 1950). 
194. U.N. Doc. S/1511 (June 27, 1950). 
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assistance available to a unified command under the United 
States; 
- requested the United States to designate the com-
mander of such forces; 
- authorized the unified command at its discretion to 
use the United Nations flag in the course of operations 
against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of 
the various nations participating; and 
- requested the United States to provide the Security 
Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action 
taken under the unified command. 195 
In total, 42 member nations of the United Nations and five non-
members made offers of assistance to South Korea. 196 Among the of-
fers of military assistance from the member nations, only national con-
tingents of more than one battalion were accepted. The armed forces 
of sixteen nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Canada, Australia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, New Zealand, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Ethiopia, Colombia, Thailand, the 
Philippines and Luxemburg) were accepted. Many other nations pro-
vided humanitarian assistance such as medical supplies and food. Na-
tionalist China's offer of three infantry divisions was not accepted, 
fearing the possible intervention of Communist China. 
Among the armed forces of the United Nations Command, South 
Korean and American forces comprised more than 90 percent, while 
the total forces of the other fifteen nations comprised less than 10 per-
cent of the 750,000 UN forces. 197 At the end of 1951, South Korean 
proportion among UN forces was more than 40 percent, 198 and con-
tinued to increase thereafter. In a word, even after the intervention of 
the United Nations, South Korea remained the principal belligerent in 
terms of actual fighting forces. 199 
(b) South Korea As the Host Country 
South Korea was the host country in terms of its role, interests, 
and causes of the war. 200 The Korean War broke out between South 
195. U.N. Doc. S/1588 (July 7, 1950); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra note 2, pp. 
135-136. 
196. FRUS, supra note 40, p. 761. 
197. Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 117. 
198. Ibid., p. 117; FR US, supra note 80, p. 1384. 
199. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, p. 79. 
200. Ibid., p. 80. 
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and North Korea, and stemmed from the Korean division. The war 
was conducted only on Korean territory. Although several countries 
were involved in this war, only a portion of their armed forces were 
engaged in the war, while all of the Korean armed forces were en-
gaged. Moreover, the situation following the conclusion of the armi-
stice agreement may suggest something. Every belligerent except 
South and North Korea established normal diplomatic relations with 
one another. This might mean that the Korean problem, including the 
implementation of the armistice agreement, would eventually become 
more and more the problem of the Korean people themselves, if not 
their exclusive problem. The South-North Joint Communique of July 
4, 1972 supported this position: "Unification shall be achieved 
through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external 
imposition of interference."201 
In the light of the situation, an armistice agreement without 
South Korean participation would be meaningless. Any attempt at 
legal explanations based on the faulty interpretations of the Korean 
Armistice Agreement, which deny the South Korean participation in 
this Agreement, is unrealistic. 
(c) South Korean Legitimacy 
At the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet 
Union agreed to disarm Japanese forces in Korea. The Soviet Union 
would deal with Japanese forces north of the 38th Parallel, while the 
United States would maintain those south of the 38th Parallel. This 
partition of Korean peninsula was the result of an impromptu decision 
made under pressure in an urgent situation. Due to the atomic bomb-
ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 8, Japanese forces 
collapsed unexpectedly soon. Stalin quickly entered in the war against 
Japan in Manchuria on August 8, and the Soviets rushed southward. 
Embarrassed by this unexpected situation, the United States proposed 
the 38th Parallel as the demarcation line between two occupational 
powers. This idea of partition was recommended by the State-War-
Navy Coordinating Committee, after being prepared by two young 
military officers. 202 
The Soviets accepted this proposal, and on September 2, 1945, 
General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the 
201. White Paper, supra note 164, pp. 85-86. 
202. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea, Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969, pp. 25-26; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 
/9451947, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 120-121. 
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Pacific, issued General Order No. 1 governing the conditions of Japa-
nese surrender. This order included the partition of Korea. This was 
to be the source of all Korean tragedies to come. 
The two separate regimes of Korea were formed under the two 
occupational powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. After 
the failure of negotiations of the Joint Soviet-American Commission 
for an independent and unified Korea, the United States brought this 
problem to the United Nations. The United Nations General Assem-
bly adopted Resolution 112(11) on November 14, 1947, which estab-
lished the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea for the 
purpose of holding free elections and forming an all Korean govern-
ment under its supervision.203 However, the Soviet Union refused the 
activities of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in 
North Korea, while the Commission carried out its task in South Ko-
rea with the cooperation of the United States forces. The Commission 
asked the Interim Committee of the General Assembly whether it 
should carry out the General Assembly's program in South Korea 
only, since it was unable to carry out its function in North Korea due 
to Soviet opposition. The Interim Committee of the General Assem-
bly advised the Commission to implement the program in South Ko-
rea alone under the existing circumstances. 204 
A general election was held on May 10, 1948 in South Korea 
under the supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission 
on Korea. Out of a population of 20 million, 7,036,750 voted, 
amounting to approximately 72 percent of qualified voters. 205 On 
May 31 the elected representatives convened as the Korean National 
Assembly. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea ap-
proved the result of the election. 206 
After the election, the National Assembly of Korea hurried to 
form a national government. The National Assembly adopted the 
Constitution of the Republic of Korea on July 12 and promulgated it 
on July 17. They elected Syngman Rhee as the first President of the 
Republic of Korea on July 20. The formation of a national govern-
ment was completed on August 15, 1948, and received the authority of 
government from the United States Military Command. This Korean 
203. U.N.G.A. Res. 112(11) (November 14, 1947); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra 
note 2, pp. 39-41. 
204. U.N.G.A. Res. (February 26, 1948); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra note 2, p. 
57. 
205. U.N. Doc. A/Ac.19/80, Officials Records of the Third Session (1948), supp. no. 9, 
vol. 1; Goodrich, supra note 5, p. 59. 
206. Ibid., p. 59. 
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Government was inaugurated on August 15, 1948.207 The United Na-
tions General Assembly approved the newly formed Government of 
the Republic of Korea as a legitimate government: 
The General Assembly ... declares that there has been es-
tablished a lawful government [the Government of theRe-
public of Korea] having effective control and jurisdiction 
over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission 
was able to observe and consult and in which the great ma-
jority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government 
is based on elections which were a valid expression of the 
free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which 
were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this 
is the only such government in Korea . . . 208 
South Korea's legitimacy prompted the United Nations to inter-
vene in the Korean War. The Security Council, declaring "that the 
Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established govern-
ment . . . and that this is only such government in Korea,"209 recom-
mended that the Members of the United Nations furnish such 
assistance to South Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed at-
tack.210 Thus, given the relative weight placed on the issue by the 
United Nations, it would be unreasonable to exclude South Korea 
from the armistice agreement. Following this line of reasoning, it 
would be all the more unacceptable that the condemned North Ko-
rean regime as an aggressor, which had been recognized only as a bel-
ligerent by most nations, be a principal party to the agreement.211 
ii. Legal Foundations Supporting South Korea as a Legal 
Party to the Korean Armistice Agreement 
(a) Legal Analysis of the Relations between the 
United Nations Command and the South 
Korean Armed Forces 
When the United Nations forces arrived in Korea, the South Ko-
rean Government assigned the command authority over all South Ko-
rean forces to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations 
207. Ibid., p. 59. 
208. U.N.G.A. Res. 195(111) (December 12, 1948); Resolutions Relating to Korea, supra 
note 2, pp. 58-59. 
209. U.N. Security Council Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/1501 (June 25, 1950). 
210. U.N. Security Council Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (June 27, 1950). 
211. Lyou Byung Hwa, supra note 1, p. 83. 
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Command. President Rhee's letter to General MacArthur of July 15, 
1950 documented this decision: 
In view of the common military effort of the United Nations 
on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military 
forces, land, sea, and air, of all the United Nations, fighting 
in or near Korea have been placed under your operational 
command, and in which you have been designated as 
Supreme Commander, UN forces, I am happy to assign to 
you the command authority over all land, sea, and air forces 
of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continua-
tion of the present state of hostilities, such command to be 
exercised either by you personally or by such military com-
mander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exer-
cise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent areas 
212 
General MacArthur replied through then Ambassador to Korea John 
J. Muccio on July 18, 1950: "Please express to President Rhee my 
thanks and deepest appreciation for the action taken in his letter of 
July. It cannot fail to increase the coordinated power of the United 
Nations forces operating in Korea. I am proud indeed to have the 
gallant ROK forces under my command .... " 213 
After this move, South Korean forces performed military opera-
tions under MacArthur together with the other UN forces. The South 
Korean forces were different, however, from the other forces of the 
United Nations Command in terms of legal character. First, the 
United Nations forces were formed under Security Council Resolu-
tions 83 and 84, which "recommend[ed] that the Members of the 
United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as 
may be necessary to repel the armed attack ... "214 and "recom-
mend[ed] that all Members providing military forces . .. pursuant to 
the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces . . . to a 
unified command ... .'m5 However, South Korean forces were not 
deployed under these resolutions, but rather had been engaged in the 
war before the resolutions. In addition, the resolutions were directed 
to members of the United Nations, South Korea was not, however, a 
member of the United Nations. Third, the United Nations forces were 
engaged in the Korean War to repel the North Korean attack, and to 
212. Korea-U.S. Relations, supra note 128, pp. 556-557; FRUS, supra note 192, p. 388. 
213. Korea-U.S. Relations, supra note 128, pp. 557-558. 
214. U.N. Doc. S/1511 (June 27, 1950). 
215. U.N. Doc. S/1588 (July 7, 1950). 
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restore international peace and security, while South Korean forces 
were engaged in the war for their survival, which had been threatened 
by the North Korean attack. For this reason, the Allied Nations sent 
only a portion of their armed forces in Korea, while South Korea en-
gaged all its troops in the war. Last, South Korean forces joined the 
United Nations Command through an assignment in the form of a 
letter, and not by United Nations resolutions. 
Considering the importance of the assignment, it is appropriate to 
clarify its legal character. President Rhee's letter to General MacAr-
thur of July 15, 1950, was clear on its purpose. "In view of the com-
mon military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of 
Korea in which all military forces . . . of the United Nations, fighting 
in or near Korea have been placed under your operational command 
... " The composition of troops and duration of assignment are also 
expressed: "I am happy to assign to you command authority over 
. . . all forces of the ROK during the period of the continuation of the 
present state of hostilities . ... " Therefore, unless the South Korean 
Government recalled this assignment of command authority, it would 
continue in legal effect until the termination of the "present state of 
hostilities." In other words, if armed hostilities ceased, the assignment 
would also be terminated. In this sense, this act of assignment is a so-
called "legal act under the resolutive condition" or "legal act with the 
resolutive clause," in which the subject of legal act preestablishes the 
end of its legal effects, bound to an uncertain event. This assignment's 
resolutive condition or clause is "during the period of the continuation 
of the present state of hostilities," and the uncertain event was the end 
of the hostilities. Thus, since the armistice brought an end to actual 
armed hostilities, command authority automatically reverted to the 
South Korean Government. A separate legal act from either side was 
unnecessary to achieve this goal.216 
In this regard, after the conclusion of the Korean Armistice 
Agreement, there was an agreed minute of conference between the 
governments of the United States and South Korea of November 17, 
1954, based on the conference held between President Eisenhower and 
President Rhee during the latter's visit to the United States, July 27-
30, 1954. It read: 
. . . It is the intention and policy of the Republic of Korea 
to: 1) cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify 
Korea ... 2)retain ROK forces under the operational con-
trol of the United Nations Command while that Command 
216. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, pp. 85-86. 
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has responsibility for the defense of the ROK, unless after 
consultation it is agreed that our mutual and individual in-
terests would be best served by a change. . . . Based upon 
the conditions which the Republic of Korea declares it will 
create, it is the intention and policy of the United States to: 
1) continue its program of helping to strengthen the Repub-
lic of Korea ... 217 
The legal character of the agreed minute of the conference is not 
clear. The terms of the agreed minute are general global principles of 
cooperation. Its expression and form are different from an interna-
tional treaty, as expressed in the language "it is the intention and pol-
icy of. . . " In light of the above considerations, the agreed minute of 
the conference is more akin to a statement of intent, and does not 
contain the legally binding nature of an international treaty between 
two nations. The document takes the form of a kind of gentlemen's 
agreement or some temporary agreed policy-cooperation between two 
friendly governments, the binding force of which is political and moral 
rather than legal. 
In light of the foregoing discussion, we may now address the issue 
of the legal relation between the United Nations and South Korean 
forces. As explained above, South Korean forces under the United 
Nations Command differed from the other forces of the United Na-
tions Command. South Korean forces were placed under the United 
Nations Command by a separate act of the South Korean Government 
simply for effective military operation. Therefore, it would be reason-
able to conclude that the relation between the United Nations Com-
mand and South Korean forces is that of a coalition army. There are 
many examples of coalition armies in military history, especially in the 
two World Wars. 218 
(b) A Coalition Army and the Conclusion of an 
Armistice Agreement 
As the argument above demonstrates, the United Nations forces 
and South Korean forces formed a coalition army under the com-
manding authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations 
Command. As relevant to this discussion, the question arises as to 
how to conclude an armistice agreement for a coalition army. This is 
217. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (November 29, 1954), pp. 810-811; FR US, supra note 
80, pp. 1875-1877. 
218. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, p. 88. 
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the key to the determination of parties to the Korean Armistice 
Agreement. 
Several examples involving coalition armies can be found in armi-
stice agreements relating to the two World Wars, such as: the Armi-
stice between Austria-Hungary and the Allied Powers, November 3, 
1918 (signed at Villa Giusti- Padua);219 the Armistice Convention 
between the Great Britain and the Allied Powers, and Turkey, signed 
at Murdos on October 30, 1918;220 the Armistice with Germany, 
signed at Compeigne on November 11, 1918;221 the Armistice with 
Italy, signed at Fairfield, Sicily, September 3, 1943;222 the Armistice 
with Italy: Instrument of Surrender, September 29, 1943;223 the Armi-
stice with Rumania at Moscow, September 12, 1944;224 the Armistice 
with Bulgaria, October 28, 1944;225 the Armistice with Hungary, Jan-
219. This armistice was concluded between Austria-Hungarian Representative Victor 
Weber Elder von Webnau and the Supreme Commander of the Italian Army, Pietro Bado-
glio. Badoglio signed the agreement on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers. With 
his signature, all member nations of the Allied and the Associated Powers became parties 
to the armistice agreement. U.S. Dept. of State, Treaties and Other International Agree-
ments of the United States of America, 1776-1949, vol. 2, Charles Bevans, ed., pp. 1-8. 
220. This armistice agreement was signed by Vice Admiral Somerset Artur Gough-
Calthorpe, British Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Station and Turkish Minis-
ter of Marine, Rechard Hickmet Bey. British Commander Gough-Calthorpe signed for the 
Allied Powers. Clive Parry, Consolidated Treaties Series 1918-1919, vol. 224, New York: 
Oceana, pp. 169-171. 
221. This armistice was concluded between Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Allied Armies, acting in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers, and Admiral 
Wemyss, First Sea Lord, and Herr Erzberger, Secretary of State, President of the German 
Delegation, Marshal Foch signed on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers. Bevans, 
supra note 219, pp. 9-19; Parry, supra note 220, pp. 286-299. 
222. This agreement provides: "The following conditions of an armistice are presented 
by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, acting by 
authority of the Government of the United States and Great Britain and in the interest of 
the United Nations, and are accepted by Pietro Badoglio, Head of Italian Government." 
Bevans, supra note 207, pp. 769-775. 
223. This armistice was concluded by letter from the Commander-in-Chief of Allied 
Forces Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Italian Supreme Commander Pietro Badoglio. Eisen-
hower signed on behalf of all Allied Forces. Ibid., pp. 775-784. 
224. The "Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the 
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the Government of Rumania 
on the other hand, concerning armistice" was concluded between the Soviet Representative 
Malinovski and the Rumanian Representative Lucretiu Patrascanu. Malinovski signed this 
armistice on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Ibid., 
pp. 901-907. 
225. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom concluded this ar-
mistice with Bulgaria. Representative of the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterra-
nean Station J.A.H. Gammell signed the armistice for the United States, the Soviet Union 
and the United Kingdom, and P. Stainov signed it for Bulgaria. Ibid., pp. 909-913. 
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uary 20, 1945.226 All these examples indicate that if the Commander-
in-Chief of a coalition army signs an armistice agreement, all member 
nations of the coalition army become parties to this armistice agree-
ment. As a result, it is not necessary that all representatives of each 
composing member nation of the coalition army sign the armistice 
agreement. Rather, it is the general tendency and international cus-
tom that one representative of the coalition army signs the armistice 
agreement on behalf of all member nations of the coalition army.227 
There might be an expressed or implied agreement among the nations 
of the coalition army concerning the conclusion of the armistice before 
the representative signs it. It would be a reasonable legal interpreta-
tion that this expressed or implied agreement among the composite 
nations of the coalition army delegated to the representative of the 
coalition army to conclude the armistice agreement. Sometimes this 
internal agreement may be expressed in the text of the armistice agree-
ment itself. For example, the Armistice between Turkey and the Al-
lied Nations of October 30, 1918 reads "Conditions of an armistice 
agreed to and concluded between Vice Admiral Sommerset Arthur 
Gough-Calthorpe, British Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean 
Station, acting under authority from the British Government, in agree-
ment with their Allies, H.E. Rechad H. Bey, Turkish Minister of 
Marine . . . acting under authority from the Turkish Govern-
ment."228 Usually, however, this internal agreement is not expressed 
within the text of the armistice agreement. 
(c) The Signature of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
United Nations Command and South 
Korea as a Legal Party to the 
Armistice 
The Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953 was con-
cluded between the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Com-
mand and the Commanders of the Communist side. The legal effects 
of the signature of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations 
Command should be applied to the coalition army under his com-
manding authority. As explained above, he commanded a coalition 
army composed of the United Nations forces in proper sense and the 
226. "Agreement concerning an armitstice between the USSR, the UK and the USA, on 
the one hand, and Hungary on the other hand," was signed by K. Voroshilov and Gy-
ongyyosi Janos." Voroshilov signed for the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Ibid., pp. 994-1104. 
227. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, pp. 88-89. 
228. Parry, supra note 220, p. 169. 
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South Korean forces. The United Nations forces in proper sense were 
created by the Security Resolutions 83 and 84 in 1950, while the coali-
tion of the United Nations forces and South Korean forces were 
formed by the South Korean Government's assignment of the com-
manding authority to the United Nations Command on July 15, 1950. 
Thus, the signature of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations 
Command represents the composite members of the coalition army, 
i.e., the United Nations and South Korea. It was not necessary for the 
representative of South Korea to sign directly the text of the armistice 
agreement in order to be a legal party to this agreement. 
In order for South Korea to be a legal party to the armistice 
agreement, two conditions should be fulfilled. First, there should be 
an internal agreement between the United Nations Command and 
South Korea concerning the conclusion of the armistice agreement; 
second, there should be a lawful conclusion of the armistice agreement 
by the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. 
The first condition - that is, the internal agreement between the 
United Nations Command and South Korea, can be substantiated by 
several documents. The joint statement between President Rhee and 
Special Envoy WalterS. Robertson of July 11, 1953, is one of the doc-
uments. It reads: 
During the past two weeks we have had many frank and cor-
dial exchanges of views which have emphasized the deep 
friendship existing between the Republic of Korea and the 
United States and have gone far toward achieving mutual 
understanding of the troubled questions which have arisen in 
connection with arrangements for an armistice, the exchange 
of prisoners, and the forthcoming political conference . . . 229 
In addition, President Rhee's letter to the United States Secretary of 
State, July 24, 1953, President Rhee's letter to President Eisenhower, 
July 27, and President Eisenhower's letter to President Rhee, July 27, 
confirmed this internal agreement. 230 
The Communist Delegation was aware of this internal agreement 
and required South Korean agreement to the armistice. At the ple-
nary meeting of armistice talks on July 12, 1953, United Nations dele-
gate Harrison informed the anxious Communist delegate Nam 11 
about this agreement: 
In consequence of negotiations completed with the Govern-
229. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (July 20, 1953), pp. 72-73. 
230. FRUS, supra note 80, pp. 1428-1445. 
PEACE AND UNIFICATION IN KOREA AND INT'L LAW 65 
ment of the Republic of Korea, we have received suitable 
assurances from the ROK Government that it will, during 
the post hostility period, work in close collaboration for our 
common objectives. During this period provisions of the 
present draft armistice agreement will be implemented. You 
are assured that the United Nations Command, which in-
cludes the ROK forces, is prepared to carry out the terms of 
the armistice. 23 1 
The second condition - that is, the lawful conclusion of the ar-
mistice agreement, was also fulfilled. The two sides lawfully signed 
the armistice and continued to abide by its terms. Therefore, with the 
signature of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Com-
mand, South Korea must be a de jure party to the armistice. How-
ever, there is an opinion that considers the United Nations forces 
themselves as a coalition army. 232 It is beyond question that the 
United Nations Command was created by the Security Council Reso-
lutions 83 and 84 in 1950 and maintained for several decades, despite 
some procedural problems could be recognized in the course of the 
adoption of these resolutions. Therefore, the United Nations Com-
mand is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, not a coalition 
army.233 
It is clear now that the armed forces under the United Nations 
Command were a coalition army composed of the United Nations 
forces and South Korean forces. Furthermore, with the signature of 
the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, South Ko-
rea and the United Nations were made parties to the Korean Armi-
stice Agreement. Thus, since South Korea was the host country, it is 
reasonable to state that South Korea should be a principal party to the 
Korean Armistice Agreement. 
Over the course of several decades, the United Nations has exper-
ienced a structural change, particularly after the massive entry of the 
new third world countries after decolonization. This structural 
change modifies the legal status of the United Nations as a party to the 
Korean Armistice Agreement. This problem and the United States 
relationship to the Korean Armistice Agreement will be considered in 
the next chapter. 
231. Ibid., p. 1378. 
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(d) Practices 
More than 30 years have passed since the conclusion of the Ko-
rean Armistice Agreement. This long period is sufficient to evaluate 
the South Korean legal status as a party to the Korean Armistice 
Agreement in light of actual practices. These practices shall be con-
sidered from several points of view. 
iii. South Korean Participation in the Operation of the 
Military Armistice Commission 
The Military Armistice Commission is a permanent organ for the 
implementation of the armistice agreement. It was established by Ar-
ticle 2(B) of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The general function 
of this Military Armistice Commission is to supervise the implementa-
tion of the armistice agreement and to settle through negotiations all 
the disputes arising from alleged violations of the armistice agreement. 
For this purpose, this Commission was to be assisted by the Joint Ob-
server Team in supervision for the implementation of the armistice 
rules concerning the demilitarized zone and the Han River estuary. 
This Military Armistice Commission is composed of ten senior of-
ficers, five of whom are appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
United Nations Command, and the other five are appointed by the 
Communist side. 
South Korean participation in this Commission began on March 
9, 1954. South Korean General Lim was appointed as one of the five 
representatives of the United Nations Command. General Lim's cre-
dentials were examined and accepted by the Communist side without 
any objection. 234 This acceptance implied that the Communist side 
had no objection to South Korean participation in the Military Armi-
stice Commission. It also implied that they recognized the South Ko-
rean role in the implementation of the armistice agreement. South 
Korean participation in the Commission gradually grew more impor-
tant. The present composition of the five representatives of the United 
Nations Command are two South Korean, one American and two rep-
resentatives from other Allied Nations. The two representatives from 
other Allied Nations are appointed by turns among several Allied Na-
tions and their actual role in the Commission is nominal. This con-
firms the important role of South Korea in the implementation of the 
Korean Armistice Agreement.235 If one examines the actual opera-
234. Chee Chong-11, "Legal Problems Involving the UNC in Korea and the Korean 
Armistice Agreement," Korea Observer, vol. VII, No. 2 (Spring 1976), pp. 133-134. 
235. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note I, p. 92. 
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tions of the Military Armistice Commission, it will become clear that 
operations are carried out by South Korea and the United States, on 
the one hand, and North Korea and China on the other hand. These 
practices support the proposition that South Korea is a legal party to 
the Korean Armistice Agreement. 
iv. South-North Korean Dialogue 
In the early 1970s Koreans harboured great hopes of peace and 
unification after long years of frustration over the Korean division. 
This began with the South-North Red Cross Contact negotiating the 
reunion of the families dispersed in South and North Korea. This dia-
logue culminated in the issue of South-North Joint Communique on 
July 4, 1972. This was the first agreement between the two govern-
ments since the conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement. This 
Joint Communique had special meaning in terms of the political future 
of the Korean Peninsula considering the hostile confrontation between 
the two sides over the three decades that had passed. This Joint Com-
munique provided basic principles for Korean unification and South-
North Korean relations. According to this Communique, Korean uni-
fication should be achieved through independent efforts without being 
subject to external imposition or interference, and the unification 
should be achieved through peaceful means, and not through use of 
force against one another. In order to implement these agreements, 
the two sides created the South-North Coordinating Committee.236 
Thus, the South-North Korean Dialogue clearly illustrated that the 
Korean problem, including the maintenance and implementation of 
the armistice agreement, should be solved by the Korean people them-
selves. This also indicated that South Korea should be an essential 
party to the Korean Armistice Agreement. 237 
v. Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Korea 
More than three decades have passed since the conclusion of the 
Korean Armistice Agreement. Since that time, most foreign troops, 
both United Nations forces and Chinese Communists have been with-
drawn from the Korean peninsula. Only 40,000 United States forces 
remain in South Korea, in accordance with the Mutual Defense 
Treaty (October 1, 1954) between two countries. Thousands of troops 
of South Korea and North Korea are engaged in the maintenance and 
implementation of the armistice agreement. This actual situation 
236. White Paper, supra note 164, pp. 85-86. 
237. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note I, pp. 92-93. 
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clearly indicates that South and North Korea are principal parties to 
the Korean Armistice Agreement. 238 
238. Ibid., p. 93. 
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CHAPTER TWO. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS COMMAND AND INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR PEACE IN 
THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
Section A. Structural Change Of The United Nations And The 
International Political Situation Surrounding 
Korea 
1. Decolonization and the New Situation in the United Nations 
Before the Korean War, the United Nations had only 59 member 
states. From the late 1950s, however, decolonization began and nu-
merous new nations entered in the United Nations. By 1970 about 70 
nations became new members, doubling the number of member 
states.239 
This new situation drastically changed the United Nations. Until 
that time, the United States was the predominant power in the United 
Nations because most member states were dependent on American 
economic assistance after the destruction of World War II. However, 
in the 1970s the situation changed. Most new member states were 
newly born from European colonies. As a result, their tendency was 
to lean ideologically towards socialism. The Communist propaganda 
of equality appealed to those states who had suffered so much under 
the western colonialism. 240 These new states claimed to be non-
aligned, but in fact, were opposed to the United States in the United 
Nations. Thus, the United States could not continue to exercise its 
predominant role in the United Nations. In other words, these states 
blocked many resolutions which the United States supported. 
This drastic change also affected the United Nations' role in the 
Korean problem. Until 1960, South Korean legitimacy in the United 
Nations had been absolute because the Government of South Korea 
was established under the auspices of the United Nations and pro-
tected by it. On the other hand, North Korea was not even permitted 
to attend discussions of the Korean problem in the United Nations. 
Since the 1960s the situation has changed. Many newborn nations 
knew little about the Korean problem in the United Nations, nor were 
they interested in it. They simply were opposed to the "superpower" 
United States, and thus also its seeming protege, South Korea. 
239. C. A. Colliard, Institutions des Relations Internationales, Paris: Dalloz, 1978, pp. 
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The first concrete result of this change, in terms of the Korean 
question, appeared in the fifteenth session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in April 1961. After the United States proposed to in-
vite the South Korean representative to the discussion of the Korean 
question at the First Committee,241 the Soviet Union counterproposed 
to also invite the North Korean representative, saying that without 
participation of both parties, the discussion could not be fruitfut242 
The Indonesian representative proposed a simultaneous invitation of 
both representatives, slightly modifying the Soviet proposal. In the 
face of such circumstances, United States Delegate Stevenson pro-
posed a compromise. Stevenson proposed a simultaneous invitation of 
both representatives under the condition that North Korea "first un-
equivocally accepts the competence and authority of the United Na-
tions within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean 
question as has already been done by the Republic of Korea. "243 
North Korea did not participate in the discussion of the Korean 
question in the United Nations General Assembly, refusing to accept 
the competence and authority of the United Nations. However, this 
change would be very important, because it reflected the structural 
change in the United Nations. The change continued to evolve. Thus, 
the situation of the Korean question in the United Nations in the early 
1970s differed greatly from that of the 1950s. 
2. The People's Republic of China's Entrance in 
the United Nations 
After Communist China took over mainland China from Nation-
alist China, the Communists cabled the President of the General As-
sembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on November 
18, 1949, saying that Nationalist China should not represent the Chi-
nese people in the United Nations. The Soviet Union, supporting this 
position, proposed that the Security Council should exclude the Na-
tionalist delegate. But this proposal was defeated on January 13, 1950 
by six to three with two abstentions. The Soviet delegate then de-
clared that the Soviet Union would not participate in any further Se-
curity Council meetings until the delegate of Nationalist China was 
excluded, and that it would not recognize as legal any decision made 
by the Security Council with the participation of the Nationalist dele-
241. UN Doc. A/C.l/L268 (April 10, 1961). 
242. UN Doc. A/C.1/L270 (April 10, 1961). 
243. UN Doc. A/C.l/837 (April 12, 1961). 
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gate.244 The question of Chinese representation in the United Nations 
from then on confronted the General Assembly and other organs of 
the United Nations. The United States stubbornly opposed, however, 
the entrance of the People's Republic of China into the United 
Nations. 
In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion 1688 (XVI), deciding that any proposal to change Chinese repre-
sentation in the United Nations was an important question requiring a 
two-thirds majority vote for approval under Article 18 of the United 
Nations Charter. This requirement was necessary for blocking the 
proposal of the replacement of Chinese representation in the United 
Nations because many nations leaned towards the People's Republic 
of China. In fact, Article 18, Paragraph 2 of the United Nations Char-
ter is not so clear: "Decisions of the General Assembly on important 
questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of members present 
and voting. These questions shall include recommendation with re-
spect to the maintenance of international peace and security, ... the 
admission of new members to the United Nations ... the expulsion 
of members." There is no mention about the replacement of the repre-
sentation. As a result, the question whether or not the replacement of 
Chinese representation is an important problem is not clear. But Arti-
cle 18, Paragraph 3 of the Charter provides that decisions on other 
questions, including the determination of additional categories of 
questions to be decided by a two-third majority, shall be made by a 
majority of the members present and voting. Thus, every year the 
United Nations General Assembly reiterated the same decision on 
whether the replacement problem would be an important problem or 
not, and under the influence of the United States, tried to reject the 
replacement. The number of votes supporting the People's Republic 
of China continued to increase, however, and on October 25, 1971, the 
United Nations General Assembly rejected the opinion that the re-
placement question is an important problem requiring a two-thirds 
vote. On the same day, the General Assembly supported the replace-
ment of the Chinese representation in the United Nations by a vote of 
seventy-six to thirty-five with seventeen abstentions, more than a two-
thirds majority (Resolution 2758). Thus, the People's Republic of 
China was admitted into the United Nations, and became a permanent 
member of the Security Council, although the United States voted 
against the replacement. It is no question that the Sino-American rap-
244. UN Doc. S/PV.461 (January 13, 1950); Public Papers of the Secretary-Genera/ of 
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prochement developed after Nixon's "Ping-pong diplomacy" of April 
1971 greatly influenced this change. 
This replacement of the Chinese representation in the United Na-
tions deeply affected the Korean question in the United Nations. On 
one hand, North Korea now got the support of two permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council. On the other hand, the influence of the 
United States in the United Nations was comparatively reduced. 
3. Sino-American Rapprochement 
Since the Korean War, in which the United States had fought 
against Communist China (the People's Republic of China), the two 
nations' relationship continued to be bad. In the 1960s, however, 
Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, culminating in the Ussuri River 
clash in 1969. As a result, the People's Republic of China felt more 
imminent danger from the Soviet Union than from the United States. 
This worry was justified by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968.245 On the other hand, the United States had suffered a 
lot of difficulties from the Vietnam War. President Nixon announced 
the Guam doctrine in July 1969, stating that the United States would 
gradually reduce its military involvement in Asia and try to avoid di-
rect military involvement in local conflicts. 246 In this situation, both 
the United States and China tried to improve their relations. First, the 
United States showed its favorable attitude by permitting its citizens to 
travel in China. The United States also relaxed the trade embargo on 
the mainland of China and interrupted the Seventh Fleet's regular pa-
trolling of the Taiwan Strait. 247 China invited the United States' table 
tennis team to China in April, 1971. The relations quickly developed 
and President Nixon announced on July 15, 1971 his plan to visit 
China. Nixon's advisor Henry Kissinger had prepared this plan in a 
secret visit to Peking. President Nixon visited China from February 
21 to 28, 1972. This visit resulted in the issuance of the Shanghai 
Communique, on February 28, between President Nixon and Premier 
Chou En-lai: 
During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions 
were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-
245. J. C. Hsiung, "The Conceptual Foundation of the United States China Policy," 
University of Maryland Law School Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary 
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lai on the normalization of relations between the United 
States of America and the People's Republic of China. . . . 
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese . . . main-
tain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of 
China. . . . [i]t affirms the ultimate objective of the with-
drawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Tai-
wan. . . . They agreed to facilitate the progressive 
development of trade between their two countries. The two 
sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various 
channels . . . for concrete consultations to further the 
normalization of relations between the two countries and 
continue to exchange views on issues of common 
interest. . . . 248 
Sino-American relations continued to develop in accordance with 
the principles of the Shanghai Communique. In May, 1973, liaison 
offices between two countries were established in Peking and Washing-
ton to carry out the de facto function of regular embassies. As a re-
sult, the volume of trade between the nations increased from $95 
million in 1972 to $937 million in 1974. Exchanges and cooperations 
in other domains were similarly increased. This development of Sino-
American rapprochement culminated in the announcement of a joint 
communique on December 15, 1978 on the establishment of diplo-
matic relations between the two nations beginning January 1, 1979.249 
This Sino-American rapprochement made great impact on the 
Korean question. It meant that China would accept the status quo in 
Korea and try to maintain it, saying that the Korean problem should 
be solved by Koreans themselves through peaceful means. 
4. South-North Korean Dialogue 
The fundamental change of external environment surrounding 
Korean Peninsula naturally influenced both South and North Korea 
to seek new policy on Korean unification. That is, a South-North dia-
logue without external interference. This dialogue began in a humani-
tarian way. In a commemorative address on the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of national liberation on August 15, 1970, President Park 
248. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (March 20, 1972), pp. 435-438; Hungdah Chiu, ed., 
"Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China: Problems, Analysis and 
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of South Korea said that if North Korea would desist forthwith from 
perpetrating all sorts of military provocations and renounce their pol-
icy of communizing the whole of Korea by force, he would be "pre-
pared to suggest epochal and more realistic measures, with a view to 
remov[e], step by step, ... in the interest of laying the ground work 
for unification and on the basis of humanitarian consideration ... " 250 
As a concrete proposal of this Declaration, the South Korean 
Red Cross proposed on August 12, 1971, a conference between the 
two Korean Red Cross delegates to discuss reunion of dispersed fami-
lies. Two days later the North Korean Red Cross accepted this propo-
sal. As a result, preliminary talks between the two Red Cross societies 
were held on September 28, 1972, at Panmunjom. 251 This humanita-
rian talk quickly developed into important political negotiations con-
cerning the Korean question. These negotiations were secretly carried 
out by two high ranking delegates from South and North Korea. The 
secret negotiations resulted in the issue of the South-North Joint Com-
munique on July 4, 1972.252 
According to this Communique, in an effort to remove misunder-
standing, mistrust, and to mitigate increased tensions that had arisen 
between the South and the North resulting from the long separation, 
the two sides agreed to the basic principles concerning the South-
North relations and unification. 
First, as the basic principles for unification, they agreed: 1) unifi-
cation should be achieved through independent efforts without being 
subject to external imposition or interference; 2) unification should be 
achieved through peaceful means, and not through use of force; 3) a 
great national unity, as a homogeneous people, should be sought first, 
transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems. 
Second, in order to ease tensions and restore severed national ties, 
they agreed not to slander one another, and to carry out various ex-
changes in many areas. 
Third, in order to prevent unexpected military incidents and to 
solve problems arising in South-North relations directly and promptly, 
they agreed to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and 
Pyongyang. 
Fourth, they agreed to cooperate for successful South-North Red 
Cross talks. Fifth, in order to implement aforementioned agreements 
250. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Ko-
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and settle other problems arising from South-North relations, they 
agreed to create a South-North Coordinating Committee. 
Even after the South-North Joint Communique, the fundamental 
disparity between South and North Korea still remained, but this his-
torical trend, together with the sudden changes of Korea's external 
situation, made a great change in foreign policy on both sides. South 
Korea, realizing the changing trend in the external environment, espe-
cially sought accommodations to the new political current rather than 
being forced to accept the imposing result of this change. On June 23, 
1973, South Korean President Park Chung Hee announced the Special 
Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification.253 
The main purposes of this Statement were the peaceful coexistence, 
gradual reconciliation between South and North Korea, and long-term 
unification of Korea. In his Statement, President Park explained the 
process of the South-North Korean dialogue: South Korea had taken 
the position that both sides should endeavor to gradually remove the 
artificial barriers between the South and the North by solving easier 
and more practical problems first and to phase out feelings of mutual 
distrust and replace them with those of mutual confidence through 
concrete results. On the other hand, North Korea, in disregard of the 
existence of deep-rooted feelings of distrust between the South and the 
North, insisted that military and political problems that might endan-
ger South Korean security must first be dealt with as a package in the 
talks. 
President Park continued to explain Korea's external environ-
ment: the era of cold war after World War II came to an end, and a 
new era of peaceful coexistence, based on the status quo, began. 
In these circumstances, he declared a new foreign policy of South 
Korea: 
1) The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task 
of the Korean people. We will continue to exert every effort to accom-
plish this task. 
2) Peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all 
means. The South and the North should neither interfere with each 
other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other. 
3) We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience 
to secure concrete results from the South-North dialogue based on the 
spirit of the South-North Joint Communique dated July 4, 1972. 
4) We shall not oppose North Korea's participation with us in 
253. The Institute for East Asian Studies, Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, Se-
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international organizations, if it is conducive to the easing of tensions 
and the furtherance of international cooperation. 
5) We shall not object to our admittance into the United Na-
tions together with North Korea, if the majority of the member states 
of the United Nations so wish, provided that it does not cause hin-
drance to our national unification. Even before our admittance into 
the United Nations as a member, we shall not be opposed to North 
Korea also being invited to the United Nations General Assembly's 
deliberation of the Korean question in which the representative of the 
Republic of Korea is invited to participate. 
6) The Republic of Korea will open its doors to all the nations 
of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. 
At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies and social 
institutions are different from ours to open their doors likewise to us. 
7) Peace and good-neighborliness are the firm bases of the for-
eign policy of the Republic of Korea. It is reaffirmed that we will 
continue to further strengthen the ties of friendship existing between 
our friendly nations and our country.254 
President Park added that these policies were interim measures 
during the transitional period pending the achievement of unification 
and that taking these measures did not signify the recognition of 
North Korea as a state. 
This statement opened the United Nations' door and its Special 
Agencies to North Korea. As a result, several western countries estab-
lished diplomatic relations with North Korea. Ironically, this state-
ment had better results for North Korea than South Korea. 
5. North Korea's New Attitude Toward the United Nations 
Until the 1970s, the United Nations did not recognize the North 
Korean regime as a legal government, condemning it as an aggressor. 
As a result, the United Nations did not allow North Korean participa-
tion in its meetings, even in discussions of the Korean problem. Fol-
lowing the Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and 
Unification of President Park, however, North Korea established a 
permanent mission to the United Nations in New York in July 
1973.255 At the same time, North Korea took a seat in several Special 
Agencies. North Korea strategically chose leftist Algeria, not the So-
viet Union, as its spokesman to get support among the majority third 
254. Ibid., pp. 323-325. 
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world countries in the United Nations.256 Now the North Korean re-
gime not only participated in the discussion of the Korean question in 
the United Nations, but also criticized South Korea and the United 
States in the United Nations. After more than two decades, the 
United Nations was fundamentally changed concerning the Korean 
question. As a result, South Korea, who had until then monopolized 
the support of the United Nations, was on the defensive in the United 
Nations. 
This situation continued to deteriorate and culminated in 1975 
when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the two contra-
dictory resolutions concerning Korea.257 Subsequently, the interna-
tional situation was once again changed. Because the rapid economic 
growth of South Korea overshadowed North Korean diplomatic tac-
tics, the international environment became more favorable toward 
South Korea. 258 
Section B. Legal Problems Surrounding The Dissolution Of The 
United Nations Command 
The United Nations Command was created by the United Na-
tions Security Council to repel North Korean aggression against South 
Korea. The Communists have always demanded United Nations 
Command's dissolution from its creation. The Communists demand, 
however, had been ignored until this structural change in the United 
Nations. In the 1970s North Korea began to pursue aggressive diplo-
matic attacks against South Korea in the United Nations. The main 
purpose of these activities was to encourage the dissolution of the 
United Nations Command and withdrawal of U.S. military forces in 
South Korea. This purpose was partially achieved in 1975, when the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the two contradictory res-
olutions on the Korean question. The main content of these resolu-
tions concerned the dissolution of the United Nation's Command. 
From an international legal point of view, it is important to clar-
ify the legal character of the dissolution of the United Nation's Com-
mand, because both South and North Korea are deeply concerned 
with this problem. Their concerns are groundless, however, from the 
legal point of view. Their arguments are based upon wrong interpreta-
tions of the legal status of the United Nations Command in connection 
256. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note I, pp. 96-97. 
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with the Korean Armistice Agreement. It seems that both South Ko-
rea and North Korea assume that South Korea is not a legal party to 
the Korean Armistice Agreement, and that the United Nations Com-
mand is essential in maintaining the Korean Armistice Agreement. 
South Korea, however, is a legal party to the Korean Armistice Agree-
ment. (See Chapter I) The question of whether the United Nations 
Command is essential in maintaining the Korean Armistice Agree-
ment is considered hereinafter. 
1. The Dissolution of the UNCURK and Its Legal Implication 
a. The Function of the UNCURK 
The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabil-
itation of Korea (UNCURK) was established in the optimistic pros-
pect for the unification of Korea. After the success of the celebrated 
amphibious landings at Inchon on September 15, 1950, the United Na-
tions' Command continued victorious operations against the retreating 
Communists. The question then was whether the United Nations 
Command should push back the Communists just to the north of the 
38th Parallel or should it try to achieve the unification of Korea by 
force. Resolution 83 of the United Nations Security Council on June 
27, 1950, recommended that members of the United Nations "furnish 
such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel 
the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the 
area." This resolution could be interpreted to authorize an advance 
into North Korea for the complete restoration of peace in the area. 
The United Nations, however, decided to adopt another resolution 
which would be more concrete and clear. Resolution 376 (V) was 
adopted by the General Assembly on October 7, 1950. This resolution 
established UNCURK to implement its decision concerning the unifi-
cation and rehabilitation of Korea on the threshold of total military 
victory for the United Nations Command in Korea. 
This resolution provided detailed processes of the Korean unifica-
tion such as elections and formation of a unified government. It also 
provided the functions of UNCURK:259 
1) to assume the function exercised by the United Nations Com-
mission on Korea; 
2) to represent the United Nations in bringing about the estab-
lishment of a unified, independent and democratic government for all 
Korea; 
259. U.N.G.A. Res. 376(V) (October 7, 1950); ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Reso-
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3) to exercise such responsibilities in connection with relief and 
rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General 
Assembly; 
4) To prepare a report to the next regular session of the General 
Assembly and to any prior special session. 
In sum, the function of the UNCURK was to carry out the 
United Nations programs concerning the unification and rehabilita-
tion of Korea. Since most people expected to see imminent total mili-
tary victory of the United Nations Command,260 the United Nations 
created this Commission to carry out concrete programs of 
unification. 
b. The Dissolution of the UNCURK 
This optimism was not premature. At the beginning of October 
1950, several hundred thousand Chinese Communist forces intervened 
in Korea by attacking the United Nations forces on all fronts. As a 
result, the military situation was reversed and the Communists again 
took North Korea under their controP61 
By concluding the Korean Armistice Agreement, the United Na-
tions gave up its objective of Korean unification by force. The original 
purpose and function of the UNCURK were modified. Korean unifi-
cation was deemed impracticable for the foreseeable future. Thus, the 
UNCURK could not carry out its expected function but simply 
helped the rehabilitation of South Korea and observed South Korean 
political situations and general elections. 262 
The Communist side first proposed dissolving UNCURK in the 
early 1950s. The Soviet Union proposed a draft-resolution on March 
10, 1953, but it was rejected by a vote of fifty to five in the General 
Assembly.263 Proposals were repeatedly made to the General Assem-
bly by the Communist side and each time rejected by the great major-
ity of the United Nations members. 264 It is interesting to note, 
however, that the reason given for the proposed dissolution of UN-
CURK since 1961 is that the unification of Korea is a domestic prob-
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lem of the Korean people. 265 
As explained above, since the 1960s the United Nations has un-
dergone a structural change with the massive entrance of new born 
nations from decolonization. This change in the United Nations itself 
deeply affected the Korean question in the United Nations. The disso-
lution of UNCURK was once more at issue. North Korea chose Al-
geria as its spokesman and proposed the dissolution of UNCURK. 
After the issue of the South-North Joint Communique on July 4, 1972, 
which declared that peaceful unification of Korea was to be achieved 
without external interference, the North Korean voice demanding the 
dissolution of UNCURK became louder: 
In the light of the new elements which exist in the regime, it 
is now more than ever necessary to reconsider the terms of 
reference and activities of the United Nations Commission 
for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and the pres-
ence of the United Nations Military Command in Korea.266 
On June 23, 1973, after South Korean President Park announced 
in the Special Statement Regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Uni-
fication stating that he would not oppose North Korea's participation 
in international organizations and discussions of the Korean question 
before the United Nations, the situation quickly evolved. North Ko-
rea immediately sent its permanent mission to the United Nations in 
New York, and accelerated its diplomatic activity, with the strong 
support of the Communist bloc and many Third World countries. 
After the structural change in the United Nations, South Korea 
realized that the United Nations would no longer be useful for the 
Korean question. It agreed with the North Korean side in adopting a 
consensus statement without vote concerning the dissolution of UN-
CURK. The General Assembly adopted this consensus statement 
without vote on November 28, 1973.267 According to this statement, 
it was noted with satisfaction that a joint communique had been issued 
by South and North Korea on July 4, 1972, providing the following 
principles of the Korean unification: 1) the unification should be 
achieved independently without external interference, 2) by peaceful 
means; and 3) great national unity should be promoted. Hoping that 
the South-North dialogue would continue to develop, the statement 
265. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L303 (December 7, 1961); A/C.l/L404 (October 25, 1967); A/ 
C.1/L455 (December 9, 1968). 
266. U.N. Doc. A/8752 (July 17, 1972); A/8752 (September 15, 1972). 
267. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/L661; A/9030; A/9341; Resolutions, supra note 259, pp. 443-
445. 
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expressed the General Assembly's decision to dissolve immediately the 
United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of 
Korea (UNCURK). 
c. The Legal Implication of the Dissolution 
The legal implication of the dissolution of UNCURK should be 
considered in terms of its function and purpose. According to Resolu-
tion 376(V) of the United Nations General Assembly, the purpose and 
function of UNCURK were to assume the function exercised by the 
United Nations Commission on Korea, to represent the United Na-
tions in establishing a unified, independent, democratic government of 
Korea and to help the rehabilitation of Korea. The purpose and func-
tion of the United Nations Commission on Korea were also the Ko-
rean unification.268 Again, the purpose and function ofUNCURK are 
the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. Between these two pur-
poses of UNCURK, the rehabilitation was no longer necessary be-
cause the Korean economy had grown strong. The remaining purpose 
was the Korean unification. 
The dissolution of UNCURK was not the result of achievement 
of its purpose but abandonment of its purpose. After the structural 
change in the United Nations, the Korean unification through the 
United Nations seemed almost impossible. The consensus statement 
that dissolved UNCURK indicated that the Korean unification should 
be achieved by the Koreans themselves without external interfer-
ence.269 In sum, the United Nations retreated from its involvement in 
the Korean unification by dissolving UNCURK. Thus, the legal im-
plication of the dissolution of UNCURK means that the question of 
the United Nations was taking heads off from the Korean question. 
The dissolution of UNCURK is not only a consequence of the consen-
sus statement of November 28, 1973, but also the natural result of the 
structural change of the United Nations itself. 
2. The Two Contradictory Korean Resolutions of the United 
Nations General Assembly in November 1975 
a. Background 
After the dissolution of UNCURK, the immediate objective of 
North Korean policy focused on the dissolution of the United Nations 
Command. To North Korean eyes, this dissolution would be the last 
268. U.N.G.A. Res. 112 (II) (November 14, 1947); U.N.G.A. Res. 195 (III) (December 
12, 1948). 
269. U.N. Doc. A/9030; A/9341; A/C.l/L661. 
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symbolic organ connecting South Korean legitimacy with the United 
Nations. Therefore, it would be North Korean strategy to try to cut 
off this symbolic connection between the United Nations and South 
Korea through the dissolution of the United Nations Command. 
North Korea expected to be able to more effectively demand the with-
drawal of the United States troops in Korea once the United Nations 
Command was dissolved. In other words, the final objective of North 
Korean policy would be the withdrawal of the United States troops in 
South Korea. 
With this strategy North Korea proposed the dissolution of the 
United Nations Command and the withdrawal of foreign troops from 
South Korea at the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in 1974. South Korea, defending its position, tried to 
maintain the United Nations Command which it thought was essential 
for the implementation of the armistice agreement. In this backdrop, 
the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3333 (XXIX), which was a 
compromise but closer to the South Korean position: 
The General Assembly . . . expresses the hope that the Se-
curity Council, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued 
adherence to the Armistice Agreement and the full mainte-
nance of peace and security in the area, will in due course 
give consideration, in consultation with the parties directly 
concerned, to those aspects of the Korean question which 
fall within its responsibilities, including the dissolution of the 
United Nations Command in conjunction with appropriate 
arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement which is 
calculated to preserve peace and security in the Korean pe-
ninsula, pending negotiations and conciliation between the 
two Korean Governments leading to a lasting peace between 
them.270 
Immediately after the adoption of Resolution 3333, both sides be-
gan to prepare for another showdown in the 30th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1975. Both South Korea and North 
Korea dispatched several goodwill missions to Third World countries 
and invited several high ranking officials from these countries lobbying 
for their support in the United Nations.271 This tragic rivalry of South 
and North Korea culminated in the adoption of the two contradictory 
resolutions at the Thirtieth session of the General Assembly. This un-
270. U.N.G.A. Res. 3333 (XXIX) (December 17, 1947; Resolutions, supra note 259, pp. 
459-460. 
271. Foreign Policy, supra note 253, pp. 76-82. 
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reasonable event clearly showed the inability of the United Nations to 
solve the Korean question after its structural change. 
b. Resolution 3390A (the South Korean Position) 
i. Content 
The gist of Resolution 3390A, proposed by South Korea, is based 
on Resolution 3333 of the General Assembly, 17 December 1974. 
South Korea agreed to the dissolution of the United Nations Com-
mand on condition that appropriate arrangements be made to main-
tain the Korean Armistice Agreement. In support of this position, the 
United States sent a letter on June 27, 1975 to the President of the 
Security Council stating that it was prepared to terminate the United 
Nations Command on January 1, 1976, provided that there were alter-
native arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement.272 
The South Korean Foreign Minister also announced a statement on 
June 27, 1975 affirming South Korean willingness to enter into ar-
rangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement.273 
Resolution 3390A contains primarily a continuation of the South-
North Korean dialogue, alternative arrangements for the maintenance 
of the Armistice Agreement, and the dissolution of the United Nations 
Command.274 South Korea considered the United Nations Command 
to be essential to the implementation of the Korean Armistice Agree-
ment. Consequently, South Korea agreed to the dissolution of the 
United Nations Command only in conjunction with alternative ar-
rangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement. In order to 
emphasize its willingness to dissolve the United Nations Command, 
South Korea suggested that the Command might be dissolved on Jan-
uary 1, 1976, once the alternative arrangements were made. 
n. Legal Interpretation of the South Korean Position 
The principal objective of the South Korean position is to main-
tain peace and security in Korea. The external situation around the 
Korean peninsula and the structural change of the United Nations it-
self confused and embarrassed the South Korean Government. The 
United Nations, which had helped form the South Korean Govern-
ment and defended it in the face of Communist aggression, now lost its 
traditional principles and direction with the addition of new members 
272. U.N. Doc. S/11737 (1975). 
273. Korea Question, supra note 257, pp. 197-200. 
274. U.N.G.A. Res. 3390 A (XXX) (November 18, 1975); Resolutions, supra note 259, 
pp. 475-477. 
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not even in existence before the 1960s. In this uncertain situation, 
South Korea concentrated on maintaining peace and security on the 
Korean peninsula. The South Korean Government, modifying its tra-
ditionally dominant position of legitimacy in the United Nations as 
compared to the North Korean regime, proposed minimum security 
measures if the present security mechanism was to be changed. The 
South Korean Government presumed that the United Nations Com-
mand, whose Commander-in-Chief had signed the Korean Armistice 
Agreement, would be essential at least for the implementation of the 
Armistice Agreement. This position, however, was based on an incor-
rect legal interpretation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. 
The South Korean interpretation erred in two respects. The first 
error was the presumption that South Korea was not to be a legal 
party to the Armistice Agreement. The second error was that the 
United Nations would be a party to, or at least an essential organ for 
the implementation of, the Armistice Agreement. 
According to the statement of the South Korean Foreign Minis-
ter, responsibility for the implementation of Resolution 3333 now re-
sides with the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. 
Therefore, before the dissolution of the Command, the Commander-
in-Chief should designate officers of South Korea and the United 
States to take over maintenance of the Armistice Agreement from the 
Commander-in-Chief. This statement implied that the dissolution of 
the United Nations Command without appropriate arrangements 
would invalidate the Armistice Agreement.275 The United States 
Government's letter to the President of the Security Council on June 
27, 1975 confirmed this position.?276 The South Korean Memoran-
dum on the Korean question at the 30th session of the United Nations 
General Assembly of October 13, 1975, maintained the same 
position. 277 
Considering these arguments, the South Korean position clearly 
presumed that South Korea would not be a legal party to the Armi-
stice Agreement and that the United Nations Command would remain 
the essential organ for the continued legal effect of the Armistice 
Agreement. However, South Korea should be a principal legal party 
to the Korean Armistice Agreement under coalition army rules. If the 
commander of a coalition army signs an armistice agreement, all 
members composing the coalition army become parties to the agree-
275. Korean Question, supra note 257, pp. 197-200. 
276. U.N. Doc. S/11737 (1975). 
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ment.278 Furthermore, the United Nations Command functions 
merely as a subsidiary organ with no international legal personality, 
and thus cannot act as legal party to an international agreement. 
Legal effects of actions of this subsidiary organ belong to the organiza-
tion itself, namely the United Nations. Therefore, if the United Na-
tions Command is dissolved, the problem of extinction of a legal party 
to the Korean Armistice Agreement never arises; the only problem 
may be some technical arrangements. In this sense South Korean con-
cerns may be groundless, at least in terms of legal interpretation. 
c. Resolution 3390 B 
1. Content 
The North Korean position concentrates on the unification of 
Korea, while South Korea occupies itself with peace and security in 
Korea. North Korea insists on the withdrawal of foreign troops and 
dissolution of the United Nations Command emphasizing self-deter-
mination and the non-intervention of foreign countries. According to 
Resolution 3390 B, the North Korean position, it is urgently necessary 
to terminate foreign interference in Korea's internal problems, in or-
der to guarantee a durable peace in Korea and to accelerate independ-
ent and peaceful Korean reunification. North Korea proposed: 
1) to dissolve the United Nations Command and withdraw all 
foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United 
Nations; 
2) to call upon the real parties to the Korean Armistice Agree-
ment to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement; 
3) to urge South and North Korea to observe the principles of 
the South-North Joint Communique; and 
4) to take practical measures to stop arms reinforcement, drasti-
cally reducing the armed forces of both sides to an equal level. 279 
u. Legal Interpretation of the North Korean Position 
Possessing several contradictory elements, North Korea's posi-
tion is not initially clear. First, North Korea proposes to put an end to 
the Korean Armistice Agreement, yet it speaks of durable peace in 
Korea. According to the North Korean Memorandum of the Korean 
question at the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assem-
278. See the conclusion in Chapter I of this Volume. 
279. U.N.G.A. Res. 3390 B (November 18, 1975); Resolutions, supra note 259, pp. 477-
479 
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bly, the Armistice Agreement represents no more than a temporary 
cease-fire taken by two belligerent parties in an unstable state. There-
fore, according to the North Korean arguments, the Korean Armistice 
Agreement should be replaced by a peace agreement because "the Ar-
mistice Agreement cannot perform its original function owing to the 
constant sabotage of the Armistice Agreement by the United States 
side."28° Furthermore, North Korea holds that as the United Nations 
Command is a signatory to the Korean Armistice Agreement, once 
the United Nations Command dissolves, the Armistice Agreement 
must also cease to exist. 281 
North Korea's position that the Korean Armistice Agreement is 
imperfect, unstable, and should be put to an end is unreasonable. A 
peace agreement is neither a suspension nor a termination of an armi-
stice agreement, but rather its achievement and development. More-
over, an armistice today serves to terminate war itself even without 
resolving its cause. If North Korea really wants peaceful relations 
with South Korea, both sides should conclude a peace agreement that 
would make the principles of the South-North Joint Communique real 
legal terms. 
Second, it is absurd that North Korea proposes to negotiate a 
peace agreement with the United States while ignoring South Korea, 
when North Korea also speaks of the non-intervention of foreign pow-
ers and self-determination. According to the North Korean claim, the 
Korean Armistice Agreement was originally signed between the North 
Korean Commander and the Communist Chinese Commander, on the 
one hand, and the Commander of the United Nations Command on 
the other. The Chinese Communists "(h]ave already withdrawn to-
tally from Korea, and the so-called United Nations forces present in 
South Korea now are in fact U.S. troops. Therefore, the real parties to 
the Armistice Agreement ... " are North Korea and the United 
States.282 
It might be partially correct that North Korea recognizes the im-
portant position of the United States in the Korean Armistice Agree-
ment. However, it is obviously wrong not to realize the absolutely 
necessary position of South Korea as host country in the Korean ques-
tion. According to the international customs of the coalition army, 
South Korea must be the de jure party to the Korean Armistice 
Agreement as a result of the signature of the Commander-in-Chief of 
280. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/1054 (1975), p. 12. 
281. Ibid., p. 16. 
282. Ibid., p. 13. 
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the United Nations Command, under which the South Korean forces 
and the United Nations forces formed a coalition army.283 
Third, North Korea incorrectly believes that the Korean Armi-
stice Agreement would cease to exist if the United Nations Command 
is dissolved. Again, the United Nations Command represents only a 
subsidiary organ that cannot be an international legal person. The in-
ternational legal person in this case is the United Nations. Therefore, 
if the United Nations Command is dissolved, there is no extinction of 
a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement. 
It is superficial and naive to determine the North Korean position 
only through the arguments expressed in official documents. Unfortu-
nately, the credibility of Communist North Korea is low. For exam-
ple, during the active South-North Korean dialogues of the early 
1970s, North Korea had prepared several infiltration tunnels for a sur-
prise attack against South Korea.284 Thus, North Korea lost credibil-
ity as a good faith negotiator with South Korea. 
d. Adoption of the Two Contradictory Resolutions 
Two contradictory resolutions on the Korean question were 
adopted on November 18, 1975 by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. South Korea proposed Resolution 3390 A, which 
was adopted by a vote of fifty-nine to fifty-one with twenty-nine ab-
stentions.285 North Korea proposed Resolution 3390 B, which was 
adopted by a vote of fifty-four to forty-three with forty-two absten-
tions. The two resolutions contradict each other in that Resolution 
3390 A proposes the dissolution of the United Nations Command in 
concurrence with appropriate arrangements for maintaining the Armi-
stice Agreement, while Resolution 3390 B proposes unconditional dis-
solution of the United Nations Command. Resolution 3390 A 
concerns the maintenance of the Korean Armistice Agreement while 
Resolution 3390 B seeks the end of the Armistice Agreement. The 
simultaneous implementation of both resolutions is impossible. The 
United Nations' irresponsible act not only undermines the authority of 
the organization, but also clearly demonstrates the ineffectiveness and 
incapacity of the United Nations regarding the Korean question. 
Furthermore, the adoption of the two Korean resolutions leads to 
283. See Chapter I, Section 3. 
284. Three infiltration tunnels in the demilitarized zone were discovered in November 
1974, March 1975 and October 1978. For further information, see Korean Overseas Infor-
mation Service, A Handbook of Korea, 5th ed., Seoul: 1983, pp. 460-461. 
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possible polemics concerning their legality. After the adoption of the 
two contradictory resolutions, the Swedish delegate Rydbeck made a 
significant statement: 
The Swedish delegation deeply regrets that the question of 
Korea has not been treated in a more positive manner during 
the present session of the General Assembly. Polemics and 
confrontation cannot solve the difficult problems involved in 
the Korean issue, nor can controversial resolutions pressed 
to the vote and adopted with a number of affirmative votes 
far below the majority of member states.286 
This statement did not directly question the legality of the adop-
tion, but simply indicated the adoption was carried on a number of 
votes far below the majority of member states. However, Article 18 
Paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter provides that decisions of 
the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-
thirds majority of the members present and voting, and that these 
questions include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The Korean resolutions at the thirti-
eth session of the General Assembly concerned the maintenance of the 
Korean Armistice Agreement, dissolution of the United Nations Com-
mand, and maintenance of peace and security in the region, probably 
important questions demanding a two-thirds majority of member 
states present and voting. Despite this, the legality of this adoption 
was not questioned. The Korean question has long been treated in this 
manner. For example, the General Assembly's Resolution 2268 
(XXV) of December 7, 1970, concerning the Korean question, was 
adopted by a vote of sixty-three to thirty-seven, with twenty-five ab-
stentions. Resolution 3333 (XXIX), December 17, 1974, on the Ko-
rean question, was adopted by sixty-one votes to forty-two, with 
thirty-one abstentions. All of these adoptions are possible objects of 
legal polemics. 287 
3. The Withdrawal of United Nations Forces and the Actual 
Situation of the United Nations Command 
a. The Withdrawal of United Nations Forces 
When the Korean Armistice Agreement was concluded, United 
Nations forces began withdrawing from Korea. Two-thirds of the 
United Nations forces were withdrawn from Korea within two years 
286. Ibid., p. 62. 
287. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, pp. 130-131. 
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after the armistice, including more than six divisions of the United 
States forces. 288 The withdrawal continued and was almost completed 
in the early 1970s. At the thirtieth session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, United States Representative D. P. Moynihan ex-
plained the present situation of the United Nations Command: 
The United Nations Command today comprises those mili-
tary personnel directly involved in the carrying out by the 
United Nations Command of its Armistice Agreement re-
sponsibilities, and includes less than 300 non-Korean person-
nel. Most of these are U.S. military personnel assigned as 
staff personnel to the Command itself, and the remainder are 
part of the ceremonial honor guards of the Command. 
American forces serving in Korea in accordance with the 
U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Security Treaty of 1954 are 
not part of the United Nations Command .... 289 
In other words, there are virtually no combat troops except a 
small number of staff personnel to the Command itself and a ceremo-
nial honor guard. The staff personnel are mostly the United States 
military personnel. 
b. The Actual Situation of the United Nations Command 
According to the 1950 United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions 83 and 84, which created the United Nations Command, the mis-
sion and function of the Command was to repel the Communist armed 
attack against South Korea and to restore international peace and se-
curity in the region. The original United Nations Command was a 
military command for combat operations. The present United Na-
tions Command cannot carry out such military operations. Less than 
three-hundred staff members and ceremonial honor guards by no 
means constitute combat troops. What is a reasonable legal explana-
tion of the actual situation of the United Nations Command? Frankly, 
it should be recognized that the original military command for combat 
operations no longer exists. The nominal existence of the United Na-
tions Command, whose forces comprise less than 300 non-combat per-
sonnel, cannot be interpreted as the continuation of the original 
United Nations Command. Why should this nominal existence of the 
United Nations Command be sustained? This has resulted from an 
incorrect legal interpretation of the United Nations Command and the 
288. U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1952-54, vol. 
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Korean Armistice Agreement, based on two groundless suppositions. 
One is that South Korea is not a legal party to the Korean Armistice 
Agreement. The other supposition is that the United Nations Com-
mand is a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement (North Korean 
position)290 or that the United Nations Command is an essential organ 
for the implementation of the armistice (supposed South Korean posi-
tion). 291 However, South Korea should be a legal party to the Korean 
Armistice Agreement and the United Nations Command is merely a 
subsidiary organ of the United Nations and cannot be a legal party to 
an international agreement. 
Bearing this argument in mind, it may be said that the United 
Nations Command was already de facto dissolved by the withdrawal 
of almost all United Nations forces from Korea. The dissolution of 
UNCURK in 1973 was a clear expression of the United Nations' in-
tention that it would no longer handle this complicated problem. In 
fact, the United Nations cannot handle this problem due to its struc-
tural change resulting from the presence of numerous new nations. In 
the political domain, the United Nations would become an interna-
tional forum for various political opinions. 
Although it is an undeniable truth that the United Nations has 
helped and protected the existence and development of South Korea, 
it is also true that the United Nations Command was de facto dis-
solved when United Nations forces retreated from Korea. If the Ko-
rean War recurred, it is unlikely that the sixteen nations would again 
send their troops to Korea to defend South Korea despite the great 
sanction declaration. The sixteen nations issued this declaration at the 
conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The probable re-en-
gagement of the United States would be based on the Mutual Defense 
Treaty between the two countries, not the framework of the United 
Nations action. 
Section C. International Legal Mechanisms Of Peace In Korea 
Without The United Nations Command 
1. The Legal Significance of the Dissolution of the United 
Nations Command: Three Contending Opinions 
Structural change in the international situation relating to Korea 
made the United Nations Command in Korea, the long time guarantee 
for Korean security, not only the object of international polemics, but 
290. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/1054 (September 24, 1975), p. 13. 
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also the de facto dissolution of the Command by the withdrawal of 
United Nations forces from Korea. Notwithstanding the symbolic 
presence of the staff members and honor guards, it is reasonable to say 
that the original United Nations Command no longer exists. Some 
40,000 of the United States forces now present in Korea are not 
United Nations forces, but are in fact United States forces serving in 
Korea under the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States 
and South Korea. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the interna-
tional legal mechanisms of peace in Korea without the United Nations 
Command. First, the legal significance of the dissolution of the United 
Nations Command will be considered. 
a. Opinion 1: Extinction of One Party to the Korean 
Armistice Agreement 
This opinion is based on the premise that the United Nations 
Command would be the only legal party of the United Nations to the 
Korean Armistice Agreement. In this context, if the United Nations 
Command is dissolved, extinction of a legal party to the Armistice 
Agreement would result. Thus, the Armistice Agreement itself would 
be extinct. The North Korean position is very clear on this point, as 
expressed in its Memorandum on the Korean question at the thirtieth 
session of the United Nations General Assembly: 
If the United Nations Command, a signatory to the Korean 
Armistice Agreement, is dissolved, the Armistice Agree-
ment, too, will have no alternative but to cease its existence 
... Moreover, since the South Korean Authorities are not a 
signer of the Armistice Agreement and have consistently op-
posed the Armistice itself, they cannot become a signatory to 
the Armistice Agreement . . . 292 
The South Korean position is not clear. At times its position 
seems consistent with this opinion. For example, the South Korean 
Aide-Memoire on the Korean question at the thirtieth session of the 
United Nations General Assembly appears to be along these lines: 
The North Korean position is unrealistic and dangerous, be-
cause it does not mention at all how to ensure continued ad-
herence to the Armistice Agreement after the dissolution of 
the United Nations Command which is a party signatory to 
the agreement . . . 293 
292. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/1054 (September 24, 1975), pp. 16-17. 
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But the South Korean position does not say that the dissolution 
of the United Nations Command would result in the extinction of the 
Armistice Agreement, and in this respect differs from the North Ko-
rean position. This opinion is legally incorrect because it holds that 
the United Nations Command, a subsidiary organ of the United Na-
tions, is a legal party to the Korean Armistice Agreement, and that 
South Korea is not a legal party to it. 
b. Opinion 2: The Disappearance of an Essential Organ for 
Implementing the Armistice Agreement 
This opinion holds not that the dissolution of the United Nations 
Command would result in the extinction of the Armistice Agreement, 
but that eventually some similar situation would ensue due to the dis-
appearance of the essential organ for implementing the Armistice 
Agreement. The positions of South Korea and the United States are 
similar to this opinion, although they do not clearly address the legal 
meaning of the dissolution. These positions are somewhat obscure. 
This opinion is found in the letter of the United States Government 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, dated June 27, 
1975: 
The Government of the United States, in consultation with 
the Government of the Republic of Korea . . . is ready to 
terminate the United Nations Command and, together with 
the Republic of Korea, to designate military officers of the 
United States and the Republic of Korea as successors in 
command, as provided for in Paragraph Seventeen of the Ar-
mistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, who would ensure im-
plementation and enforcement of all provisions of the 
Armistice Agreement, which are now the responsibility of 
the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command 
294 
The same opinion is expressed in the statement of the South Korean 
Government concerning the implementation of the General Assembly 
Resolution 3333.295 
Based on the supposition that South Korea might not be a legal 
party to the Korean Armistice Agreement, this opinion is incorrect. 
Furthermore, this opinion does not reflect the real practices concern-
ing the implementation of the Armistice. In fact, South Korea and the 
United States have an exclusive role in implementing the Armistice 
294. U.N. Doc. S/11737 (June 27, 1975). 
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Agreement through the Military Armistice Commission. They receive 
virtually no influence from the United Nations or other nations. 
The legal order should reflect the reality, rather than the reality 
be subject to the legal order. The reality is that the United Nations 
Command is already de facto dissolved and that South Korea and 
North Korea should be the principal parties to the Korean question, 
including the implementation of the Armistice Agreement. Moreover, 
South and North Korea are determined to solve the Korean question 
independently without the intervention of external powers, as ex-
pressed in the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972. There 
would never be any feasible agreement if it excluded either South Ko-
rea or North Korea. 296 
c. Opinion 3: The Quasi-Withdrawal of the United Nations 
as a Party to the Korean Armistice Agreement 
The legal significance of the dissolution of the United Nations 
Command is difficult to ascertain with clarity. It involves two differ-
ent legal acts at the same time: 1) the withdrawal of the United Na-
tions as a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement and 2) the 
transfer of its responsibility to the parties directly concerned. As the 
United Nations Command serves merely as a subsidiary organ of the 
United Nations, the United Nations Command was never a legal party 
to the Armistice Agreement. The United Nations itself was the legal 
party. Therefore, if the United Nations Command is dissolved, there 
is no extinction of a party to the Armistice Agreement, unless the 
United Nations itself ceases to exist. 
The dissolution of the United Nations Command, however, 
would provide a clear expression of the intention of the United Na-
tions to cease direct involvement in solving the Korean question. The 
consensus statement adopted by the United Nations General Assem-
bly on November 28, 1973, which decided the dissolution of UN-
CURK, also expressed this intention. This statement encouraged the 
South-North Joint Communique dated July 14, 1972, which expressed 
the principle of self-reliant unification without external interference.297 
In this case, the act of the United Nations would not represent a de-
nunciation of the Armistice Agreement. A denunciation is a unilateral 
act denouncing the legal obligation of an international treaty. The dis-
solution would not mean under any circumstances a denunciation of 
legal obligations of the United Nations for the Korean Armistice 
296. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, p. 133. 
297. U.N. Doc. A/9341 (November 28, 1973). 
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Agreement. It means simply that the United Nations intends to trans-
fer its responsibility to directly concerned parties and to withdraw 
from direct involvement in the Korean question. The directly con-
cerned parties are principally South and North Korea, and to a lesser 
degree the United States and China. 
In conclusion, the dissolution of the United Nations Command 
means that the United Nations withdraws from a direct role in the 
Korean question and transfers its responsibility to the directly con-
cerned parties. 
The expression "quasi-withdrawal of the Untied Nations as a 
party to the Armistice Agreement" is inexact, but it is justified in the 
absence of a more proper term. 298 
2. Parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement After the 
Dissolution of the United Nations Command 
a. The General Problem 
The United Nations status as a superficial party to the Korean 
Armistice Agreement by the signature of the Commander-in-Chief of 
the United Nations Command gives rise to questions concerning the 
legal parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement upon dissolution of 
the Command. These questions concern South Korea and the United 
States and do not affect the Communist side. The dissolution of the 
United Nations Command, whose commander signed the Armistice, 
leaves uncertainty as to the identity of the parties on the Untied Na-
tions side. 
First, South Korea's legal status would be consolidated by the 
dissolution. South Korea, though it should be a principal party to the 
Korean Armistice Agreement, has been over-shadowed by the United 
Nations Command. Some have denied South Korea's legal status as a 
party to the Armistice Agreement. The dissolution of the Command 
would remove this shadow from South Korean sovereignty.299 
. Second, the dissolution of the United Nations Command is le-
gally interpreted as quasi-withdrawal of the United Nations as a party 
to the Korean Armistice Agreement. This presents questions as to the 
successor of the United Nations as a party to the Armistice Agreement 
and the relationship between the United Nations and the United 
States. The next section addresses these questions. 
298. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note I, pp. 133-135. 
299. Ibid., p. 136. 
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b. The Relationship Between the United Nations and the 
United States 
The role of the United States in the Korean question has been 
very important from the beginning. The United States had the most 
important role in the liberation of Korea from the Japanese, the divi-
sion of Korea, and the establishment of the South Korean government 
by initiating the United Nations action and United Nations Command 
military operations in Korea. The United States also had the principal 
responsibility for the negotiation and conclusion of the Korean Armi-
stice Agreement, as well as post-war peace-keeping in Korea through 
the operation of the Military Armistice Commission. After the de 
facto dissolution of the United Nations Command, the United States 
role did not change. Thus, it is necessary to clarify the legal status of 
the United States with regard to the Korean Armistice Agreement and 
the relationship between the United Nations and the United States. 
The North Korean position is very clearly expressed in its Memo-
randum on the Korean question at the thirtieth session of the United 
Nations General Assembly.300 According to this Memorandum, the 
Armistice Agreement was originally signed by the Commander of the 
North Korean Army and the Commander of Communist China's 
forces, and also by the United Nations Command. The Chinese have 
already withdrawn from Korea. "The so-called United Nations Com-
mand present in South Korea now are, in fact, United States troops." 
Therefore, the Memorandum said, the real parties to the Armistice 
Agreement are North Korea and the United States. 
The positions of South Korea and the United States are not clear. 
Although both South Korea and the United States strongly suggested 
that the United States would continue to take responsibility for main-
taining the Korean Armistice Agreement even after the dissolution of 
the United Nations Command. For example, the United States Gov-
ernment's letter dated June 27, 1975, to the President of the Security 
Council expressed this position: 
The Government of the United States, in consultation with 
the Republic of Korea, wishes to bring to the attention of the 
Security Council that it is ready to terminate the United Na-
tions Command and, together with the Republic of Korea, to 
designate military officers of the United States and the Re-
public of Korea as successors in command, as provided for 
300. U.N. Doc. A/C.I/1054 (September 24, 1975); ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Memoranda Submitted to the UN General Assembly Regarding the Korean Question, Vol. 2 
Seoul: 1977, pp. 1018-1019. 
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in Paragraph 17 of the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 
1953, who would ensure implementation and enforcement of 
all provisions of the Armistice Agreement, which are now 
the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the United 
Nations Command.301 
Here the expression "designate military officers of the United States 
and the Republic of Korea as successors in command" would mean 
that after the dissolution of the United Nations Command, South Ko-
rean and American officers would take responsibility for implementa-
tion of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The statement by the South 
Korean Foreign Minister dated July 7, 1975, concerning the imple-
mentation of General Assembly Resolution 3333 expressed the same 
position. 302 
South Korea and the United States planned to take responsibility 
for the implementation of the Armistice Agreement after the dissolu-
tion of the Command. Since South Korea has been the principal party 
to the Armistice Agreement, this position indicates that the United 
States would replace the United Nations as a party to the Armistice 
Agreement after the dissolution of the United Nations Command. 
This replacement would be somewhat different from a succession of 
treaty in the strict sense. A succession of treaty in international law 
takes place as a result of a territorial change or the extinction of an 
international organization. 303 In this case, however, there is just the 
extinction of the United Nations Command, a subsidiary organ, and 
not the United Nations itself. Considering all these elements, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that the United States would replace the United 
Nations as a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement in conjunction 
with the de facto dissolution of the United Nations Command.304 
Practices such as the operation of the Military Armistice Commission 
confirm this position. 
3. The Implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement 
After the Dissolution of the United Nations 
Command 
a. The Validity of the Armistice Agreement 
According to the North Korean Memorandum on the Korean 
301. U.N. Doc. S/11737 (June 27, 1975). 
302. Korea Question, supra note 257, pp. 198-200. 
303. Dictionaire de Ia Terminologie du Droit International Public, Paris: Sirey, 1960, p. 
587; A.G. Pereira, La Succession d'Etats en Matiere de Traites, Paris: Pedone, 1969, p. 4. 
304. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, pp. 137-139. 
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question at the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly, the dissolution of the United Nations Command would result in 
the extinction of the Korean Armistice Agreement. 
If the United Nations Command, a signatory to the Korean 
Armistice Agreement, is dissolved, the Armistice Agree-
ment, too, will have no alternative but to cease its existence. 
Accordingly, it is out of the question from the outset to 
change only the signatory to the Armistice Agreement while 
keeping it as it is, though it may be another matter to replace 
the Armistice Agreement. 305 
The North Korean position is legally incorrect and contradictory. 
North Korea's incorrect position results from legal ignorance. North 
Korea believes that the United Nations Command is a party to the 
Korean Armistice Agreement, but in reality the United Nations Com-
mand is merely a subsidiary organ. This subsidiary organ cannot be a 
party to an international treaty. Only international organizations such 
as the United Nations and Special Agencies can be parties to an inter-
national treaty. Furthermore, the North Korean position is contradic-
tory because it claims that the United States is a real party to the 
Korean Armistice Agreement and that the dissolution of the United 
Nations Command would result in the extinction of the Armistice 
Agreement. 
Since South Korea should be a principal party to the Korean Ar-
mistice Agreement, there would not be an extinction of the Armistice 
Agreement if the United Nations withdrew from the Armistice Agree-
ment. The United States would replace the United Nations as a party 
to the Korean Armistice Agreement when the United Nations Com-
mand is dissolved. 306 
In conclusion, the Korean Armistice Agreement would not be ex-
tinct under any circumstances with the dissolution of the United Na-
tions Command. 
b. The Operation of the Military Armistice Commission 
Although there is no problem in the legal mechanisms for peace-
keeping in the Korean peninsula after the dissolution of the United 
Nations Command, there may be some technical problems in imple-
mentation of the Armistice Agreement. Some technical and adminis-
trative measures will be necessary for continued operation of the 
305. U.N. Doc. A/C.l/1054 (September 24, 1975), Korea Question, supra note 257, pp. 
1007-1026. 
306. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note 1, p. 141. 
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Military Armistice Commission, which serves as an important organ 
for the implementation and enforcement of the Armistice Agreement 
because the United Nations Command Commander-in-Chief is re-
sponsible for the operation of the Military Armistice Commission in 
accordance with Paragraphs 17 and 20 of the Armistice Agreement. 
As South Korean and American officers are already taking responsi-
bility for the operation of the Military Armistice Commission, the 
only necessary technical measure is to replace the nominal title of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command with South 
Korean and American officers. 
The analogic solution to the problem can be found in the history 
of international politics. Following decolonization, new-born states 
recognized the binding force of the treaties concluded by the preceding 
colonial state with the exception of expressive denunciation. For ex-
ample, according to Article seven of the Treaty between the United 
States and the Philippines of July 4, 1946, the Philippines are engaged 
in the legal obligation of treaties concluded by the United States.307 
Another similar case was seen when Ivory Coast, Congo, Central Af-
rica, and Senegal declared that, after independence, they would abide 
by the terms of the treaties308 concluded by France in the colonial 
period. In all these cases the same technical problems of replacing the 
original responsible organ exist, showing that this problem is not 
unique to the dissolution of the United Nations Command. Accord-
ingly, the analogy would apply to the Korean Armistice Agreement 
after the dissolution of the Command. The peace would depend not 
upon legal interpretation, but rather upon the goodwill of the parties 
concerned. 309 
307. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. II, Washington: GPO, p. 985. 
308. Ibid .• p. 979. 
309. Lyou Byung-Hwa, supra note I, p. 142. 
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CHAPTER THREE. THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Although a voluminous number of books and articles concerning 
Korean unification have been published, most of them concentrate on 
describing the expressed policies of South and North Korea. They fail 
to offer either positive suggestions for unification or legal analysis for 
unification planning. This is understandable, given the possibility that 
Korean unification might not be easily achieved in the foreseeable fu-
ture under the present circumstances. 
However, Korean unification is a prerequisite to the development 
of the Korean nation as a democratic and rich country playing its 
proper role in the history of the world. The Korean nation, with a 
population of sixty million and a cultural tradition spanning 
thousands of years, has not taken its proper place in the modern 
world. Korea has thus suffered the tragic national division imposed by 
outside powers. 
Geographically situated among the major powers of the world, 
Korea has struggled for survival throughout most of its history. The 
clear truth emerging from Korea's long historical experience shows 
that the way of Korean survival and prosperity is not to pursue a bal-
anced policy toward the major powers, but rather to become one of 
them. Korean unification is the first prerequisite for reaching this 
goal. In this sense, it is essential for Korea's future to seek out feasible 
means of unification and to formulate a legal basis for this national 
task. For this purpose, after a very brief survey of South and North 
Korean unification policies, various facts directly relating to Korean 
unification will be studied. The legal situation of a divided Korea will 
also be analyzed. Finally, in light of this research, some feasible meth-
ods for Korean unification will be suggested. 
Section A. The Unification Policies Of South And North Korea 
1. South Korea 
a. President Rhee (1950s) 
President Rhee Syngman, the first president of South Korea, ini-
tially tried to consolidate the fragile new-born government of South 
Korea in the face of domestic factional disputes and the tense con-
frontation with North Korean Communists. For this purpose, Presi-
dent Rhee on the one hand lobbied for international recognition of his 
government and, on the other hand, exerted all his efforts to persuade 
the United States government to assist in assuring Korean security. 
As to the first objective, President Rhee succeeded in achieving clear 
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recognition from the United Nations under the auspices of the United 
States. The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the South 
Korean Government with very strong words on December 12, 1948: 
The General Assembly . . . declares that there has been es-
tablished a lawful government (the Government of theRe-
public of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction 
over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission 
was able to observe and consult and in which the great ma-
jority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government 
is based on elections which were a valid expression of the 
free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which 
were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this 
is the only such government in Korea. . . . 310 
With respect to the second objective of South Korea, the South Ko-
rean government failed to persuade the United States to provide 
enough military assistance to assure South Korean security, due to the 
"Europe first" policy of the United States government.311 
During the latter part of the Korean War, President Rhee at-
tached much importance to the unification of Korea, stubbornly op-
posing an armistice without the solution of the Korean division. It is 
understandable that he could not help but resist an armistice without 
the solution of the Korean division after such heavy casualties and 
despite the favorable military situation of the United Nations Com-
mand. President Rhee's letter of May 30, 1953 to President Eisen-
hower expressed this emotional situation: 
We are fearfully aware ... that to accept any armistice ar-
rangement which would allow the Chinese Communists to 
remain in Korea would mean to the Korean nation, in terms 
of eventualities, an acceptance of a death sentence without 
protest . . . I beg you to allow the Korean people to con-
tinue the fighting, for this is the universal preference of the 
Korean people to any divisive armistice or peace. Our first 
choice, if we are allowed to make it, is still to have our allies 
by our side to actively help us fight out our common issue. 
But, if that is no longer possible, we would rather wish to 
have the right of self-determination to decide the issue our-
310. UN General Assembly Resolution 195 (III), 12 December 1948; ROK, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Resolutions of the UN Principal Organs Relating to Korea (1947-1976), 
Seoul, 1976, pp. 58-59. 
311. Kim Hak-Joon, The Unification Policy of South and North Korea, Seoul: Seoul 
National University Press, 1977, p. 72. 
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selves conclusively one way or the other. Anyway, it is be-
yond question that we cannot any longer survive a stalemate 
of division .... 312 
President Rhee's stubborn position continued even after the con-
clusion of an armistice agreement. Although South Korea attended 
the Geneva Political Conference on the Korean question, it did so re-
luctantly and under heavy pressure from the United States govern-
ment. President Rhee never believed that negotiations with the 
Communist side could lead to positive results.313 He insisted on unifi-
cation by force, but in the face of strong U.S. opposition his claim 
became more and more a bluff without much chance of realization. 
President Eisenhower's letter of March 20, 1953, to President Rhee 
confirmed the United States' position: 
If you should initiate such military action, my obligation to 
both United States forces and to other United Nations forces 
would be to plan how best to prevent their becoming in-
volved and to assure their security .... 314 
President Rhee's bluff of unification by force did not benefit the 
objective of unification. Instead, it created unnecessary tension in 
United States-Korean relations and isolated Korea from world opin-
ion. Furthermore, his bluff delayed the fortification of South Korean 
forces through U.S. military assistance.315 
This is not to say that President Rhee never proposed any policy 
of peaceful unification. He did propose such policies, but never with 
the intention that the Communist side would accept his proposal. For 
example, at the Geneva Conference on the Korean question, his gov-
ernment proposed a fourteen point proposal. The main points were:316 
1) free elections under United Nations supervision, in proportion to 
the population of the whole of Korea, to be determined by a national 
census under United Nations supervision; 
2) complete withdrawal of Chinese forces before elections, and the 
312. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-
1954, volume XV, Korea, part 1, Washington: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1984, 
pp. 1124-1126. 
313. The South Korean Government's Statement dated 18 April 1954 concerning its 
participation in the Geneva Conference, in US Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, volume XVI, The Geneva Conference, Washington: 
GPO, 1981, pp. 114-115. 
314. Ibid., pp. 44-46. 
315. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, 
volume XV, Korea, part 2, Washington: GPO, pp. 1598-1666. 
316. FRUS, The Geneva Conference, supra note 313, pp. 278-279; 310-313. 
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withdrawal of United Nations forces to be completed upon effective 
control of a unified government; and 
3) continuation of the South Korean constitutional system. In sum, 
President Rhee's proposal was the annexation of North Korea under 
the South Korean constitutional system through a general election. 
Considering the legitimacy of the South Korean Government, his pro-
posal might have some legal ground, but it was very clear that North 
Korea would not accept this proposal and President Rhee himself did 
not expect acceptance. · 
b. President Park and Beyond 
The unification policy of President Park Chung-Hee is much 
more realistic and steady than that of President Rhee. In summary, 
President Park's policy was economic development prevailing over 
North Korea, and then a gradual approach to the peaceful unification 
by easing tensions between South and North Korea through dialogue 
and reconciliation based on various exchanges between South and 
North Korea. This unification policy can be divided into two periods. 
First, in the 1960s, President Park concentrated on building national 
strength through a rapid economic development policy under a 
staunch anti-Communist approach without dialogue with North Ko-
rea. His statements and addresses repeatedly expressed this policy 
trend. "[O]ur basic principle for unification is to foster our strength 
by expediting economic construction and modernizing our country to 
the level of advanced nations as rapidly as possible .... " 317 
We need a certain period of time before we can elevate our 
economic might to be a far more superior position than that 
of the North Korean puppet regime by completing the estab-
lishment of a self-sufficient economy and the modernization 
movement, and before we equip ourselves with an absolutely 
superior might over the puppet regime ... [t]he more eager 
we are for unification, the more we must realize that we are 
the very persons who have to do this task .. Y 8 
Second, in the 1970s, President Park continued to pursue rapid 
economic growth and also attempted some gradual contact with the 
North Korean regime on the base of national strength which he had 
achieved. He expressed this position in his commemorative address on 
August 5, 1970, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the national liberation. 
317. Major Speeches by Korea's Park Chung Hee, compiled by Shin Bum-Shik, Seoul, 
1970, p. 257. 
318. Ibid., p. 254. 
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In this address, he reiterated his past remarks, stating that it might be 
the latter part of the 1970s before major efforts could be made for 
unification, believing that by that time South Korean national strength 
could help the South Koreans to unravel the entanglement of the unifi-
cation problem. Then, he suggested his unification approach: 
Any approach toward the unification by peaceful means is 
not feasible without easing tensions. Therefore, such an ap-
proach should be preceded above all by an unequivocal ex-
pression of attitude. In case we can recognize that the North 
Korean Communists comply with and accept the prerequi-
sites in deeds . . . I would be prepared to suggest epochal 
and more realistic measures with a view to removing, step by 
step, various artificial barriers existing between the South 
and the North, in the interest of laying the groundwork for 
the unification and on the basis of humanitarian considera-
tions .... 319 
This new approach of President Park succeeded in opening initial 
contacts. In August 1971, the Red Cross of South and North Korea 
began to negotiate on reunions of families dispersed in South and 
North Korea. 320 On July 4, 1972, the South-North Joint Communi-
que was announced, offering some hope for Korean unification. This 
Communique, the first formal agreement between the governments of 
South and North Korea since the conclusion of the Armistice Agree-
ment, formulated some basic principles of unification. 
Although the South-North Joint Communique did not make 
much progress, President Park continued to pursue his gradual ap-
proach. He believed that both sides should endeavor to gradually re-
move the artificial barriers between thee South and the North by 
solving easier and more practical problems first, and to phase out feel-
ings of mutual distrust and replace them with those of mutual confi-
dence through concrete results. 321 
In conclusion, his basic formula for unification was clear and real-
istic. First, national strength should be built through rapid economic 
development. On the basis of prevailing national strength, gradual 
peaceful unification should be carried out, by easing tensions and rec-
319. The Institute for East Asian Studies, Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, Se-
oul, 1975, pp. 148-157. 
320. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on SouthNorth Dialogue in Ko-
rea, Seoul, 1982, pp. 63-84. 
321. The Institute for East Asian Studies, Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification, supra 
note 319, pp. 161-167. 
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onciling South and North Korea. For this purpose, he proposed three 
basic principles:322 1) Peace should be finally established on the Ko-
rean peninsula through a mutual non-aggression agreement between 
the South and the North; 2) the South and the North should open 
doors to each other and restore mutual trust by pursuing rapid pro-
gress of South-North dialogue with sincere and open exchanges and 
cooperation; and 3) based on the above foundations, free general elec-
tions should be held throughout Korea under fair election manage-
ment and supervision and in direct proportion to the indigenous 
population, thereby achieving the unification of the country. 
Although President Park's unification policy was very reasonable 
and realistic, he did not envision a concrete program for unification in 
the foreseeable future. In this sense, his policy was to lay a long-term 
basis for unification, rather than to realize the concrete objective of 
unification. 
After the death of President Park, the South Korea unification 
policy has continued along the lines he established. For example, 
President Chun's Declaration of the Formula for National Reconcilia-
tion and Democratic Unification on January 22, 1982, expressed a 
similar position. In this declaration, President Chun said that it would 
be essential to promote trust between the South and the North and 
eliminate from national life all impediments to unification to facilitate 
the drafting of a unified constitution. For this purpose, he proposed: 
1) to normalize relations between South and North Korea, and to 
conclude a provisional agreement on basic relations between South 
and North Korea; 2) to open their societies to each other through 
various forms of exchanges and cooperation; and 3) to establish a resi-
dent liaison mission in Seoul and Pyongyang and appoint a plenipoten-
tiary envoy with the rank of cabinet minister to head the liaison 
mission. 323 
The South-North Korean dialogue has made no substantial pro-
gress, and the two sides continue to maintain nominal contacts. How-
ever, it is noteworthy that, after the South Korean proposal of August 
20, 1984, to open trade and economic cooperation with North Korea, 
South Korea accepted the North Korean offer on September 8 for re-
lief goods to victims of floods in South Korea. 324 This was the first 
concrete result after long nominal contacts between South and North 
322. Ibid., pp. 175-186. 
323. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Ko-
rea, supra note 320, pp. 352-356. 
324. Korean Overseas Information Service, Inter-Korean Economic Talks, Seoul, 1984, 
pp. 5-6. 
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Korea. Then the two sides began talks on various economic exchanges 
between South and North Korea. A recent meeting was held at 
Panmunjom on May 17, 1985, but still achieved no tangible results. 325 
The two sides also resumed Red Cross talks, suspending twelve 
years ago, to arrange reunions for many families separated by the na-
tional division. On May 27, 1985, an eighty-four member North Ko-
rea delegation visited Seoul to hold a meeting with the South Korean 
delegation. The two sides agreed to exchange a limited number of sep-
arated family members around August 15, the fortieth anniversary of 
the national liberation. They agreed to hold another meeting on July 
15 at Panmunjom to work out the procedures for the exchange. 326 At 
last, the reunion of separated families was possible on September 20, 
1986. Each side sent a one hundred fifty-one member delegation to 
the other's capital, and among them were fifty persons of separated 
families. 327 
2. North Korea 
With only a superficial survey of the North Korean proposals, it 
would be difficult to pinpoint exactly the unification policy of North 
Korea due to the propagandistic character of its proposals. For exam-
ple, just before the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, 
1950, North Korea carried out an intensive campaign for peaceful uni-
fication, proposing a general election in August 1950. The campaign, 
however, was intended only to camouflage the preparation of an im-
pending armed attack.328 During the active South-North dialogue in 
the early 1970s, North Korea constructed several infiltration tunnels 
in the demilitarized zone.329 In light of this, examination of North 
Korean official proposals or public pronouncements would not render 
an objective analysis, but rather would amount to superficial observa-
tions. The real intentions and objectives of North Korean unification 
policy should be discerned through all available means. In keeping 
with this, it would be reasonable to summarize the main points of the 
North Korean proposals and analyze them in terms of possible objec-
tives and actual deeds. 
325. The Washington Post, May 17, 1985. 
326. The Washington Post, May 28 and 31, 1985. 
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a. North Korean Proposals for Unification 
Over four decades North Korea made numerous proposals for the 
unification of Korea, but the main points of all these proposals are 
very similar. This consistency over time in the North Korean position 
might be partially explained by the fact that while the head of the 
South Korean government has changed several times, in North Korea 
Kim 11-Sung has maintained his power for four decades and is now 
preparing the succession of power for his son. 
The key points of the North Korean proposals for unification in-
clude withdrawal of United States forces, the guarantee for Commu-
nist activities in South Korea, a national conference of all political 
parties and social organizations in preparation for general elections 
which would exclude certain anti-Communist leaders, the reduction of 
armed forces or integration of armed forces of South and North Ko-
rea, general elections, and the formation of a unified government. In 
addition to these points, pending perfect unification, North Korea also 
proposed the establishment of a federal republic permitting two ex-
isting regimes. An eight-point unification formula adopted by North 
Korea on June 28, 1949, illustrates these key points. The main points 
consisted of: 1) peaceful unification of the Korean people; 2) general 
elections throughout South and North Korea on September 15, 1949, 
the promulgation of a new constitution, and the establishment of the 
Republic of Chosun; 3) elimination of the oppression of democratic 
parties and social organizations (Communist activities) in South Ko-
rea; 4) a joint conference of democratic political parties and social or-
ganizations in preparation for a general election; and 5) exclusion of 
anti-people reactionary persons (anti-Communist leaders) in South 
Korea from the joint conference.330 A North Korean proposal of June 
1950 detailed its personanon-grata, including the most influential anti-
Communist leaders such as President Rhee Syngman, Kim Sung-Soo, 
Cho Byung-Ok, and others. After the conclusion of the Armistice 
Agreement, North Korea made similar proposals at the Geneva Polit-
ical Conference on the Korean question held April 26 to June 15, 
1954, resisting the general elections under the United Nations 
supervision. 331 
The North Korean proposals of the 1970s reveal the recent policy 
330. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Ko-
rea, supra note 320, p. 209; Kim Hak-Joon, supra note 311, p. 183. 
331. US Department of State, The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-
June 15, 1954, Washington: GPO, 1954, pp. 39-40; FRUS, The Geneva Conference, supra 
note 313, pp. 149-150. 
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of North Korea. On April12, 1971, the North Korean Foreign Minis-
ter Ho Dam proposed an eight-point formula for unification. The 
main points were: 1) American forces should be withdrawn from 
South Korea; 2) The armed forces of South and North Korea should 
be reduced to 100,000 men each or less; 3) The South Korea-U.S. Mu-
tual Defense Treaty and the South Korea-Japan Treaty should be de-
clared null and void; 4) After the withdrawal of American forces from 
South Korea, a free election should be held throughout South and 
North Korea to establish a unified government; 5) The political activi-
ties of all political parties and social organizations throughout South 
and North Korea should be guaranteed; 6) Pending complete unifica-
tion, a confederation system should be formed between South and 
North Korea to permit two different systems; 7)The South and the 
North should engage in mutual trade and cooperation, and exchanges 
in various domains; and 8) A South-North political conference should 
be held with the participation of all political parties and social organi-
zations for consultation over these problems. 332 
This formula of unification has since been reaffirmed. For exam-
ple, on June 23, 1973, North Korean President Kim 11-Sung confirmed 
this proposal in a speech at the mass rally welcoming visiting Czecho-
slovakian Communist leader Gustav Husak, in which he proposed the 
so-called five-point unification program. The salient features were: 1) 
Dissolution of military confrontation and relaxation of tension be-
tween the South and the North; 2) Multilateral collaboration and ex-
change between the South and the North; 3) Convocation of a grand 
national conference composed of representatives of all walks of life, 
political parties, and social organizations in the South and the North; 
4) Institution of a South-North confederation system under the name 
of Confederal Republic of Koryo (Korea); and 5) Joint entry of the 
South and the North into the United Nations as a single member. 333 
b. An Analysis of North Korean Proposals 
1. The Main Points of North Korean Proposals 
Although the North Korean regime proposed numerous unifica-
tion programs, they could all be summed up in the following main 
points: 1) the withdrawal of American forces; 2) the guarantee of 
Communist activities in South Korea; 3) the release of all political 
prisoners including North Korean spy agents; 4) a national conference 
332. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in 
Korea, supra note 320, pp. 212-213. 
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organized under North Korean terms to carry out a general election 
and the formation of unified government; and S)pending the formation 
of unified government, the establishment of a confederal republic. 
First, North Korea concentrates on the withdrawal of United 
States forces. This demand is understandable considering that the 
North Korean invasion in 1950 almost achieved its objective, and was 
thwarted only by United States intervention. They seemed to judge 
that as long as American forces stayed, their objective of unification 
would be impossible. Consequently, they took the withdrawal of 
American forces as a prerequisite for unification. For this reason they 
tried a variety of measures to realize the withdrawal of United States 
forces, sometimes through the use of provocations such as the ax-mur-
der of United States officers by North Korean soldiers on August 18, 
1976, and other times through peace propaganda. Their attempts, 
however, have yet to succeed. 
Second, North Korea has attempted to establish a Communist 
connection in South Korea. For this purpose it demands the guaran-
tee of Communist activities, permission for a Communist party in 
South Korea and release of Communist spy agents imprisoned in 
South Korea, the abolition of the Anti-Communist Law, and repeal of 
the National Security Law.334 It seems strange, however, that the 
North Koreans unilaterally demand such conditions at a serious con-
ference. Such demands indicate clearly that it would be very naive to 
expect something extraordinary from negotiations with the North Ko-
rean Communists. 
Third, North Korea requires a national conference of all political 
parties and social organizations to organize general elections for Ko-
rean unification. According to North Korean Representative Ryu 
Jang-Shik at the third meeting of the Vice-chairmen of the South-
North Coordinating Committee on January 30, 1974, the "Grand Na-
tional Congress" would be composed of an equal number of delegates 
from sixty to seventy political parties and social organizations in South 
and North Korea under the following conditions which applied only 
to South Korea: 1) Include in the South Korean delegation represent-
atives of political parties and social organizations based on the North 
Korean Communistic view of class, as well as civil representatives; 2) 
Include in the South Korean delegations of the so-called "Unification 
and Revolutionary Party," which was fabricated by North Korea and 
non-existent in South Korea; and 3) Exclude anti-Communist political 
334. Ibid., pp. 200-201. 
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parties, organizations and individuals. 335 It would be very difficult for 
rational men to imagine the shameless demand of the North Korean 
Communists. Study of such an infeasible proposal would prove 
useless. 
Fourth, North Korea proposed the "Confederal Republic of 
Koryo (Korea) pending the complete unification of Korea. This has 
been repeatedly proposed since August 14, 1960, when North Korean 
President Kim 11-Sung made a commemorative address on the na-
tional liberation day, stating: 
If South Korea is not yet prepared to accept a free all-Korea 
general election, there should be one provisional measure or 
another. As such a provisional measure, we propose a con-
federation system between the two halves of the country. 
Under the confederation system we propose, the existing 
political systems of South and North Korea will be allowed 
to remain as they are for some time . . . and a supreme na-
tional committee will be formed with representatives from 
the governments, mainly to coordinate economic and cul-
tural development in South and North Korea. . . . 336 
Since then this confederation system has been proposed on many occa-
sions. This vague concept of a confederal system may mean some kind 
of federal system, not a confederal system, because members of a con-
federal system maintain their international legal persons as independ-
ent states in internationallaw.337 Thus, members of a confederation 
are admitted in the United Nations individually, not as a confedera-
tion. Because the North Korean proposal insists that South and 
North Korea should be admitted in the United Nations as a single 
nation, this system cannot be a confederation. Aside from this dis-
crepancy, this proposal contains some positive ideas. If it offers a tem-
porary measure for the consolidation of national unity in trying to 
restore mutual trust and ease tension between South and North Korea, 
pending a complete unification, it deserves further study. This mea-
sure would be also useful for preventing external interventions. 
However, the problem is found in the measure's preconditions 
and concrete implementation. The Central Committee's report at the 
Sixth Congress of the North Korean Worker's Party on October 10, 
1980, clarified the proposal for a confederation system: 
335. Ibid., pp. 221-222. 
336. Ibid., pp. 240-241. 
337. Dictionnaire de 1a Terminologie du Droit International, Paris: Sirey, 1960, pp. 
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To achieve independent peaceful unification of the father-
land, the fascist military rule should be done away with and 
democratization of the society should be realized in the 
South. The Anti-Communist Law and the National Security 
Law . . . should be abrogated. At the same time, all polit-
ical parties and social organizations should be legalized. The 
unjustly arrested and imprisoned democratic personages . . . 
should be set free. . . . The American authorities should 
. . . behave in a way meeting the wishes and views of all the 
world peoples . . . by withdrawing their troops from South 
Korea at an early date. . . . Our party suggests that the fa-
therland be unified through the establishment of a confederal 
republic. . . . The Democratic Confederal Republic of 
Koryo (Korea) should be a neutral state which does not affil-
iate itself with any political or military alliance or bloc. 338 
In conclusion, this vague concept of a confederal system would have 
the same problems as does the national conference for unification. 
Both proposed unacceptable preconditions for South Korea. 
ii. The Objective of North Korean Proposals 
In light of the above considerations, it seems clear that the final 
objective of the North Korean proposals is a communization of the 
entire Korean nation. More concretely, North Korea concentrates 
first on the withdrawal of United States troops, then on carrying out 
the Communist revolution in South Korea, and finally focuses on uni-
fication under Communism. 
This objective is not merely a conclusion based on research of 
North Korean unification policies, but also continues to be expressed 
publicly by the North Korean authorities. For example, Kim 11-Sung 
enunciated the so-called three revolutionary capabilities at the Ali 
Arham Social Science Institute on April 15, 1965. According to 
North Korean President Kim, they must: 1) strengthen their revolu-
tionary base politically, economically, and militarily by successful so-
cialist construction in the Northern half; 2) strengthen the 
revolutionary capability in South Korea by politically awakening and 
solidly uniting the South Korea people; and 3) strengthen the solidar-
ity between the Korean people and the international revolutionary 
force. 339 North Korean President Kim more clearly expressed this 
338. A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra note 320, pp. 253-255. 
339. Ibid., pp. 225-226. 
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idea at the Fifth Convention of the Worker's Party on November 2, 
1971 when he stated: 
The South Korean revolution is an integral part of the whole 
Korean revolution. For the nationwide victory of the Ko-
rean revolution, we must accelerate the socialist construction 
in the northern half of the Republic while further fostering 
the revolutionary struggle in South Korea. . . . The basic 
mission is to expel the American imperialists from South 
Korea . . . and establish an advanced social system in the 
South .... [t]he South Korean revolutionaries ... must 
positively carry out the revolution by correctly combining 
various patterns and methods of struggle such as political 
and nonpolitical struggle, legal . . . as well as nonlegal 
struggle, violent and non-violent struggle. . . . 340 
The North Korean "peaceful unification" would be quite different 
from the common sense notion of that concept. It would not be a 
peaceful unification achieved through free elections reflecting the free 
will of the people. Peaceful unification cannot be on North Korean 
terms, considering that the South Korean population is more than 
double that of North Korea, and that the standard of living and eco-
nomic strength of South Korea is far greater than that of North Ko-
rea. Essentially, North Korean peaceful unification means at best a 
Communist revolution. This cannot be achieved by peaceful means, 
but can only be achieved by force. This intention is seen in brutal 
incidents such as the Rangoon incident of October 1983, which at-
tempted to kill South Korean President Chun but instead killed seven-
teen members of the presidential delegation. 341 
Section B. Various Facts Relating To Korean Unification 
1. The Neighboring Countries and Korean Unification 
Several countries neighboring the Korean peninsula are major 
world powers. Their interests in Korea have deeply affected Korean 
self-determination through its history. In modem history, Korea has 
been a victim of the power struggle among these neighboring coun-
tries. The Korean division was not a result of Korean action but was 
imposed by external powers against the will of the Korean people. As 
Korean politics have been involved in the power struggle of major 
powers since Korean independence, it is necessary to study the posi-
340. Ibid., pp. 226-227. 
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tions of the major powers toward Korean unification. This does not 
mean that Korean unification depends on their policy, but that a prac-
tical policy of Korean unification should consider the important inter-
ests of its neighbors. If any of these major powers consider that its 
vital interests might be harmed by a formula of Korean unification, it 
would strongly oppose such a unification formula and impede the 
achievement of unification. Therefore, it is clear that any feasible plan 
for the unification of Korea should consider the vital interests of 
neighboring countries. In this regard, it is useful to study the position 
and interests of Korea's neighboring countries with respect to Korean 
unification. 
a. The United States 
The United States has been directly involved in the Korean ques-
tion since the end of World War II. After the Korean War, in which 
the United States sacrificed a great deal of its human and material 
resources in repelling the Communist attack against South Korea, 
both the strategic and economic aspects of American interests in the 
Korean peninsula increased. The basic position and the interest of the 
United States on the Korean question continued to develop with some 
variation depending on the U.S. administration. What are the basic 
positions and objectives of the United States in the Korean question? 
After the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement, the United 
States considered two alternatives for the future of the Korean penin-
sula. This policy was formulated during the final stages of armistice 
negotiations when the conclusion of an armistice agreement was immi-
nent. According to the Report by the National Security Council, con-
cerning United States objectives with respect to Korea in the period 
following the armistice dated July 7, 1953 the United States govern-
ment considered two alternative feasible objectives: 
(a) A Korea divided for an indefinite period by the present 
demarcation line, with the Republic of Korea tied into the 
United States security system and developed as a military 
ally. 
(b) A unified, neutralized and substantially unchanged Re-
public of Korea (such an objective would entail Communist 
agreement to a unified Korea with the United States political 
orientation in exchange for United States agreement to re-
move United States forces and bases from Korea ... This 
objective should also involve guarantees for the territorial 
and political integrity of a unified Korea under the Republic 
of Korea and its admission to the United Nations and possi-
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bly would involve limitation on the level and character of the 
Republic of Korea defense forces. )342 
Between these two alternatives, the United States government at that 
time preferred a unified Korea. The same report explained the reasons 
for that preference: 
An independent and united Korea has been a constant 
United States political objective. This objective can now fea-
sibly be achieved only through the neutralization of Korea. 
The relinquishment of its military position in Korea which 
would result from neutralization would not be critical for the 
United States. In the event of general war, the desirability of 
attempting to defend Korea would be problematical. With 
respect to the danger of local aggression against Korea, it 
would in any case be only the prospect of retaliation by the 
United States forces that would deter such aggression. The 
danger of internal subversion or indirect aggression in Korea 
could and should be countered by adequate Korean security 
forces and United States covert activity and economic assist-
ance. On the positive side, the security of Japan would be 
favored by the withdrawal of Communist military power (in-
cluding air forces) beyond the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The 
savings made possible for the United States by its being re-
lieved of the necessity of supporting United States bases in 
Korea and large, heavily-armed Korean forces would make 
possible strengthening of the military position of the free 
world in other areas. The unification of Korea under the Re-
public of Korea, even on a neutralized basis, would . . . be 
regarded as a more constructive result of the war and more 
to the credit of the United States than the restitution of the 
status quo ante. 343 
However, after the failure of the Geneva Conference on the Ko-
rean question the United States Government chose the alternative of a 
divided Korea because the Communist side would not give up the 
Communist regime in North Korea. The Second Progress Report by 
the Operations Coordinating Board to the National Security Council 
dated December 29, 1954, on the United States Objectives and 
Courses of Action with Respect to Korea explained the position of the 
United States. 
First, the Report explained the contents and problems of the first 
342. FRUS, 1952-54, Volume XV, Korea, part 2, supra note 315, pp. 1344-1345. 
343. Ibid., p. 1346. 
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alternative objective. This objective was "a unified and neutral Korea 
under an independent and representative goveJll.ment." More specifi-
cally, this objective was: 1) A unified Korea fnendly to the United 
States, without foreign forces or bases in Korea; 2) United States and 
Communist assurances of the territorial and political integrity of Ko-
rea under the Republic of Korea but foregoing all rights granted to the 
United States under a U.S. Korean mutual assistance pact; and 3) A 
level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capa-
ble of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major 
power.344 According to this Report, in the discussion of the Korean 
question it was evident that the Communists would not agree to any 
unification that did not permit continuance of the Communist regime. 
The Communist representatives at the Geneva Conference refused to 
agree to free elections impartially supervised by the United Nations. 
Thus, there would be little prospect for fruitful negotiation on the Ko-
rean problem in the foreseeable future. 
In light of these circumstances, the Report chose the second alter-
native objective. The second objective was: pending a political settle-
ment and in the absence of a violation of the armistice, the United 
States should, conditioned upon the satisfactory cooperation of South 
Korea, 1) continue to observe the armistice and try to avoid renewed 
fighting; 2) accept the division of Korea on the present demarcation 
line while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean question by the 
use of other than military pressures; and 3) tie South Korea into the 
United States security system and develop it as a military ally. This 
report concluded that the prospect for Korean unification appeared 
remote and that the primary emphasis to the United States policy was 
to achieve a position of strength in South Korea. 
Two decades have passed without major changes since the adop-
tion of the Report. Only after the Vietnam War were there some 
changes in the Korean policy of the United States, including with-
drawal of U.S. ground troops in Korea. This movement does not im-
ply any significant change in American policy toward Korea based on 
the two alternative objectives. If there is any change in the United 
States policy on the Korean question, it is simply a change in the 
methods due to environmental changes such as the Vietnam War, and 
Sino-American Rapprochement. Following these environmental 
changes, the United States might want to reduce its active role in the 
Korean question. This might appear to be the maintenance of the sta-
344. Ibid., pp. 1950-1951. 
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tus quo in the Korean peninsula, putting greater responsibility on the 
Koreans themselves and encouraging South-North Korean dialogue. 
The United States' economic interest in Korea represents another 
important factor in U.S.-Korean relations. The traditional American 
interest in Korea may have been strategic and military, but after the 
wonderful growth of the South Korean economy, South Korea has 
become one of the major economic partners of the United States, and 
this interest is ever increasing. 
In conclusion, the United States position on the Korean question 
has been based on two alternative feasible objectives. The first objec-
tive is a unified Korea friendly to the United States without any for-
eign troops or bases in Korea. The second objective offers a Korea 
divided on the present demarcation line with South Korea tied into the 
United States security system and developed as a military ally. The 
first objective is not a neutral unified Korea in the proper sense, but 
simply a unified Korea friendly to the United States without any for-
eign troops, including United States troops. Because the prospect of 
the first objective is remote, the United States government has imple-
mented the second objective, a divided Korea. Of course, it is possible 
that a unified Korea would be a U.S. military ally serving American 
interests. But this might not be possible unless the United States risks 
a global war against one or two major powers. Without the use of 
force, there may be only two alternatives left to the United States. 
Between them, the United States has chosen the second objective, 
which ultimately equates to the maintenance of the status quo m 
Korea. 
b. The Soviet Union 
As a neighboring country of the Korean peninsula, the Soviet 
Union historically has been interested in Korea. In the early twentieth 
century, Russian ambition in Korea was curtailed only by its defeat in 
the Russo-Japanese War during 1904 to 1905. 
In the March 20, 1946 opening statement of the U.S.-Soviet Joint 
Commission, Soviet delegate Terenti Shtikov frankly expressed the 
modern Soviet position: 
The Soviet Union has a keen interest in Korea being a true 
democratic and independent country, friendly to the Soviet 
Union, so that in the future it will not become a base for 
attack on the Soviet Union.345 
345. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, volume VIII, 
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The Soviet policy to maintain a favorable government in Korea was 
stubbornly manifested in the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission as well as 
in the United Nations and was one of the factors resulting in the Ko-
rean War. United States intelligence research estimated that the ag-
gressive imperialism of Stalin attempted to resolve the Korean 
question on his terms throughout the Korean War. The Intelligence 
Estimate prepared by the Office of Intelligence Research, U.S. Depart-
ment of State just after the start of the Korean War (June 25, 1950) 
evaluated in detail the Soviet role in the Korean War. 346 This Esti-
mate stated that the North Korean government was completely under 
Kremlin control and there was no possibility that the North Koreans 
acted without prior instruction from Moscow. According to this Esti-
mate, there had been indications since early June that the Soviet 
Union was reviewing its Far Eastern policy in a Moscow conference of 
practically all top Soviet representatives in Far Eastern areas. Thus, 
the move in Korea would be decided only after the most minute exam-
ination of all factors involved in the Far Eastern situation. 
The Intelligence Estimate also analyzed the Soviet motives for the 
Korean War in terms of Soviet global strategy and found: 1) It would 
offer a test on grounds militarily most favorable to the Soviet Union 
and detrimental to the resolution of the United States' announced pol-
icy of total diplomacy. 2) A severe blow would be dealt to U.S. pres-
tige throughout Asia. 3) Soviet military control of all Korea would be 
an important step securing the approaches to the Soviet Union. 4) 
Soviet military domination of all Korea would give Moscow an impor-
tant weapon for the intimidation of the Japanese in connection with 
Japan's future alignment with the United States. Eventually the So-
viet attempt failed and reduced Soviet influence in Korea. This bitter 
failure of the Soviet Union prompted modification of its position on 
the Korean question, and the Soviet Union has since tried to maintain 
the status quo in Korea rather than to pursue an aggressive expansion-
ism. Furthermore, the consolidation of the American position in Ko-
rea makes it more difficult for Soviet expansionism to control all of 
Korea. 
The fundamental change of the international situation relating to 
Korea in the three decades after the Korean War is important in ana-
lyzing the Soviet Union's Korea policy. The most important change 
in this respect is the Sino-Soviet conflict which culminated in the mili-
tary clash at the Ussuri River in 1969. Because the Sino-Soviet con-
346. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, vol-
ume VII, Korea, Washington: GPO, 1976, pp. 148-151. 
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flict has grown to such a degree that the Soviet Union is China's most 
dangerous enemy and vice versa.347 In this situation, the Soviet Union 
would not pursue aggressive expansionism or endorse North Korean 
adventurism in the Korean peninsula. 
From the mid-1950s, Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev pursued 
coexistence with the West resulting in three decades without a major 
armed conflict between the two blocs. This international trend pre-
ferred to maintain the status quo in Korea. This trend does not mean, 
under any circumstances, that the Soviet interests in Korea have 
changed or that the Soviet Union would oppose any unification of Ko-
rea. It simply means that the Soviet Union would prefer to maintain 
the status quo in Korea rather than to take the risks of the Korean 
unification. 
Of course, the Soviet Union has strongly supported North Korea 
in the South-North Korean confrontation. The North Korean regime 
was formed and developed under the auspices of the Soviet Union. 
Soviet economic assistance to North Korea from 1946 to 1960 
amounted to U.S. $700 million.348 Despite this, relations between 
North Korea and the Soviet Union deteriorated after the Korean War, 
due particularly to Khruschev's de-Stalinization campaign and his 
policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States. This deteriora-
tion in relations did not mean that the Soviet Union would not support 
North Korea. The Soviet Union cannot help but support North Ko-
rea in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict and U.S.-Soviet confron-
tation. However, the Soviet Union would not want to risk again 
supporting a North Korean attempt to unify Korea by force. In sum, 
the Soviet Union supports North Korea in maintaining the status quo 
in Korea. 
c. China 
Until the twentieth century, Korean foreign relations had been 
limited primarily to those with China. This long tradition explains the 
varied and traditional Chinese interests in Korea. Chinese interven-
tion in the Korean War also can be interpreted in this context. The 
November 11, 1950 statement issued by the Chinese foreign minister 
concerning Chinese intervention in the Korean War confirmed this 
position: 
347. See George Ginsburg and C.F. Pinkele, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute 1949-
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[T]he question of the independent existence or downfall of 
Korea has always been closely linked with the security of 
China. To help Korea and repel United States aggression 
means to protect our own homes and our own country. It is, 
therefore, completely natural for the Chinese people to be 
ready to help Korea and offer resistance to United States 
. 349 aggression. . . . 
After the Korean War, Communist China contributed substantial 
economic assistance to North Korean post-war reconstruction. 
Although it is very difficult to get exact statistics about North Korean 
economics, reliable estimates revealed that Chinese economic assist-
ance to North Korea from 1946 to 1960 amounted to U.S. $600 mil-
lion.350 Communist China has always supported North Korea in the 
South-North Korean confrontation. Relations between North Korea 
and China have been better than North Korean-Soviet relations. 
However, continuing changes in the international situation over the 
three decades after the Korean War modified the Chinese position on 
the Korean question, although Chinese interests in Korea have never 
changed. The major relevant changes in the international situation are 
the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Sino-American rapprochement. These 
changes fundamentally affected Chinese foreign policy in the sense 
that the "friend" and the "enemy" of Communist China were com-
pletely reversed. This situation complicated the Chinese position in 
the Korean question. China tried to maintain a close relationship with 
North Korea while attempting to improve relations with the United 
States, a country North Korea considered an enemy. It seems inevita-
ble that China would be in an awkward position on the Korean ques-
tion, considering its desire not to lose North Korea to the Soviet bloc 
and to improve its relations with the United States. Therefore, it is 
difficult to evaluate China's long-term position on the Korean ques-
tion. China undoubtedly will continue to support North Korea in the 
South-North Korean confrontation. However, supposing that South 
Korea succeeded in the unification of Korea on its terms, would this 
situation be advantageous or dangerous to China? This hypothetical 
situation would be advantageous to China in the context of the Sino-
Soviet conflict and economic relationship. The problem is that China 
will support North Korea in the South-North Korean confrontation to 
keep North Korea away from the Soviet bloc. Considering these com-
349. UN Document S/1902, IS November 1950. 
350. North Korea, supra note 348, p. 255. 
PEACE AND UNIFICATION IN KOREA AND INT'L LAW 119 
plications, it is understandable why China wants to maintain the sta-
tus quo in Korea. 
Relations between South Korea and China have steadily devel-
oped in this context. Although no diplomatic relations exist, the two 
countries have on several occasions negotiated directly with each 
other. For example, with the hijacking of a Chinese civil airliner on 
May 5, 1983,351 the two countries directly negotiated the handling of 
the problem in Seoul. During the intrusion of a Chinese naval torpedo 
into South Korean territorial waters in March 1985, the two govern-
ments again had direct talks resulting in the Chinese government's 
apology to the Korean government. 352 
The development of relations between South Korea and China is 
particularly remarkable in the area of trade. Although trade between 
the two countries is indirect, usually through middlemen in Hong 
Kong or Japan, the volume of trade has rapidly increased and 
amounted to about U.S. $300 million in 1984, roughly double the 1983 
level. 353 China also permitted South Korea to hold a trade exhibition 
in Macao on December 3-5, 1984. In mid-November of 1984, a 
chartered Swiss-Air flight brought 146 European tourists directly from 
Seoul to Peking. 354 An official Chinese delegation participated at the 
Asian Pacific Tele-Community Conference held in Seoul in November 
1984.355 
In the domain of sports, the two countries have rapidly develop-
ing relations. In March 1984, a South Korean sports team partici-
pated in the Davis Cup's preliminary games held at Kunming in China 
and in April of that year Chinese athletes came to Seoul to compete in 
the Asian Junior Basketball Championship as well as the Second 
Asian Swimming Championship. In addition, in September 1984 a 
Chinese delegation attended the Olympic Council of Asia meeting in 
Seoul, where Chinese Representative He Zhenlian stated that China 
would take part in the Asian Games and the Olympic Games to be 
held in Seoul in 1986 and 1988 respectively. 356 
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d. Japan 
Considering the facts that Japan is an island country and that 
Korea provides an important access for Japan to the Asian and Euro-
pean continents, it is easy to understand Japan's interest in Korea. 
Historically, Japanese imperialist forces occupied Korea and Manchu-
ria, provoking bitter anti-Japanese sentiment in the area. This animos-
ity prevented the Japanese from establishing normal relations with the 
area. Only in 1965 did South Korea and Japan normalize their diplo-
matic relations. 
As soon as Korea-Japanese diplomatic relations were established, 
general relations between the two countries rapidly developed. Ja-
pan's primary concern in the Korean question seems to be Japanese 
security. A Communist Korean peninsula would pose an imminent 
threat to Japan, considering that two major Communist powers would 
completely encircle the Japanese islands. The Japanese government 
has repeatedly expressed its concern over this security issue. The 
Nixon-Sato Joint Communique of November 1969 manifested this 
concern: "The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the 
continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister 
deeply appreciated the peacekeeping efforts of the United States in 
that area and stated the security of the Republic of Korea was essen-
tial to Japan's own security."357 Japanese economic interests in Korea 
are also very important. South Korea is now Japan's second largest 
export market after the United States.358 
The varied and close relations between South Korea and Japan 
have been consolidated by Nakasone's active Korean policy. The two 
governments recently exchanged visits of heads of government, and 
Japan offered an apology for Japan's past invasion into Korea. 359 
Japan has supported South Korea in the Korean question and has 
maintained limited unofficial relations with North Korea. Due to Ja-
pan's situation after World War II, Japanese influence in the Korean 
question is relatively small as compared to other neighboring coun-
tries. As the Japanese military is still weak, Japanese relations with 
Korea are predominantly economic. 
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2. The Sino-Soviet Conflict and the Sino-American 
Rapprochement 
a. The Sino-Soviet Conflict 
After the emergence of Nikita Khruschev in the Soviet Union, 
Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate. His policy of peaceful coex-
istence with the United States and the de-Stalinization campaign dis-
turbed the Chinese. Mainland China expected active Soviet assistance 
in its military operations against Nationalist China in 1958, but the 
Soviet Union did not want to provoke the United States under the 
peaceful coexistence policy. The Soviet Union did not help Commu-
nist China in its attempt to blockade the Nationalist-held off-shore is-
lands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958.360 
Tension from deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations resulted in the 
eruption of hostilities in the 1960s after centuries of territorial dis-
putes. In the western sector, China yielded 440,000 square kilometers 
to Russia under the 1860 Treaty of Peking, and also yielded 70,000 
square kilometers under the Treaty of St. Petersburg. 361 In the north-
eastern region, China yielded 59,000 square kilometers to Russia 
under the 1858 Treaty Aigun, and another 400,000 square kilometers 
were lost under the 1860 Treaty of Peking. 362 The actual disputed 
area is 41,000 square kilometers in the region of the western sector and 
900 square kilometers in the northeastern area along the Ussuri 
River. 363 This territory conflict escalates into armed conflicts in the 
late 1960s. The hostilities were formalized in April 1979, when China 
decided not to extend the thirty-year-old treaty of friendship, alliance, 
and mutual assistance of 1950 beyond its expiration date of April 
1980.364 In light of the historical animosity between the Soviet Union 
and China and the difficult nature of territorial dispute, the Sino-So-
viet conflict will not be easily resolved. In this respect, all possible 
implications of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the Korean question should 
be considered in planning a long-term unification policy. 
First, it seems that North Korea has managed to maintain its in-
dependence and maximize its leverage to its benefit in this dispute. 
North Korea carefully watched the confrontation between the Soviet 
Union and China in the late 1950s. It was indeed embarrassing for the 
360. US Department of the Army, China: A Country Study, Third Edition, Washing-
ton: GPO, 1981, p. 406. 
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North Koreans, who depended heavily on both Chinese and Soviet 
economic and military assistance. At first North Korea did not 
choose a side in the dispute and hoped that the Soviet Union and 
China would resolve their differences. However, after the Congress of 
East European Communist Parties in late 1962 attacked the North 
Korean attitude, North Korea stood on the Chinese side.365 North 
Korea's position resulted in a decline of Soviet assistance which af-
fected the North Korean economy. 
After the fall of Khruschev from power in October 1964, North 
Korea tried to improve its relations with the Soviet Union, especially 
since supporters of the so-called Cultural Revolution of China at-
tacked North Korean President Kim 11-Sung as a "fat revisionist."366 
Since then, North Korea has pursued a path independent of both the 
Soviet Union and China.367 Since 1969, North Korea has maintained 
a comparatively balanced policy toward the Soviet Union and China. 
The Soviet Union and China, both afraid of losing North Korea to the 
other, tried to maintain a close relationship with North Korea. In this 
context, Kim 11-Sung visited China in April 1975, and the Soviet 
Union in May 1948, while Chou En-lai visited North Korea in April 
1970 and Deng Xiaoping visited in September 1978 and again in April 
1982.368 
Second, the North Korea-China-Soviet Union triangle is very 
complicated and implies various possible future evolutions. A recent 
news article on the subject demonstrates the complexity of this 
triangle: 
The military balance in the mid-1980s . . . is moving in the 
opposite direction (in favor of South Korea) . . . Only Mos-
cow can provide the North with the MIG 23s to match the 
F15s ... in the South, and the price Moscow is demanding 
to up-grade North Korea's defense is access to its military 
facilities for the Soviet Pacific fleet, . . . anchorage and re-
fueling rights at the ports on North Korea's western 
coast .... Japanese officials believe that the Chinese suc-
ceeded in convincing (North Korean) Kim that this was too 
high a price to pay, before Kim departed for Moscow last 
May (1984) for his first visit to the Soviet Union in seventeen 
years .... Kim's Moscow trip apparently did not yield a 
365. U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, pp. 29-30. 
366. Ibid., pp. 21-31. 
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new military accord .... Moscow, however, has hardly 
given up. On November 13 (1984), Kapitsa was dispatched 
to Pyongyang on a 14-day visit to make up lost ground. Ob-
servers view the border treaty initialled to resolve the two 
countries long standing dispute as a significant concession on 
Moscow's part . . . Kapitsa's unpublicized mission . . . was 
to negotiate a military package which would provide Py-
ongyang with MIG 23s ... in return for access to North 
Korean military facilities ... [t]he outward signs indicate 
that his mission was less than a success. . . . On December 
1 (1984) publicly announced Kim's three day unofficial visit 
to the Chinese capital from November 26-28 ... 369 and his 
talks with Hu Yaobang on the Kapitsa's visit. 
Third, considering North Korea's insecure position in the context 
of the Sino-Soviet conflict, it has been North Korea's good fortune to 
maintain its balancing policy in the Sino-Soviet conflict and succeed in 
assuring the support of both China and the Soviet Union. Strangely 
enough, South Korea has had no positive policy on this issue. If the 
Sino-Soviet conflict creates insecurity for North Korea, it would be 
expected that South Korea would pursue some positive policy to take 
advantage of this conflict to weaken North Korean ties with one or 
both of its major allies. 
b. The Sino-American Rapprochement 
The Sino-American rapprochement is not an event independent 
of the Sino-Soviet conflict, but another aspect of the conflict. The pro-
cess of Sino-American rapprochement explained above will not be re-
peated here, but its implications for Korean unification shall be 
considered. 
The Sino-American rapprochement quickly changed the cold war 
in the Korean peninsula. The U.S. and China, the two opposing major 
powers directly involved in the Korean question, normalized their dip-
lomatic relations and became friends. This sudden turn of events 
greatly affected the mechanism for peace and unification in the Korean 
peninsula. A superficial observation suffices to see this change in Ko-
rea. Just after the Shanghai Communique made by Nixon and Chou 
Enlai,370 the South-North Joint Communique was issued on July 4, 
369. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong, 17 February 1985, pp. 26-27. 
370. US Department of State, Bulletin, March 20, 1972, pp. 435438; Hungdah Chiu ed., 
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124 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
1972, constituting the first significant movement toward the unifica-
tion of Korea since the Korean War. This movement did not, how-
ever, indicate any significant agreement on Korean unification in the 
Nixon-Chou talks or in the South-North Joint Communique. It 
showed only a change in environment concerning the Korean ques-
tion. This change of environment has several aspects. First, the Sino-
American rapproachment ended the confrontation between the United 
States and China, even in Korea. However, the rapprochement did 
not make peaceful unification of Korea feasible. Even in the Shanghai 
Communique the two sides failed to reach an agreement on the Ko-
rean question:371 
The United States will maintain its close ties with a support 
for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support 
efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of ten-
sion and increased communication in the Korean 
peninsula .... 
It (China) firmly supports the eight-point program for 
the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the govern-
ment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North 
Korea) on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of 
the United Nations Commission for the Unification andRe-
habilitation of Korea. 
Although China stated that it would support the North Korean 
position of unification, it might not have believed that the North Ko-
rean unification program was feasible. It merely expressed its support 
for North Korea, conscious of Chinese-North Korean relations. The 
statement of the United States was more frank. It did not mention 
Korean unification but a "relaxation of tension and increased commu-
nication in the Korean peninsula."372 A reasonable interpretation of 
their intentions was that they accepted the status quo and peace in 
Korea while they encouraged both sides to carry out negotiations by 
themselves. By encouraging the South-North Korean dialogue, did 
they believe that it would result in peaceful unification? It is not clear, 
but it seems that they hoped more for an easing of tensions than for 
peaceful unification, although they did not expressly give up the goal. 
The fact that the United States' statement did not mention Korean 
unification might indirectly indicate this attitude. 
371. Ibid., pp. 147-148. 
372. Ibid., p. 147. 
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3. The National Strength of South and North Korea 
No matter what unification policy South and North Korea may 
pursue, it is beyond question that national strength is the most impor-
tant factor in unification. Both South and North Korea clearly know 
and have repeatedly expressed this truth. Therefore, national strength 
is an essential element to be considered in planning any unification 
policy. It is naive to interpret "peaceful unification" as a unification 
achieved by agreement through negotiations without any considera-
tion of national strength or other real factors. In light of this, several 
aspects of the national strength of South and North Korea will be 
studied. 
a. Economic Strength 
1. South Korea 
South Korean economic development from a poor, war-destroyed 
economy to a prosperous, industrial state is often called an economic 
miracle. President Park Chung-Hee, after taking power in a military 
coup d'etat in May 1961, concentrated on the economic development 
of South Korea through a rapid expansion of exports based on several 
five year economic development plans beginning in 1962. 
In the twenty-year period between 1962 and 1981 the GNP 
at 1975 prices grew from U.S. $6.3 billion to $30.4 billion, an 
increase of 483 percent, and per capita GNP at current 
prices rose from U.S. $87 to $1,607. This growth was fueled 
by the rapid expansion of exports, which increased from ap-
proximately U.S. $50 million to $21.3 billion over the same 
period.373 
This economic growth continued in the 1980s, and in 1983 the 
GNP of South Korea was U.S. $75.3 billion, per capita GNP was U.S. 
$1,884 and the dollar volume of commodity exports was U.S. $24.4 
billion. In 1986, the last year of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1982-1986), 
the GNP is expected to exceed U.S. $90 billion, with the value of com-
modity exports at U.S. $50 billion and per capita GNP of U.S. 
$2,200.374 As South Korean industry developed, the structure of in-
dustry also changed. Heavy and chemical industries represent the 
fastest growing industrial sectors. During the Fifth Five Year Plan 
period, these industries are projected to grow at an annual rate of 12.2 
373. Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, pp. 
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percent, while light industry is projected to grow at 9.5 percent per 
annum.375 
Having emerged as an important industrial country, South Korea 
is now concentrating on becoming a new power in high technology 
industries. Through strategic joint ventures with leading companies in 
the United States and Japan, domestic research and development, 
South Korea is rapidly developing high technology industries such as 
computers, robots, and fiber optics. 
South Korea is on the threshold of advancing into export 
markets for very large scale integrated circuits and is shaping 
up as a potential strong telecommunications competition 
... Lately, semiconductors have grabbed the spotlight ... 
Samsung Semiconductor has introduced South Korea's first 
64 K dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chip to be 
made without foreign license . . . Meanwhile, Hyundai 
Electronics has developed 16 K static random-access mem-
ory (SRAM) that will be mass produced sometime later in 
1984.376 
n. North Korea 
North Korea also performed well in economic development im-
mediately after the Korean War. Compared to South Korea, North 
Korea possessed extensive natural resources including eight billion 
tons of coal and four billion tons of iron ore beneath its soil as of 1980, 
and other non-ferrous metals such as tungsten, lead, copper, and 
zinc.377 
After the First Five Year Plan (1957-1961), which gave priority 
to heavy industry and collectivization of agriculture, North Korea 
succeeded in establishing an industrial foundation. Actual production 
surpassed the planned target one year ahead of schedule and was com-
pleted in 1960. However, due to the excessively vigorous pursuit of 
economic development, both workers and machinery were exhausted. 
The concentration on heavy industry and the unbalanced development 
plan led to imbalances between different sectors. As a result, North 
Korea's Kim 11-Sung proclaimed 1960 as the year of adjustment.378 
The first Seven Year Plan (1961-1967) failed, as the North Ko-
375. Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, pp. 
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rean Government admitted, and it was extended for another three 
years. According to official explanations, the reason for its failure was 
the disproportionate amount of funds expended on national defense. 
But the actual reason for the failure appeared to be the drastic reduc-
tion in economic assistance from the Soviet Union and China during 
the Sino-Soviet conflict. Thereafter, North Korea discontinued the 
publication of annual economic statistics. 379 
After initial contacts with South Korea through South-North 
Korean dialogue in the early 1970s, North Korea seemed to be sur-
prised at the rapidly growing economy of South Korea. North Korea 
immediately began to import machinery from Western Europe and Ja-
pan during the period of the Six Year Plan (1971-1976). Excessive 
imports resulted in an embarrassing international balance of payments 
problem and a growing foreign debt beyond North Korea's financial 
ability. In order to overcome these difficulties, the North Korean au-
thority launched several mass campaigns such as the Three Revolu-
tions Team Movement and the Seventy Day Speed Battle but were 
unsuccessful. 380 
The Second Seven Year Plan (1978-1984) tried to rectify the 
problems of past economic plans by establishing major targets in vari-
ous industrial sectors. However, the planned targets were not 
achieved judging from various indicia. No announcement has been 
made that the targets of the plan have been attained, as was done in 
the past. An article in Nodong Sinmun (the official North Korean 
newspaper) appeared on October 9, 1984, titled, "Let Us Vigorously 
Advance Toward the Attainment of the Goals of the Second Seven 
Year Plan." A new foreign economic policy was adopted on January 
26, 1985, aiming to revitalize the stagnant North Korean economy by 
importing new technology and capital from abroad.381 Although sev-
eral economic plans of North Korea did not succeed as planned, 
North Korea has nevertheless developed some industrialization 
through these plans. According to South Korean estimates, North 
Korean GNP in 1983 amounted to U.S. $14.5 billion with per capita 
GNP of U.S. $765.382 
North Korea's stagnant economy can be attributed to the cen-
trally-directed economic system of a communist society, excessive mil-
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itary expenditures (23. 8 percent of GNP in 1983), inefficient economic 
planning and management, and the closed society of North Korea. 
b. Population, Territory and Military Strength 
i. South Korea 
South Korea's population is very large when compared to its ter-
ritory. Its total population as of 1984 was 40,578,000 in a territory of 
99,022 square kilometers, for a density of 404 persons per square kilo-
meter. Furthermore, the Korean territory is mountainous, with 
mountains covering roughly seventy percent of the whole peninsula. 383 
However, population growth in South Korea has been remarkably re-
duced from an annual growth rate of 2.3 percent in the period 1966-
1970 to an annual growth rate of 1.6 percent in the period 1976-1980. 
The growth rate is expected to be further reduced to an annual rate 
below 1.5 percent through government policy.384 The total population 
of South Korea is expected to be around 50 million by the year 2000. 
The military strength of a country is difficult to determine accu-
rately because of several factors. To attempt to determine the military 
strength of a country only in terms of military personnel and the quan-
tity of weapons is deceptive. The most important factor in military 
strength is economic strength, the fundamental base of potential mili-
tary power. 
After the Korean War, the military forces of South Korea were 
equipped and trained primarily by the United States. However, fear-
ing a possible recurrence of war in Korea, certainly influenced by the 
bluff policy of President Rhee, and considering the economic ability of 
South Korea to support armed forces, the United States government 
limited the military strength of South Korea to the level of sustained 
military operations while relying upon the United States supporting 
forces. The Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to 
the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) of 
April 2, 1954, clearly expressed this position. According to this mem-
orandum, the security of South Korea depended on the deterrent effect 
of the military posture of the United States and on the immediate em-
ployment of U.S. forces in support of South Korean forces in the event 
of Communist aggression in Korea, rather than on the size of South 
383. Korean Overseas Information Service. A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, pp. 
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Korean forces themselves. 385 As "the deterrent effect of the military 
posture of the United States" the United States considered use of 
atomic weapons coupled with the announced intention of the United 
States to resist renewed aggression. This position was confirmed by 
the Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of 
Defense of March 31, 1954.386 
In this context, the United States government refused the expan-
sion program of South Korean forces proposed by the South Korean 
government. The proposed program consisted of thirty-five to forty 
Army divisions; 6DD, 16DE, 4AM, 2AO, 2AE and 1AF for the 
Navy; and five fighter wings, two light bomb wings, one reconnais-
sance wing, and one transport squadron for the Air Force. 387 Instead, 
the levels of military strength the United States government author-
ized for South Korea were 655,000 Army personnel (twenty divisions); 
15,000 Navy personnel with a maximum of eighty-three ships; 23,500 
Marine personnel; and 9,000 Air Force personnel for one fighting 
wing.388 
South Korea maintained this level of military forces until 1961. 
In the early 1960s, however, the South Korean government began to 
build up a self-reliant defensive capacity. In the early 1970s, when the 
United States government decided to withdraw its ground forces from 
Korea, South Korea boosted its defense industry to assure self-reliant 
defense capabilities. For this purpose, the South Korean government 
enacted the Law on Military Supplies, and also took various measures 
to support the defense industry, such as the creation of a support fund, 
subsidies, tax privileges, defense fund raising, and other steps. 389 In 
1975, the Defense Tax System was enacted to assure the funds neces-
sary for the defense industry. This policy of defense industry develop-
ment succeeded in producing almost every kind of military material 
including long-range missiles, multi-firing rockets, M-48 A3 and M-48 
A5 tanks (the equivalent of U.S. M-60 A1), 500 MD helicopters, de-
stroyers, and F-5F fighter bombers.390 The number of military person-
nel has not changed much, but paramilitary manpower and reserve 
forces have increased to several million. 
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n. North Korea 
There are no official statistics for the North Korean population. 
The most recent official statistics on its population were those of 1963. 
Strangely enough, North Korean authorities have kept secret most in-
dicators of its national strength, probably fearing South Korea's 
greater economic and military potentiaJ.391 However, reliable esti-
mates based on indirect methods such as totaling electoral districts 
(one district contains 30,000 persons) or official statement indicating 
the percentage of the population in certain domains suggest that the 
total North Korean population in mid-1983 was approximately 18.9 
million. 392 The annual growth rate of its population varies with the 
demographer, but on the whole was 2.5 percent or less in the period 
1975-1980.393 Some scholars visiting North Korea in the first half for 
1980 were told by North Korean authorities that the annual growth 
rate of its population was 1. 6 percent. 394 Although the North Korean 
government encourages its people to have as many as four to six chil-
dren, late marriage due to social conditions such as long periods of 
military service (five to seven years) slows down a rapid growth in 
population. 395 
The total area of North Korean territory is 122,370 square kilo-
meters, roughly fifty-five percent of the Korean peninsula (221, 120 
square kilometers). Although the total area of North Korea slightly 
exceeds that of South Korea, some eighty percent of North Korea's 
land area is composed of mountains and uplands, making the actual 
habitable land of North Korea smaller in area than that of South 
Korea. 396 
After the Korean War, which devastated 500,000 North Korean 
troops, 397 North Korea concentrated on rebuilding its armed forces, 
largely relying on military assistance from the Soviet Union and 
China. Furthermore, North Korea concluded the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union and 
China in July 1961. These treaties are, in reality, mutual defense trea-
ties. The treaties provide that if one party is invaded, the other party 
will render military and other assistance with every available means at 
391. U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, p. 58. 
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its command. These treaties are to be automatically renewed periodi-
cally, unless one of the parties gives notice one year in advance of its 
termination. Soviet and Chinese support for North Korea is not limit-
less. After several aggressive actions were taken by North Korea in 
the late 1960s, such as infiltration of North Korean commandos into 
South Korea and the shooting down of American EC 121 reconnais-
sance aircraft, the Soviet Union declined to supply new advanced 
weapons and military equipment to North Korea. 398 
In relation to its small population, less than nineteen million in 
1983, North Korea maintains a surprisingly large level of armed forces 
of 700,000 to 800,000 regular troops with five million para-military 
forces. 399 To maintain such a large number of armed forces, North 
Korea has extended its compulsory military service term to longer 
than the official five year term, and women also share military service, 
making up as much as thirty percent of armed forces. This policy 
greatly affects the manpower available for economic production.400 
North Korea's armed forces are well equipped. For ground 
forces, they are equipped with 2,600 tanks, FROG missiles, and large 
numbers of artillery guns, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft weapons. 
The North Korean Navy is equipped with nineteen submarines, 317 
fast-attack craft, and 150 coastal amphibious ships. North Korea has 
emphasized its Air Force by providing it with 700 aircrafts, containing 
twenty-eight fighter wings and three bomber wings.401 According to 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), North 
Korea apparently received permission from the Soviet Union to manu-
facture the MIG-21 in 1975.402 
With its determined and aggressive policy of unification, North 
Korea concentrated on its defense industry and succeeded in produc-
ing most military weapons and equipment such as AK-47 rifles, mor-
tars, rocket launchers, artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, personal 
carriers, submarines and probably combat aircraft. It is very expen-
sive for North Korea's population of eighteen million to maintain such 
large armed forces. Actual annual defense expenditures are estimated 
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at as much as twenty to twenty-five percent of GNP.403 Since South 
Korean economic development is much more rapid and dynamic than 
that of North Korea, North Korea will continue to be hard-pressed to 
compete to increase its military strength, and in the long run, it will be 
in a very difficult situation. 
c. A Brief Comparison of the National Strength between 
South and North Korea 
i. Population and Area of Territory 
The population of South Korea in 1983 was 39.95 million while 
North Korean population was estimated at 18.90 million. The annual 
growth rate of the South Korean population in 1983 was 1.56 percent 
while the North Korean growth rate was estimated at 2.23 percent. 
Thus, the South Korean population is more than twice that of North 
Korea. Furthermore, South Korean labor productivity is estimated to 
be much higher than that of North Korea because of the lag of North 
Korean technology behind that of the South. North Korean industrial 
facilities are obsolete, and its communist economy has systematic de-
fects which hamper more effective economic operation as its economic 
structure develops to a higher degree. 
Superficially, North Korean territory is larger than that of South 
Korea. The total area of the Korean peninsula is 221,120 square kilo-
meters, of which fifty-five percent or 122,098 square kilometers be-
longs to North Korea and forty-five percent or 99,022 square 
kilometers belongs to South Korea. However, North Korean territory 
is very mountainous and eighty percent is composed of mountains and 
uplands, leaving only twenty percent for habitation and agriculture. 
Therefore, the population has been concentrated in the South. In ad-
dition, North Korea possesses far more natural resources than does 
the South.404 
ii. GNP 
The gross national product of South Korea in 1983 was U.S. 
$75.3 billion and its per capita GNP was U.S. $1,884 while North 
Korean GNP in 1983 was estimated at U.S. $14.5 billion with a per 
capita GNP U.S. $765. Thus, South Korean economic strength in 
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Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, pp. 13-18. 
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1983 was five times greater than that of North Korea. This wide gap 
of economic strength between South and North Korea is expected to 
increase because the economic growth rate of South Korea (around 
nine percent) is far larger than that of North Korea (about four per-
cent). If this trend continues, the estimated gap between two sides 
after ten years is forecast as follows: 
South Korean GNP 5(1 + 0.09)10 
8 
North Korean GNP (1 + 0.04)10 
The South Korean economy after ten years would be eight time 
larger than that of North Korea, and before the year 2000 South Ko-
rean economic strength will grow so much that North Korean eco-
nomic strength will no longer be comparable to it. 
m. Trade 
The gap in trade volume between South and North Korea is even 
greater than the gap in GNP. In 1983, South Korean exports 
amounted to U.S. $24.4 billion and its imports were valued at U.S. 
$26.2 billion, for a total volume of U.S. $50.6 billion. In the same 
year, North Korean exports were estimated at U.S. $1.49 billion and 
its imports at U.S. $1.66 billion, for a total volume of North Korean 
trade of U.S. $3.15 billion, only seven percent of the South Korean 
trade volume. If the trade growth rate of both sides are taken into 
account, the gap in trade volume between the two sides is expected to 
increase rapidly. North Korean annual export and import growth 
rates in that 1970s were 13.6 percent and 11.4 percent respectively, 
while South Korean annual export and import growth rates in the 
1970s were thirty-seven percent respectively.405 
405. Korean Overseas Information Service, Seeking a Breakthrough, supra note 382, pp. 
89-94. 
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iv. A Table of Comparison 
Major Economic Indicators (1983)4()6 
Classification Unit South Korea North Korea A:B 
(A) (B) 
Population 
Pop. Growth Rate 
Area 
GNP 
Per Capita GNP 
Real Growth Rate 
Exports 
Imports 
Total Trade 
1,000 
% 
square km 
billion $ 
u.s.$ 
% 
billion $ 
billion $ 
billion $ 
39,950 
1.57 
99,022 
75.3 
1,884 
9.1 
24.4 
26.2 
50.6 
18,900 
2.23 
122,098 
14.5 
765 
4.3 
1.49 
1.66 
3.15 
2.1:1 
5.2:1 
2.5:1 
100:7 
Major Products (1983)4()1 
Classification 
Automobiles 
Ship Building 
Machine Tools 
TV Sets 
Refrigerators 
Cement 
Chemicals 
Chemical Fertilizers 
Major Synthetic Resins 
Pig Iron 
Crude Steel 
Rolled Steel 
406. Ibid., pp. 55; 91. 
407. Ibid., pp. 79-83. 
Unit 
1,000 
1,000 tons 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 tons 
1,000 tons 
1,000 tons 
1,000 tons 
1,000 tons 
1,000 tons 
1,000 tons 
South Korea 
340 
4,000 
50 
10,500 
1,540 
23,450 
200 
1,200 
1,000 
8,852 
13,200 
18,870 
North Korea 
15 
400 
30 
200 
15 
8,700 
20 
620 
90 
4,010 
4,030 
3,190 
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Military Strength408 
Classification South Korea North Korea Remarks 
Population 38.9 million 18.6 million 
Regular Troops 601.6 thousand 784.0 thousand 
Army 520 thousand 700 thousand 
Navy 49 thousand 33 thousand 
Air Force 32.6 thousand 51 thousand 
Para-military 3.38 million 5.2 million 
Homeland Reserve 
Forces 3.98 million 5.2 million 
Tanks 1,000 2,825 South Korean 
tanks are higher 
quality 
Armored Personnel 
Carriers 850 1,140 
SAM 180 250 
SSM 12 54 
Combat Aircraft 434 700 South Korean 
aircrafts are 
higher quality 
Bombers 70 
Submarines 19 
Destroyers 18 
Other Naval Vessels 91 515 In total tonnage, 
South Korea 
outpaces North 
Korea 
4. The Special Environment of a Closed North Korean Society 
Through four decades of division, the societies of South and 
North Korea have become more heterogeneous in relation to one an-
other. Although they had managed to maintain a remarkable national 
homogeneity for several thousand years of history, the division of forty 
years has already changed much. North Korea, the most closed soci-
ety in the world, is not progressing toward national unification but 
rather is building up a solid barrier for division. Peaceful unification 
will not be achieved simply by the removal of an artificial demarcation 
line through a sudden agreement by both sides, but rather through the 
homogeneous reconciliation of the two opposing societies. Without 
this reconciliation of two very different societies, unification is not fea-
sible. If some kind of awkward unification was temporarily estab-
408. Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea, supra note 329, pp. 
469-471. 
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lished by some improbable event, it would soon lead to another civil 
war. Therefore, in order to make a viable long-term plan for Korean 
unification, the closed society of North Korea should be carefully 
studied, and some positive measures for opening and changing of this 
society should be taken. In consideration of this, the special environ-
ment of North Korean society which has evolved for four decades will 
be analyzed. 
a. Collective and Controlled Society 
A Korean-American scholar visited North Korea in 1974 and de-
scribed it in these terms: 
Outwardly, North Korea's moral and social codes were 
much like those of the Puritans. Simplicity and thrift, faith-
ful obedience to the authority, and diligence characterized 
the way of life of the people . . . [T]he people were highly 
industrious, working six days per week, and on the off-duty 
day they went to donate their free labor to the state. In early 
spring they began work at 7 a.m. and worked until5:30 p.m. 
During the busy season (May through October), they work 
from 5 a.m. to 7 or 8 p.m. They take one morning and one 
afternoon break, and a lunch period from noon to 2 p.m. I 
am not certain whether all workers take an afternoon siesta 
(between 1 and 3 p.m.), but we were told that officials take 
the 1 to 3 p.m. siesta and work until 9 or 10 at night. There 
were two study (of political ideology) periods per day; one 
before work began, and the other in the evening . . . Young 
men of ages between 17 and 45 and young women between 
the ages of 17 and 35 take compulsory military training 
which lasts one to two hours per day for ten times per 
month. Farmers and factory workers belong to the Workers 
and Peasants' Red Militia. Tight internal security is main-
tained, and check points with barbed wire barricades were 
everywhere. Even children marched in formation like 
soldiers on the way to or returning from their 
schools. . . . 409 
North Korean society may be described as a society of George 
Orwell. In order to maintain this kind of collective society, various 
surveillance systems, mass media, and a special education system are 
necessary. The official apparatus of control and surveillance over the 
409. Andrew C. Nahm, North Korea: Her Past, Reality, and Impression, Center for 
Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1978, pp. 100-101. 
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people and armed forces is the Ministry of Public Security and the 
Political Security Department. The Ministry of Public Security car-
ries out multiple functions such as regular police work, civil defense, 
prison management, traffic control, fire prevention, and counter-espio-
nage. The Political Security Department is an autonomous agency 
whose function is the operation of the secret police and reports di-
rectly to Kim Il-Sung.410 
For effective surveillance over the people, the entire population is 
classified into fifty-one categories on the basis of political reliability, 
and redivided into three broader categories: 1) the core elements are 
the Korean Workers' Party members, descendants of revolutionaries 
and patriots; 2) the wavering elements are relatives of those who went 
to South Korea and merchants and others; and 3) elements to be 
watched are the anti-Party elements, political and economic criminals, 
and religious believers.411 
Aside from official organs for security, various kinds of social or-
ganizations exist to strengthen social control. For example, in all 
schools the principal and party cells perform this function. Boys and 
girls aged nine to fifteen join the Young Pioneer Corps., and youths 
between fifteen and twenty-six join the Socialist Working Youth 
League. Women become members of the Korean Democratic Wo-
men's League. Manual, clerical, and office workers form a trade asso-
ciation. The Workers and Peasants' Red Guard is composed of 
reliable persons and carries out the surveillance over reactionary 
activities.412 
To maintain total control over social life, even domestic travel is 
severely restricted. Travellers must receive permission in advance and 
apply for food rations and coupons. Their itineraries must be ap-
proved. Travellers are subject to identification checks on the road and 
at hotels. They should have several identification documents such as 
residence cards, ration cards, union or party documents and personal 
identification cards with information on employment and marital sta-
tus and military identification.413 
The public media concentrates on the indoctrination of people. 
The North Korean regime incessantly disseminates its propaganda 
through mass media and various other means. Most radio programs 
consist of decisions and information of the Party. Most evening life is 
410. U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, p. 213. 
411. Ibid., pp. 76-77. 
412. Ibid., p. 214. 
413. Ibid., p. 215. 
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filled with political education. During the lunch breaks, propaganda 
agents read newspaper and books or carry out indoctrination through 
loudspeakers.414 
For the maintenance of this collective society, the North Korean 
regime gives priority to the educational system. In 1972, universal 
eleven-year compulsory education was established, consisting of one 
year of kindergarten, four years of elementary school, and six years of 
secondary school.415 North Korea also developed a comprehensive 
system of pre-school nursery and kindergarten facilities which attempt 
to raise children in accordance with Communist ideology and at the 
same time to free parents for outside work. Through the school pe-
riod, political and ideological education is emphasized. For example, 
in the university, social science students receive ideological education 
including the life of Kim which constitutes as much as forty percent of 
the total curriculum.416 It is beyond question that in the long run this 
education system is inefficient for economic development. 
Professor Nahm who visited North Korea in 1974 pointed out the 
problem of North Korean society: 
It is true that it has improved the material life of the poor 
and increased social benefits for them, but they are utterly 
deprived of basic human freedom and civil rights, having no 
individual choice to make. Intellectuals have been indoctri-
nated in such a way that they seem to have no thought of 
their own, or are not allowed to express their individual 
opinions. . . . The people have no freedom to choose their 
profession, the students have no freedom to select schools 
. . . and the families, with the exception of a small number 
of privileged ones, have no right to stay together. . . . Peo-
ple are fulfilled not by becoming themselves but by becoming 
part of the collective whole.417 
b. The Personality Cult of Kim 11-Sung 
North Korea's Kim 11-Sung is the symbol of North Korean soci-
ety and the source of its authority. Obedience to Kim is absolute and 
unconditional. His words are at once law and supreme command to 
all North Koreans.418 Every governmental and administrative func-
414. Ibid., p. 215. 
415. Ibid., p. 85. 
416. Ibid., p. 89. 
417. Andrew Nahm, North Korea, supra note 409, p. 103. 
418. U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, p. 164. 
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tion serves to ensure strict popular compliance with the will and words 
of Kim 11-Sung. As a result, it is impossible to suggest any opinion 
which differs from Kim's words. Efficient administration cannot be 
expected from this totalitarian regime. 
Furthermore, Kim 11-Sung is deified to a surprising degree in 
North Korea. All types of mass media are used to incite frenzied 
praises of Kim and to ensure this image of Kim in the people's minds. 
All religions have been replaced by the cult of Kim in North Korea. 
Citing a few examples suffices to demonstrate this: 
When General Kim 11-Sung came here, a new bright star ap-
peared in the Galaxy at mid-night . . . [W]ith his magical 
power and skills, General Kim 11-Sung attacked the enemy 
on both sides of the mountains and in the west and in the 
east simultaneously, and wiped them out.419 
All kinds of cultural activities are dominated by the cult of Kim. It is 
religious veneration of Kim that credits him with all accomplishment 
in North Korea. His birth place is venerated as a holy place where 
millions of pilgrims come each year.420 About 37,950 Kim 11-Sung 
libraries and about 35,000 Kim 11-Sung statutes are scattered through-
out North Korea.421 
For the purpose of Kim's cult, the modem history of North Ko-
rea is completely fabricated. To glorify the background of Kim 11-
Sung, North Korea creates various legendary stories about his parents, 
grandparents and great-grandparents. The government fabricated a 
modern history of Korea to support these created stories. Thus, every 
member of the Kim 11-Sung clan became an anti-Japanese patriot or 
anti-imperialist leader. For example, Kim 11-Sung's great-grandfather 
Kim Ung-Woo was established as a symbol for the anti-American 
struggle, saying that he had smashed the American ship General Sher-
man in 1886.422 
Since Kim 11-Sung's eldest son Kim Jong-11 is designated as heir 
apparent to Kim 11-Sung, the fanatic idolization of Kim Jong-11 is also 
being carried out: 
Soon after Korea was emancipated from Japanese rule, three 
stars rose over Mount Sorak in Kangwon Province in South 
Korea. The stars stood for Great Leader Kim 11-Sung, his 
wife, and his son, Kim Jong-11, respectively .... Kim Jong-
419. Andrew Nahm, North Korea supra note 409, p. 36. 
420. U.S. Department of the Army, North Korea, supra note 348, p. 96. 
421. Naewoe Press, Some Facts about North Korea, Seoul, 1984, p. 35. 
422. Ibid., p. 33. 
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II also produces miracles: he buries the sea with mountains 
and makes palace-like villas rise out of barren land.423 In old 
days, the Great Leader (Kim 11-Sung) had the power to 
move the ground and today the Jucheleader (Kim Jong-11) 
has the power to move time.424 
This fanatic cult of Kim is two-faced in relation to Korean unifi-
cation. First, it has a powerful effect in mobilizing the people in a 
short time and in allowing North Korea's Kim to carry out whatever 
he wants without any meaningful resistance. Second, in the long run, 
Kim's cult greatly hampers national development by cutting off all 
creative opinions in North Korean society. Thus, the economic gap 
between South and North Korea will continue to grow. 
Section C. The Legal Status Of A Divided Korea And The 
Sovereign Right For Unification 
Although several divided countries resulted from World War II, 
there are significant differences among them. The cause of division, 
the political and legal situation, the objective of the divided regimes 
and balance of power between the two divided parts are quite different. 
Therefore, it is difficult to develop a global legal theory which can 
accurately reflect the actual situations of all the divided countries. 
There is no agreement even in the terminology used to represent these 
countries. Some scholars use "multi-system nations," contending that 
use of terms such as "divided states," "divided nations," or "two 
Koreas" has the misleading connotation that there are two nations or 
states, while the term "multi-system nations" reflects faithfully the na-
ture of division in that there are two political systems within one 
state.425 However, if the terms "divided state" or "divided nation" 
(singular) is used instead of plural "divided states" or "divided na-
tions," there would be no such connection implying two states or two 
nations. Thus, terminology is not important. The reality is that there 
are very significant differences among the divided countries. Accord-
ingly, this study concentrates on the particular situation of Korea 
rather than on any attempt at a comparative approach. 
423. (Radio Pyongyang, April 1, 1983), Naewoe Press, Some Facts About North Korea, 
supra note 421, p. 26. 
424. Ibid., p. 26. 
425. Hungdah Chiu, "The International Law of Recognition and Multi-System Na-
tions," Multi-System Nations and International Law, Occasional Papers, 1981-8, School of 
Law, University of Maryland, Baltimore, 1981, p. 45; Yung Wei, "The Unification and 
Division of Multi-System Nations," Ibid., p. 61. 
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1. The Legal Status of a Divided Korea 
a. The Artificiality of the Korean Division and the Military 
Character of the Demarcation Line 
After the atomic bombings destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 
August 6 and 8, Stalin entered the war against Japan and Soviet forces 
rushed on Manchuria and North Korea within three days without any 
significant resistance. The Americans, embarrassed by this unex-
pected situation created by a sudden fall of Japanese forces, then tried 
to prevent the rapid expansion of the Soviet Union in the Korean pe-
ninsula. The result was the division of Korea.426 
On the concrete division of the Korean division, several explana-
tions have been given by responsible persons and eyewitnesses: 
Just before the surrender of Japan several one-star generals 
hurried into an office in the Pentagon with the statement 
"We've got to divide Korea. Where can we divide it?" A 
colonel with experience in the Far East protested to his 
superiors, "You can't do that, Korea is a social and eco-
nomic unit. There is no place to divide it." The general in-
sisted ... "We have got to divide Korea and it has to be 
done by four o'clock this afternoon."427 
"(John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War) asked on 
August 11 Colonel C. H. Bonesteel and me (Dean Rusk) to 
retire to an adjoining room and come up with a proposal 
which could harmonize the political desire to have U.S. 
forces receive the surrender as far north as possible and the 
obvious limitations on the ability of the U.S. forces to reach 
the area. We recommend the 38th parallel .... "428 
"About midnight, August 10-11, 1945, Colonel Charles 
H. Bonesteel and Major Dean Rusk . . . began drafting part 
of a General Order that would define the zones to be occu-
pied in Korea by American and Russian forces. They were 
given thirty minutes to complete their draft, which a State-
War-Navy Coordinating Committee was waiting for. The 
State Department wished the dividing line to be as far north 
426. U.S. Department of the Army, Korea 1950, Washington: GPO, 1952, P. 4; Harry 
Truman, Memoirs L Year of Decision, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956, p. 433. 
427. John Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur, New York, New York: Harper & Broth-
ers, 1950, p. 178; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1947, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 489. 
428. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, volume IV, 
The British Commonwealth and the Far East, Washington: GPO, p. 1039. 
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as possible, while the military departments, knowing that the 
Russians could overrun all of Korea before any American 
troops could land there, were more cautious. Bonesteel and 
Rusk wanted to follow a provincial boundary line north of 
Seoul. . . . The only map immediately available was a 
small-scale wall map of the Far East, and time was pressing. 
Bonesteel noted that the 38th parallel passed north of Seoul 
and almost divided Korea into two equal parts. He seized on 
it as the proposed zonal boundary. " 429 
This temporary demarcation line was consolidated as relations 
between the two occupying powers deteriorated. They developed their 
influences in their respective zones. The Soviet Union in particular 
had a different objective in Korea and consolidated its position in 
North Korea. As a matter of fact, immediately after arrival in North 
Korea, the Soviet Union organized an administrative mechanism 
utilizing local political organism. Soviet occupying forces cut off rail-
way and postal service between the two zones.430 
After failure of the initial attempt of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Com-
mission for Korean unification, the United States brought the problem 
to the United Nations in the face of Soviet opposition. Although the 
United Nations decided on a general election for the whole of Korea, 
Soviet opposition prevented the United Nations Temporary Commis-
sion on Korea from entering North Korea. Under these circum-
stances, the Commission carried out its mission only in South Korea 
which saw the formation of the South Korean Government on August 
15, 1948, while North Korea, in turn, established its government 
under the auspices of the Soviet Union.431 This is the well known his-
tory of the Korean division, which clearly developed against the will 
of the Korean people. 
There was no legal agreement or political intention arranged for 
the Korean division. In the German case, after its total defeat, the 
Allied Powers partitioned German territory. However, the Korean di-
vision has no reason behind it. Korean had been a victim of Japanese 
429. J.L. Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea, Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin Co., 1969, pp. 25-26; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, supra 
note 427, p. 120. 
430. D.J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, Yale University Press 1948, p. 261-; 
G.M. McCuns and A.L. Greg, Korea Today, Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 146-152; 
Kim Hak-Joon, The Unification Policy, supra note 311, pp. 41-46. 
431. For the details see U.S. Department of State, Korea 1945-1948, Washington: GPO, 
1948; Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of US Policy in the United Nations, New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1956, Kraus Reprint, 1972, pp. 16- lOl. 
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imperialism and the Korean Provisional government in China had 
fought with the Allied Forces against the Japanese since 1919, no mat-
ter how meager it might have been. Therefore, the Korean division 
was an unjustifiable sacrifice from a legal viewpoint. 
After the Korean war, the division was consolidated along the 
new demarcation line. As for the legal status of the actual demarca-
tion line, the Korean Armistice Agreement very clearly provided it in 
its Preamble: 
Agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the condi-
tions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Arti-
cles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are 
intended to be purely military in character and to pertain 
solely to the belligerents in Korea. 432 
It is beyond question that the demarcation line between South 
and North Korea is merely a temporary military demarcation line. It 
is not a national boundary between two states under international law. 
There is no international legal instrument which can afford this de-
marcation line some legal significance more than that of a military 
demarcation line. 
b. The Legal Status of South and North Korea 
Although the demarcation line between South and North Korea 
has only a military character, South and North Korea have diplomatic 
relations with more than one hundred countries and a great number of 
these countries have relations with both South and North Korea. Ac-
cordingly, it is difficult to deny the international legal personality of 
both sides. What, then, is the legal status of the two parts of Korea? 
First, it is easier to determine the legal status of South Korea. 
After the formation of the South Korean Government, the United Na-
tions General Assembly firmly approved its legal status: 
The General Assembly, ... declares that there has been es-
tablished a lawful government (the Government of theRe-
public of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction 
over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission 
was able to observe and consult and in which the great ma-
jority of the Korean people of all Korea reside; that this 
Government is based on elections which were a valid expres-
sion of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea 
432. See Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953. 
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and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; 
that this is the only such Government in Korea. . . . 
(The General Assembly) ... recommends that Mem-
ber States and other nations, in establishing their relations 
with the Government of the Republic of Korea, take into 
consideration the facts set out (above) .... 433 
Furthermore, the United Nations organized the United Nations Com-
mand and repelled the North Korean attack against South Korea on 
the ground that a legitimate government was invaded by illegitimate 
North Korean aggression. Therefore, the international society en-
dorsed the legal status of South Korea from the start. 
The United Nations did not, however, recognize the jurisdiction 
of the South Korean government over North Korean territory. The 
United Nations Resolution specified only "having effective control and 
jurisdiction of that part of Korea" (South Korea). The Resolution ad-
ded that South Korea was that "in which the great majority of the 
people of all Korea reside ... [and] that this is the only such govern-
ment in Korea."434 Accordingly, the United Nations recognized that 
the South Korean government represented the great majority of the 
Korean people, while it denied the legitimacy of the North Korean 
regime, saying that the South Korean government was the only legiti-
mate government existing in Korea. This position does not negate the 
North Korean regime under international law. In concluding the Ko-
rean Armistice Agreement with North Korea, the United Nations rec-
ognized some legal status for North Korea; for example, as a 
belligerent. Furthermore, North Korea has developed its legal status 
in international society for more than three decades. It now has diplo-
matic relations with more than one hundred countries. It is admitted 
to many special agencies of the United Nations. As a result, North 
Korea's legal status would be similar to that of a state in international 
society, although its legal status is weak as compared to that of South 
Korea. The South Korean government was formed and recognized 
under the United Nations. It represents more than two-thirds of the 
Korean people. It is recognized by more countries than North Korea. 
It has five times the economic strength of North Korea. The greatest 
difference between South and North Korea is that the South Korean 
government was formed by the free will of its people and that this 
democratic system has been maintained (albeit not without problems), 
433. UN General Assembly Resolution 195 (III), 12 December 1948. 
434. Ibid. 
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while the North Korean Government is a Communist totalitarian re-
gime ruled by one dictator who has enjoyed power for four decades. 
In conclusion, there are two contradictory aspects of a divided 
Korea. One is that the demarcation line between the two parts of Ko-
rea is merely a temporary military demarcation line. The other is that 
South and North Korea exercise international legal personalities, 
although South Korea's legal status is stronger than that of North Ko-
rea. This is a legal complexity peculiar to the divided Korea. A rea-
sonable interpretation of this complex problem is possible using two 
distinctions. 
The first distinction is between the two aspects of a divided Ko-
rea: the status of "Sellen" and the status of "Sein." Korea's status of 
Sellen is one unified country, but the Korean status of Sein is de facto 
two international legal persons. Korea should move from Sein to Sol-
len. Other countries should respect this particular aspect of a divided 
Korea. They should not hamper the process of Korean unification. 
The United Nations also recognized this in declaring in the consensus 
statement in November 1973: "It is noted with satisfaction that a joint 
communique was issued . . . which provides . . . the reunification of 
the country should be achieved independently, without reliance upon 
outside force or its interference. . . . "435 
The second distinction is between two types of relations of a di-
vided Korea: international relations and South-North Korea rela-
tions. This problem will be studied in the next section. 
c. The Legal Interpretation of South-North Korean Relations 
The peculiarities of a divided Korea are very clear in the relations 
between South and North Korea. The international relations of a di-
vided Korea and South-North Korean relations should be distin-
guished. Although South and North Korea each exercises its 
international legal personality in international society, the inter-rela-
tions between the two parts of Korea should not be regarded as inter-
national relations. It should be regarded as the internal relations of a 
divided Korea, with certain conditions. This important aspect of a 
divided Korea is expressed indirectly in the South-North Korean Joint 
Communique of July 4, 1972. First, the Communique uses the expres-
sion "two sides" instead of "two governments" or "two states." Sec-
ond, the expression "as a homogeneous people, a great national unity 
shall be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and sys-
tems" indicates that South and North Korea should be one nation and 
435. UN Documents A/9341; A/9030, November 1973. 
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seek out a great national unity. The Communique also emphasizes 
that unification should be achieved through independent efforts of the 
Korean people without being subject to external imposition or inter-
ference. This position implies that unification should be an internal 
affair of the Korean people. 436 
The positions of South and North Korea have been recognized 
several times by the United Nations.437 In this respect, relations be-
tween South and North Korea are different from relations between 
East and West Germany. Inter-German relations are ruled by the 
Treaty of December 21, 1972, on the Basis oflntra-German relations. 
The Constitutional Court of West Germany confirmed that relations 
between East and West Germany are governed by the rules of interna-
tional law and by the special rules flowing from the special character 
of a divided Germany.438 
Although the relationship between South and North Korea 
should be an internal problem for the Korean people, there should be 
certain limitations to intervention in one another's affairs. This would 
be a natural limitation resulting from the special character of a divided 
country. This limitation should be interpreted in terms of a reconcilia-
tion between "Sollen" and "Sein." For example, one part of Korea 
should not intervene in any affairs of the other part which are clearly 
internal problems. More concretely, South Korea cannot intervene in 
the nomination of cabinet members of North Korea. However, be-
yond the purely internal affairs of North Korea, South Korea has the 
right of intervention in North Korea. For example, South Korea can 
demand that North Korea guarantee basic human rights of the people 
or that North Korea bar the use of military facilities by the Soviet 
Union. 
The relationship between South and North Korea presents an-
other important factor: South Korea's prevailing status over North 
Korean status. The United Nations and international society have tra-
ditionally recognized South Korea as the sole legitimate government 
in the Korean peninsula,439 while North Korea had been denied legiti-
436. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Ko-
rea, supra note 320, pp. 84-86. 
437. UN Document A/9341, November 1973. 
438. H. Mosler and R. Bernhardt, Fontes Juris Gentium, Series A, Section II, Tom. 7: 
Decisions of German Courts Relating to Public International Law, pp. 348-365; recitation 
from Hungdah Chiu, "The International Law of Recognition and Multi-System Nations" 
in Multi-System Nations, supra note 425, p. 45. 
439. UN General Assembly Resolution 195 (III), 12 December 1948; Resolution 293 
(IV), 21 October 1949. 
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macy for a long time. The legitimacy of South Korea should be re-
flected in South-North Korean relations. Furthermore, South Korea 
represents more than two thirds of the Korean people. This represen-
tation of the majority is an important factor because a unified Korean 
government must be formed on the basis of the free will of the major-
ity of the Korean people. Therefore, the relative proportions of the 
South and North Korean populations should be applied in the process 
of unification. Finally, South Korea maintains a free market economy 
while North Korea is a collective Communist society which denies 
basic human rights. Of course, South Korea itself should improve its 
democratic system. But the collective society of North Korea cannot 
be compared to South Korean society. Accordingly, North Korean 
society must be fundamentally changed before the development of true 
relations with the South. In this sense, South Korean society should 
provide the basis for a Korean unification. 
In conclusion, South-North Korean relations are not interna-
tional relations, but are internal relations of the whole of Korea. 
Therefore, South-North Korean relations, including unification, 
should be carried out by Koreans themselves without any foreign in-
terference. As South Korea's legal status prevails over that of North 
Korea, South Korea should play a leading role in South-North Ko-
rean relations. Although South-North Korean relations are the inter-
nal affair of the whole of Korea, the intervention of one side in the 
other's affair should have certain limitations resulting from the special 
character of a divided country. Thus, one side of Korea could not 
intervene in purely internal affairs of the other. 
2. The Sovereign Right for Unification by Self-Determination 
For all their differences, every divided country holds that the uni-
fication of the country by self-determination is the national goal. For 
example, the preamble of West German Basic Law, May 8, 1949, con-
firms this position. Similarly, the constitutions of South and North 
Korea define their territory as the entire territory of the divided coun-
try.440 It is one of the most important factors in divided countries that 
they look to unification as the national goal. This is particularly clear 
for Korea. For this purpose, South and North Korea agreed on the 
principles of national unification, as in the Joint Communique of July 
4, 1972: 
The two sides have agreed to the following principles for uni-
fication of the fatherland: First, unification shall be achieved 
440. Article 2 of the South Korean Constitution. 
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through independent Korean efforts without being subject to 
external imposition for interference. Second, unification 
shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through 
the use of force against each other. Third, as a homogeneous 
people, a great national unity shall first be sought, tran-
scending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems.441 
As the relationship between South and North Korea is an internal 
problem of the whole of Korea, Koreans themselves should achieve 
Korean unification without any external interference. This Korean 
unification by self-determination is the sovereign right of the Korean 
nation. This has been recognized several times by the United Nations 
over several decades: 
In as much as the Korean question which is before the Gen-
eral Assembly is primarily a matter for the Korean people 
itself and concerns its freedom and independence . . . (The 
General Assembly) . . . calls upon all Members of the 
United Nations to refrain from interfering in the affairs of 
the Korean people ... [and] to refrain completely from any 
and all acts derogatory to the independence and sovereignty 
of Korea. 442 
It is noted with satisfaction that a joint communique 
was issued by the North and South of Korea on 4 July 1972, 
which provides . . . the unification of the country should be 
achieved independently, without reliance upon outside force 
or its interference . . . It is the general hope that the South 
and the North of Korea will be urged to continue their dia-
logue . . . in the above spirit so as to expedite the independ-
ent peaceful reunification of the country.443 
The General Assembly, considering that progress be 
made towards the attainment of the goal for the peaceful uni-
fication of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of 
the Korean people. . . .444 
As a result, it is beyond question that Korean unification by self-
determination is the sovereign right of the Korean people, and outside 
powers must not interfere. What is the extent of this sovereign right? 
South and North Korea undoubtedly should achieve their unification 
441. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Ko-
rea, supra note 320, pp. 84-84. 
442. UN General Assembly Resolution 112 (II), 14 November 1947. 
443. UN Document A/9030; A/9341, November 1973. 
444. UN General Assembly Resolution 3333 (XXIX), 17 December 1974. 
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in peaceful means as expressed in the Joint Communique. But from a 
legal viewpoint, is any use of force in the Korean question illegal? 
First, self-defense is traditionally recognized as a legal right. Ac-
cordingly, if North Korea attacks South Korea, South Korea may ex-
ercise its self-defense. Second, if South-North Korean relations are 
internal relations of the whole of Korea, under strictly limited condi-
tions, should the right of resistance to the North Korean regime be 
recognized? St. Thomas Aquinas explains that this right of resistance 
originated from natural law, which is the natural order realizing the 
common good (bonum commune). According to St. Thomas Aquinas, 
if a dictator commits so serious an injustice to the people that abiding 
by the order of the dictator in itself would result in injustice, the right 
of resistance is justified. 445 Therefore, if the totalitarian North Korean 
regime never changes its suppressive rule, it would be justified, at least 
in a legal sense, that South Korea use force in a proper manner against 
the totalitarian regime. 
Section D. Possible Means To Achieve Korean Unification 
Korean unification is a difficult and complicated problem that 
multi-faceted efforts for four decades have not been able to resolve. 
Therefore, there is no clearly assured way of unification. We should 
try to pursue some feasible means of unification, considering all the 
elements that we have studied. The lack of a clear path does not indi-
cate that there is no hope for Korean unification. The rapidly growing 
economy of South Korea is clearly preparing a way for unification. If 
the growing trend of the South Korean economy continues, the pros-
pects for Korean unification would be much brighter around the year 
2000. In this section, we will examine the prerequisites for unification 
and necessary measures for it. 
We do not desire unification at any cost but only unification based 
on a democratic system which guarantees a free market economy and 
basic human rights. Therefore, when we say "Korean unification," 
the communization of Korea is excluded. 
J. The Prerequisites for Korean Unification 
a. The Achievement of Economic Maturity 
The most important factor in Korean unification is national 
strength. Peaceful unification is not a unification achieved simply 
445. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I" II .. Qu. 96 Art. 4; II" II .. Qu. 42 Art. 
2. 
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through negotiations without considering the national strength of the 
two sides. The Communists will never resign their ambitions unless 
they are forced to do so. Accordingly, maturity of economic develop-
ment is an absolute prerequisite for Korean unification. According to 
actual statistics, South Korean GNP is five times greater than the 
North Korean GNP.446 Economic indicators show that this gap is 
expected to increase as much as ten times by 1994. If South Korean 
economic strength is fifteen or twenty times greater than that of North 
Korea, the interests of neighboring countries in South Korea would 
largely prevail over those in North Korea, and South Korea could 
pressure neighboring countries to favor it. Moreover, North Korea 
would not be able to maintain its present position in South-North Ko-
rean relations. North Korea would be forced to modify its position. 
South Korea will prevail over North Korea in the area of military 
strength as well. Therefore, if present economic trends continue, 
South Korea will be able to carry out an active policy for Korean uni-
fication in the latter part of the 1990s. 
However, South Korea should note one important factor. Eco-
nomic maturity means not only growth of economic volume but also 
improvement of welfare. It must endeavor to improve the living stan-
dards of the poorest people. To this end, it should implement a social 
security system as soon as possible. It should also extend the term of 
free compulsory education to high school, as North Korea has already 
realized the goal of free education. At the same time, South Korea 
must increase the middle class, which is an important foundation of a 
democratic society. 
b. A Strong But Democratic Government 
Korean unification is a long-range national task which cannot be 
quickly achieved. Social stability is an important prerequisite to suc-
cessfully carry out this long-term policy. Therefore, voluntary na-
tional unity should be consolidated under the leadership for a strong 
government. Unfortunately, it is true that the Korean people are not 
satisfactorily politically mature. Of course, economic development 
would quickly improve the political maturity of the people. But until 
then, social turmoil is a possible danger. In this situation, a charis-
matic leader is desirable for solid national unity. Unfortunately, for 
several decades, Korean political power has been held by unpopular 
leaders who took control by military coup d'etat. For strong national 
unity, this situation must be quickly improved and in the future, South 
446. See "Major Economic Indicators," Chapter Three, Section C.3.(4). 
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Korea should develop a mature democratic tradition where military 
forces are absolutely subject to civilian government and military coups 
d'etat are regarded as a national shame, which is possible only in less 
developed countries. At the same time, students' involvement in polit-
ical demonstrations, another phenomenon visible in the developing 
countries, should also disappear. 
A strong government should be maintained for a stable society. 
Considering the military confrontation between South and North Ko-
rea, a long-term stable government is absolutely necessary. Some 
professors of constitutional law speak for a parliamentary system of 
government, but a presidential system is far more realistic in a tense 
society like Korea. We often observe the difficult situation of ineffec-
tive coalition cabinets in mature parliamentary systems like Italy and 
Israel. The term of presidency should also be considered. Frequent 
changes of national leadership are not appropriate for carrying out any 
long-term policy of unification. This does not mean, under any cir-
cumstances, that a one-man dictatorship is preferred. On the con-
trary, a democratic system must be guaranteed particularly in the 
context of the confrontation with the totalitarian regime of North Ko-
rea. Considering all these elements, a single term of eight years for the 
presidency or possibly two terms of six years would be most desirable 
for South Korea. 
c. Persuasion of Neighboring Countries 
As we observed, the neighboring countries of Korea would like to 
see the maintenance of the status quo in the Korean peninsula. This 
does not imply that they would oppose any Korean unification. If 
they prefer the status quo in Korea, it is simply because they fear the 
uncertainty of a unified Korea in the context of their national interests 
and the risk of involvement in another Korean war. If they are per-
suaded that they will not be involved in another Korean war and that 
a unified Korea is better for them than a divided Korea, they will sup-
port Korean unification. 
In this sense, it would be useful to study the traditional American 
policy for Korean unification. As explained above, the United States 
policy for Korean unification has been based on two feasible alterna-
tives:447 (1) a Korea divided for an indefinite period on the present 
demarcation line with South Korea tied into the United States security 
system and developed as a military ally; or (2) a unified, neutralized 
Korea under a substantially unchanged South Korea. 
447. FRUS, 1952-54, part 2, supra note 315, p. 1344. 
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Between these two alternatives the United States Government in 
the 1950s preferred a unified Korea, "even on a neutralized basis."448 
However, the United States government thought that both South Ko-
rea and the Communists would oppose this alternative.449 Accord-
ingly, the United States followed the alternative of a divided Korea 
tied into the United States security system as a military ally. Despite 
this, the first alternative, one that the United States believed to be the 
only way to Korean unification without a global war, should be care-
fully studied. In reality, this alternative would not mean a neutral 
Korea. It would mean a unified Korea friendly to the United Sates 
without any foreign forces or bases. Therefore, if South Korea at-
tempted to develop this unification program, the United States would 
support it. 
Other considerations include the positions of the Soviet Union, 
China, and Japan. In the context of Sino-Soviet conflict, a unified Ko-
rea on South Korean terms would not be a threat to China. Prosper-
ous economic cooperation between China and a unified Korea would 
contribute greatly to Chinese economic development. A unified Korea 
would clearly give an advantage to Japan. It would not only be as-
sured of an important economic partner, but a unified Korea would be 
an essential approach to the Asian Continent. It would remove diffi-
cult obstacles in Japanese economic relations with China and the So-
viet Union. A unified Korea on South Korean terms would contribute 
greatly to Japanese security. The most important factor is the Soviet 
Union's interest in a unified Korea on South Korean terms. For the 
Soviet Union, a unified Korea would produce mixed results. The So-
viet Union would certainly gain several advantages from a unified Ko-
rea. If the United States withdrew its armed forces from South Korea, 
the Soviet Union would be relieved of the threat of a possible military 
confrontation with the United states in this region. It would also be 
relieved of the financial and military burden of supporting North Ko-
rea. In the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Soviet Union would 
at least be assured of a neutral neighbor if Korea is unified on South 
Korean terms. Of course, there may be certain disadvantages to the 
Soviets from such a unified Korea. For example, in the context of the 
U.S.-Soviet conflict, the Soviet Union may lose one friend in North 
Korea. On the whole, though, a unified Korea without foreign forces 
would be more advantageous to the interests of the Soviet Union than 
the present situation of a divided Korea. 
448. Ibid., p. 1346. 
449. Ibid., p. 1950; FRUS, The Geneva Conference, supra note 313, p. 138. 
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Korean unification would be very different from the German case 
in terms of the political situation. West Germany alone is the strong-
est economic power in Western Europe with the largest population. 
The West German population is about 62 million, while the East Ger-
man population is about 17 million.450 A unified Germany with a 
population of 80 million would be the dominant power in Europe as 
compared to France (54 million) and the United Kingdom (56 mil-
lion).451 Besides, Germany's neighboring countries suffered greatly 
from two invasions in the twentieth century. They naturally feel some 
fear and tension from the possible unification of Germany. Therefore, 
there may be no country willing to support the unification of Ger-
many. The Soviet Union in particular would strongly oppose the uni-
fication of Germany. Since West Germany alone is already the 
strongest power in Western Europe, West Germany may keep its lead-
ing role in the modern world even without unification. 
Korean unification would differ in several respects from the Ger-
man case. A unified Korea would have a population of 60 million and 
a territory of 221,000 square kilometers. Korea's neighboring coun-
tries exceed this size. A unified Korea would never be a threat to its 
neighboring countries. Several millennia of Korean history have 
shown that it has never committed any aggression against any other 
country. Accordingly, if the neighboring countries prefer the status 
quo in Korea, it is not because a unified Korea is a threat but simply 
because they do not know whether the eventual result of Korean unifi-
cation would be advantageous to them and because they do not want 
to risk involvement in a possible war in unifying Korea. Therefore, if 
they can be reassured that these two problems would not occur, they 
would support the unification of Korea, or at least not oppose it. 
d. A Social Change of North Korea 
As we have observed, the present society of North Korea is a 
society unique in the world. Under the deified Kim 11-Sung, almost 
the entire population is trained as military personnel and organized as 
para-military force. The territory of North Korea is fortified as a mili-
tary base. The society is totally collectivized and mechanized under 
the Communist Party's control. A new generation after the Korean 
War has been thoroughly indoctrinated for three decades to Kim's 
cult, and a large number of them are fanatical followers of Kim's cult. 
450. US Department of State, Status of the World's Nations, Washington: GPO, 1983, 
p. 6. 
451. Ibid., pp. 6; 11. 
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In this situation, unless this society is changed, Korean unification is 
not feasible. Even if some superficial unification is made, it would lead 
to another civil war. Therefore, before embarking on a program for 
unification, some practical measures should be taken to change North 
Korean society. 
e. Favorable Situations for Korean Unification 
When the prerequisites for Korean unification are fulfilled, the 
general environment is then prepared for unification. However, there 
may be unexpected events which would accelerate the process of Ko-
rean unification. There have always been unexpected events which 
have changed the history of world. The presumption that the situa-
tion relating to Korean unification would never change is unrealistic. 
In order to prove this, it would be sufficient to reflect on the past fifty 
years of world history. Friends and enemies in international society 
have constantly changed and the order of powerful nations have also 
changed. These changes will continue. For example, there is no rule 
that the Soviet Union could never be changed. The fact that China is 
slowly changing is good evidence. It is also possible that the East Eu-
ropean bloc would be broken. So also there may be a true revolution 
in North Korea. We do not know the future. What is important is 
that we should be prepared for such an unexpected event. If we are 
not prepared for that, it will not be helpful if some favorable events 
unexpectedly take place. A favorable situation will certainly come at 
some time. 
2. How Can Korean Unification Be Achieved? 
a. Internal Aspects 
1. Predominant National Strength 
As explained above, national strength is the most important fac-
tor in unification. South Korean economic power must be ten to fif-
teen times greater than that of North Korea before South Korea can 
carry out a concrete program of unification. Any kind of unification 
would be possible only through the dominant national power of South 
Korea. Therefore, South Korea should continue to concentrate on 
economic expansion. If current economic trends continue to develop, 
such a condition will be met in the late 1990s. 
n. National Unity and Support for Unification 
Unfortunately, North Korea's people have a more positive atti-
tude toward national unification than the South Korean people. Past 
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administrations in South Korea could be blamed. Past administra-
tions too often emphasized the possibility of invasion by North Korea, 
partially for political purposes. It is quite true that North Korea 
would invade the South if South Korea was in social turmoil and 
weak. However, it is not a desirable way of persuading the people. 
This policy has psychologically damaged the people's confidence in 
unification. If they lose confidence in unification, it may be critical for 
South Korea in time of crisis. The South Korean government should 
encourage its people and instill in them some confidence in unification. 
Every indicator shows that the South Korean position is far better 
than that of North Korea. Accordingly, it is easy to convince South 
Korea's people to have a positive attitude toward national unification. 
If the South Korean people are enthusiastic toward unification, they 
could easily be united for this national goal. If they are firmly united, 
national development and social stability would be clearly guaranteed. 
This is the clear method for unification. Without the people's general 
confidence in unification, Korean unification is not feasible. This is an 
important factor that can be achieved at little cost. 
Several measures should be taken to consolidate national unity. 
Considering its competition with the North, complaints of the poor 
should be addressed. For this purpose, the social security system 
should be organized. Medical insurance should be nationalized. The 
term of free compulsory education should be extended to high school. 
The financial burden of these programs should be managed through 
various practical means. For example, to extend the free compulsory 
education term, the private school system and compulsory military 
service system could be utilized. Affluent people would be encouraged 
to send their children to private schools while many qualified young 
men would be given the choice to teach in public schools instead of 
their compulsory military service. This compulsory education is par-
ticularly important in a traditional Confucian society like Korea, 
where parents attach much importance to the education of their 
children. 
iii. Consolidation of a Strong But Democratic 
Government 
The necessity of a strong but democratic government has been 
explained. The intervention of the military in politics and political 
demonstrations by students should simultaneously disappear. For this 
purpose a strong charismatic leader is desirable. A strong charismatic 
leader could consolidate national unity and lead the whole nation to-
ward development and unification. A charismatic leader will not fall 
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from heaven. If an able and virtuous person can succeed in reassuring 
national confidence and be worthy of this confidence, he would be the 
charismatic leader. Accordingly, a national leader should be elected 
by a direct national election. Any leader imposed upon the people 
would be hard-pressed to develop such national confidence, at least 
within a short period. Because of this, the actual Constitution of 
South Korea, which does not guarantee the direct popular election of 
the president, should be amended. It has been explained that the pres-
idential system is preferable to the parliamentary system and that a 
single term of eight years or possibly two terms of six years is desirable 
for the presidency. At the same time, a very strong governmental 
mechanism should be installed in this consitutional amendment to 
carry out efficiently the programs of unification. However, this strong 
governmental system should be installed within the framework of a 
democratic government which guarantees basic human rights. Adem-
ocratic system is clearly a strong point vis-a-vis the North Korean to-
talitarian system. 
iv. Reorganization of the National Defense System 
A national defense system should be divided into two different 
objectives, the national defense against external invasion and the na-
tional defense in the context of South-North Korean relations. Until 
now the two systems have been confused. However, if South Korea 
wants to actively carry out a program of national unification, the two 
national defense systems should be clearly distinguished and 
reorganized. 
First, the national defense system against external invasion 
should be organized by alliance with the United States and other 
friendly nations. The present national defense system would be in this 
category. Second, the national defense system in the context of South-
North Korean relations should be independent of any Allied system. 
National unification can be achieved only through self-reliance and 
self-determination. National unification is a Korean national problem 
and should be internationally publicized. If any one expects that some 
friendly countries would achieve the unification for the Korean people, 
it would be an impossible dream. Korean unification is possible only 
when Korea can effectively prevent the intervention of foreign coun-
tries, because if one neighbor intervenes in the Korean question, the 
other neighbors' interests would be affected. 
In view of these defense considerations, a self-reliant defense sys-
tem and the defense industry should be developed. The South Korea-
U.S. alliance should be developed as a national defense system against 
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external invasion and not in the context of South-North Korean rela-
tions. If North Korea attacks South Korea, South Korea alone should 
be able to destroy the invading forces without the involvement of U.S. 
forces. If the United States intervenes in Korea, other neighboring 
countries will necessarily side with North Korea. The Korean penin-
sula would then be merely a place for combat by the major powers, 
resulting in a disaster for Korea. The Korean War of the 1950s holds 
many lessons for Korea. Therefore, it is unrealistic to include U.S. 
supporting forces when military powers between South and North Ko-
rea are compared. South Korean forces alone must prevail against 
North Korean forces. The goals of genuine self-reliant defense 
strength and the defense industry must be achieved. This is not to say 
that the Korea-U.S. alliance would not be helpful. This alliance is 
absolutely necessary for national defense against external invasion. If 
Korean unification can be achieved, the intervention of foreign coun-
tries must be prevented. Unfortunately, this is the only feasible means 
of unification that history has taught us. Therefore, the two kinds of 
defense systems must be distinguished and the South Korean defense 
system should be reorganized. 
v. South Korea's Dominant Role in the Korean Question 
and the Reduced Role of the United States 
A dominant role for South Korea is the natural consequence of 
the above arguments. If unification is a Korean national problem and 
can be achieved only by self-reliant efforts, South Korea should take 
charge of all the responsibilities in the Korean question. 
Chapter One clearly proved that South Korea is the principal 
party to the Korean Armistice Agreement, and Chapter Two ex-
plained that the United Nations Command in Korea was de facto dis-
solved. From this, the logical conclusion is that South Korea should 
take charge of the implementation of the Armistice Agreement. South 
and North Korea, not the United States, should operate the Military 
Armistice Commission. At the same time, the commanding authority 
of South Korean forces should be separated from the United States 
forces, and both parties should establish a coordinating committee for 
effective cooperation between the two forces. This procedure is natu-
ral for a sovereign state. 
b. External Aspects 
1. Assurance of Non-Intervention of External Powers 
To carry out the program of unification, the assurance of non-
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intervention of external powers is absolutely necessary. To obtain this 
assurance, South Korea must persuade all neighboring countries that a 
unified Korea would be best for all. The two feasible alternatives of 
the United States policy in the Korean question have been explained 
here. Of these two alternatives, a unified Korea in South Korean 
terms without any foreign forces should be the basic formula for per-
suading neighboring countries. In particular, South Korea should en-
deayor to persuade the Soviet Union that a unified Korea would never 
be used as a base for attack against it. If this is accomplished, the four 
neighboring countries should conclude an agreement that they would 
never intervene militarily in Korean national affairs under any circum-
stances, except when one of them has already militarily intervened. 
Even North Korea would not oppose it, dreaming the improbable 
dream - unification on its terms. 
ii. Assurance That Neighboring Countries Will 
Not Supply Nuclear Weapons on the 
Korean Peninsula 
The four neighboring countries should also agree not to supply 
any nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula. This agreement should 
be easily reached because nuclear weapons in Korea would threaten all 
countries. Of course, there is no way to prevent North Korea from 
developing nuclear weapons. As South Korean economic strength 
would prevail against the North, South Korea would not need to 
worry about North Korean nuclear ability as long as neighboring 
countries do not supply nuclear weapons to the North. 
iii. Long-term Foreign Policy for Unification: One Korea 
Policy 
South Korea has proposed simultaneous admission of South and 
North Korea to the United Nations while North Korea has opposed 
it, emphasizing that this would constitute a two-Korea policy.452 
However, North Korea might change this position within ten years in 
light of the wide gap in national strength between South and North 
Korea. Accordingly, South Korea should be careful in making a long-
term foreign policy of unification. The East German position, which 
argues for two Germanies, should be a good lesson for South Korea. 
South Korea should concentrate on keeping the universal recognition 
that the Korean nation is only one nation. It is true that many coun-
452. ROK, National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Ko-
rea, supra note 320, pp. 223-225. 
PEACE AND UNIFICATION IN KOREA AND INT'L LAW 159 
tries have double diplomatic relations with both sides of Korea. How-
ever, as the economic gap between South and North Korea rapidly 
widens, South Korea should modify its long-term foreign policy and 
use its economic power as leverage to assure its dominant position in 
international society. In this context, South Korea should reconsider 
its current foreign policy which argues for concurrent recognition of 
both sides of Korea by the Communist bloc and the Western World. 
One of the most important elements in a unification policy is the inter-
national recognition that Korean unification is a Korean domestic 
problem and that foreign countries should not intervene. This is not a 
time to fear a North Korean invasion, but a time to try to subject the 
North Korean regime to South Korea's dominant position. Fortu-
nately, North Korea still stands strongly for a one-Korea policy. 
South Korea should not lose this opportunity. In the foreseeable fu-
ture, North Korea will probably change its position and speak for a 
two-Koreas policy. If the two-Koreas policy is firmly recognized in 
international society, there is not much hope for unification by self-
determination. The German case provides a good example of this type 
of scenario. 
c. The Aspect of South-North Korean Relations 
1. Active Measures for Social Change in North Korea 
To achieve Korean unification, the current society of North Ko-
rea must be changed. Until now South Korea did almost nothing to 
advance a change. South Korea should quickly take the offensive and 
carry out active measures to change the North Korean totalitarian col-
lective society. Of course, it would be difficult to penetrate a thor-
oughly closed society like North Korea. It is also true that the more 
closed a society, the more vulnerable to external cultures and systems. 
Thus, South Korea should urgently study this program. 
Several effective methods could be pursued to promote change in 
the North Korean society. First, mass media such as television and 
radio would be most effective. South Korea should launch a telecom-
munication satellite into the geo-stationary orbit for a direct broad-
casting television system. It would take some time for the North 
Korean people to be able to receive such direct-broadcast television 
programs from a satellite, but modern technology would quickly 
spread. At the same time, South Korea should intensify its radio 
broadcasts to North Korea and carefully select the programs. 
Second, to penetrate North Korean society, South Korea might 
use pro-North Korea Korean residents in Japan. Since the North Ko-
rean society is a very closed society and there are not many connec-
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tions between the Korean residents in Japan and North Koreans, this 
approach would be less effective. However, several hundred thousand 
pro-North Korea Korean residents in Japan would be available in var-
ious ways. 
Third, South Korea can send various public relations materials 
through the demilitarized zone by utilizing balloons and other means. 
Since the North Korean armed forces are concentrated in this area, 
this would be very effective. 
Fourth, South Korea should intensify its contacts with North 
Korea through South-North Korean dialogues in hope of progress. 
Recently, South Korea accepted the North Korean offer of relief 
materials for South Korean flood victims for the benefit of the dia-
logue. In the foreseeable future some exchanges between the two sides 
of Korea in areas such as sports and commerce are feasible. 
ii. The Desirable Direction for the South-North 
Korean Dialogue 
Although the initial period of South-North Korean dialogue in 
the early 1970s was very active, its development was stalemated. Re-
cently, the dialogue has shown some cautious movement, and some 
progress might be expected. 
The South-North Korean dialogue is very important for several 
reasons. It offers an effective means to change North Korean society 
and at the same time prevent foreign intervention in the Korean ques-
tion, emphasizing that Korean unification is being carried out by the 
Koreans themselves. Therefore, South Korea should encourage its 
progress. 
Several important considerations should be taken into account in 
encouraging the South-North Korean dialogue. First, South Korea 
should not confuse the objective of the dialogue. To hope for unifica-
tion through such a dialogue with the North Korean Communists is 
unrealistic. The only feasible objective of this dialogue is to open and 
change the closed society of North Korea. If South Korea succeeds in 
exchanges of sports or commerce with North Korea, it would be one 
of the best ways to change the closed society of North Korea. The 
North Korean Communists will never concede anything through dia-
logue unless it is forced to do so. This objective of the dialogue, to 
change North Korean society, should be communicated to the South 
Korean people. If not, the South Korean people would soon tire of 
fruitless dialogues and lose confidence in unification. 
Second, South Korea should change its attitude toward the dia-
logue and North Korea. It is not understandable that the North Ko-
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rean Communists arrogantly demand that South Korea repeal its 
Anti-Communist Law and release certain prisoners, insulting the 
South Korean Government, while South Korea is on the defensive and 
tries to be gentle. 453 This attitude should be drastically changed. 
South Korea should take a more dominant and confident position. 
South Korea should demand that the North Korean regime recognize 
the basic human rights of the Northern brethren, recognize their pri-
vate ownership and freedom of religion, and return to a free market 
economy. These demands will obviously not be accepted, but the psy-
chological benefit of this behaviour to North and South Koreans 
would be great. Attack is the best defense. 
453. Ihid .. pp. 220-222. 
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APPENDIX I 
KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, 1953 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, 
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, ON THE ONE HAND, AND 
THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S 
ARMY AND THE COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE 
PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, 
CONCERNING A MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA 
PREAMBLE 
The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations 
Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander· of the 
Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese 
People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping 
the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed 
on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice 
which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all 
acts of armed force in Korea until a f;nai peaceful settlement 
is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to 
accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and 
terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and 
Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to 
be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the 
belligerents in Korea. 
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ARTICLE I 
MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND 
DEMILITARIZED ZONE 
1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both 
sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as 
to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. 
A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to 
prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a 
resumption of hostilities. 
2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated 
on the attached map (Map 1). 1'1 
3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a 
southern boundary as indicated on the attached map (Map 1)~'1 
4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked 
as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter 
established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have 
_ suitable markers erected along the boundary between the 
Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military 
Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all 
markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along 
the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone. 
5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to 
civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by 
one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The 
Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the 
shipping in .that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on 
the attached map (Map 2). 1'1 Civil shipping of each side shall 
have unrestricted access to the land under the military control 
of that side. 
6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, 
or against the Demilitarized Zone. 
7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted 
to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically 
authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission. 
1 The originals of thc.~e maps, large-scale in size, are clepositecl with the signed 
original Agreement io the archives of the Department. of State where they are 
available for reference. 
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8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone 
shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military 
control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by 
the Commander into whose territory entry is sought. 
9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter 
the Demilitarized Zone except persons cancerned with the 
conduct of civil administration and relief and persons 
specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice 
Commission. 
10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the 
Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation 
Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, 
United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief 
in that pa1·t of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the 
Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of 
the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the 
Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number 
of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are 
permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of 
civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the 
respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total numbe:'-" 
authorized by either side exceed one thousand ('1,000) persons 
at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to 
be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military 
Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms 
unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice 
Commission. 
11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to 
prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and v~ithin 
the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its 
assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the 
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, 
its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams 'h<ith their 
assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment 
specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the 
Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall 
be permitted through the territory under the military control of 
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either side over any route necessary to move between· points 
within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not 
connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized 
Zone. 
ARTICLE ll 
CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE 
AND ARMISTICE 
A. GENERAL 
12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order 
and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by 
all armed forces under their control, including all units and 
personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve 
(12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See 
Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the 
remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.) 
13. In order to insure the stability of the Milita.!·y Armistice 
so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through 
the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher 
level, the-Commanders of the opposing sides shall: 
a. Within seventy- two (72) hours after this 
Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their 
military forces, supplies, and equipment from the 
Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All 
demolitions, minefields, 'Alire entanglements, and other hazards 
to the safe movement of personnel of the Militatr Armistice 
Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist 
within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military 
forces therefrom, together v.ith lanes known to be free of all 
such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice 
Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces 
emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes 
shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days 
after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all 
such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as 
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directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice 
Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour 
peri¢, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five ( 46) 
day period to complete salvage operations under Military 
Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature 
as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice 
Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing 
sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 
hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter 
the De1nilitarized Zone. 
b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement 
becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, 
and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters 
of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not 
withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually 
agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have 
the right to take any'· action which it deems necessary for the 
maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands", as 
used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one 
side at the time when this Atmistic.e Agreement· becomes 
effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; 
provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and 
west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO 
and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the 
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and 
the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the 
island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N, 124"40'E), 
TAECHONG- DO (37"50'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG- DO 
(37"46'N, 124"46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37"38'N, 125"40'E), 
and U-DO (37"36'N, 125°58'E), which shall remain under the 
military control 'of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations 
Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south 
of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the 
military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations 
Command. (See Map 3.) l'l 
c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing 
military personnel; provided, however, that the 1-otation of units 
and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary 
1 See footnote 1, a11te, p. 2.''n. 
168 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
duty basis, and th~ return to Korea of personnel after short 
periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be 
permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is 
defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units 
or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. 
Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from 
·• Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 
43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; 
provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand 
(35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into 
Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation 
policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced 
into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the 
aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into 
Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to 
exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that 
side who have departed from Korea since. that ~ate. 
Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea 
of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military 
Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival 
and departure and the number of persons arriving at 
or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection 
Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation 
of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry 
enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. 
d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing 
combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; 
provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, 
weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn 
out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be 
replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness 
and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, 
weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only 
through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. 
In order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored 
vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to ·be introduced into Korea 
6060Z 0 - S ~ - I 7 
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.for replacement purposes, 1·eports concerning every incoming 
shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice 
·Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; 
such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition 
of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are 
removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of 
entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection 
Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the 
replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and 
ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated 
in Paragraph 43 hereof. 
e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands 
who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement 
are adequately punished. 
f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of 
record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves 
registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a 
definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes 
effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for 
the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover arid evacuate 
the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, 
including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures 
and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall 
be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The 
Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other 
side all available information pertaining to the places of burial 
of the deceased military personnel of the other side. 
g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance 
and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its 
Joint Observer Teams, the 'Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the 
carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter 
assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supen.isory 
Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full 
convenience of movement between the headquarters of the 
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of 
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entry enumerated· in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of 
communication agreed upon by both sides (See Map 4)~'l and 
between the head:Juarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice 
Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to 
prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and 
means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main 
lines of communication are closed or impassable. 
h. Provide such logistic support, i·ncl uding 
communications and transportation facilities, as may be 
required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral 
Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams. 
i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable 
airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in 
the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice 
Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine. 
j. Insure that all members and other personnel of 
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and-of the Neutral 
Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall 
enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise 
of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and 
immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited 
diplomatic personnel under international usage. 
14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing 
ground forces under the military control of either side, which 
ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area 
of Korea under the military control of the opposing side. 
15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing 
naval fore~. which naval forces shall respect the waters 
contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of 
Korea under the military Lvntrol of the opposing side, and shall 
not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea. 
16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing 
air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the 
Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military 
control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to 
both. 
1 S!'e fnut nott> 1, a 11 f<:. p. 237. 
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17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of 
the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of 
the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The 
Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their 
respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to 
insure complete compliance with all of tl).e provisions hereof by 
all elements of their commands. They shall actively cooperate 
with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission 
and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring 
observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions 
of this Armistice Agreement. 
18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice 
Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission 
and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing 
sides. 
B. MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION 
1. COMPOSITION 
19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established. 
20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of 
ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by 
the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five 
(5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme 
Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander 
of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three 
(3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. Tht two (2) 
remaining members on each side may be major generals, 
brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents. 
21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be 
permitted to use staff assistants as required. 
22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided 
with the necessary administra ... ive personnel to establish a 
Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by 
performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such 
other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side 
172 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant 
Secretary and sucJ;t clerical and specialized personnel as required_ 
by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, 
and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic. 
23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially 
provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, 
which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior 
members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. 
b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not 
less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, 
half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in,-Chief, 
United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed 
jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army 
and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. 
Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters 
shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning 
of the Joint Observer Teams. 
2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY 
24. The general mission of the Military Armistice 
Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this 
Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any 
violations of this Armistice Agreement. 
25. The Military Armistice Commission shall: 
a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of 
PANMUNJOM (37°57'29"N, 126°40'00"E). The Military 
Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another 
point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior 
members of both sides on the Commission. 
b. Operate as a joint organization witpout a chairman. 
c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time 
to time, deem necessary. 
d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this 
Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and 
to the Han River Estuary. 
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e. Direct the operations of t.'lle JoL'lt Observer Teams. 
f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this 
Armistice Agreemeni;. 
g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the 
opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this 
Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of 
proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission. 
h. Give general supervision and direction to the 
activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of 
War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced 
Civili&ns, hereinafter established. 
i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting 
communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; 
provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to 
preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating 
with each other by any other means which they may desire to 
employ. 
j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its 
staff and its Joint. Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for 
all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels,· used in the performance of its 
mission. 
26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to 
assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the 
carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice· Agreement 
pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River 
Estuary. 
27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior 
member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint 
Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice 
Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone 
or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more 
than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been 
dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be 
dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side 
on the Commission. 
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28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior 
member of either side . thereof, is authorized to request the 
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special 
observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized 
Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been 
reported to have occurred. 
29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines 
that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it·shall 
immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the 
opposing sides. 
80. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that 
a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its 
satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing 
sides. 
3. GENERAL 
31. The Military Armistice Commission shall ~eet daily. 
Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by 
the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses 
may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the 
senior member of either side. 
32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of 
the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the 
Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each 
meeting. 
33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports 
to the Military Armistice Commission as required . by the 
Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as 
may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by 
the Commission. 
34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain 
duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required 
by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to 
maintain duplicate files of such other report~. records, etc., as 
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may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual 
dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall 
be turned over to each side. 
35. The Military Armistice Commission may make 
recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with 
respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. 
Such recommended changes should generally be those designed 
to insure a more effective armistice. 
C. NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION 
1. COMPOSITION 
36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby 
established. 
37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be 
composed of four ( 4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be 
appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-
Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and 
SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by 
neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander 
of the Korean People's Army. and the Commander of the 
Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein 
used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have 
not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to 
the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing 
nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to 
attend those meetings which for any reason the principal 
member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be 
of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number 
of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one 
side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral 
nations nominated by the other side. 
38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished 
by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may 
be appointed as alternate members of the Commission. 
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39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the 
Neutral Nations Superv}sory Commission with the necessary 
administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with 
assistilig the Commission by performing necessary record-
keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as 
the Commission may assign to it. 
40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall 
be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral 
Nations Inspection· Teams, which number may be reduced by 
agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military 
Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams 
shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the 
direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only. 
b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be 
composed of not less than four ( 4) officers, preferably of field 
grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated 
by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and 
half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated 
jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army 
and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. 
Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams 
may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In 
order tO facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams 
composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall 
ba from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, 
United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from 
a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander 
of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of 
the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as 
circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, 
clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such 
equipment as may be required by the Teams to peJiorm their 
missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as 
required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under 
his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations 
lnspeetion Teams with such of the above personnel and 
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equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that 
such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations 
of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is 
composed. 
2. FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY 
41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, 
observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in 
Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to 
report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, 
and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission. 
42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall: 
a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the 
headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission. 
b. Adopt sucli rules of procedure as it may, from time 
to time, deem necessary. 
c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral 
Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection 
provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d of this Armistice 
Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 
hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided 
for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of 
this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. 
The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, 
and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall 
be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing 
combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition 
are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be 
construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any 
secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, 
armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition. 
d. Direct and supernse the operations of the Neutral 
Nations Inspection Teams. 
e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection 
Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 4S 
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hereof located in the territory under the military control of the 
Commander-in-Chief, Uni.ted Nations Command; and five (5) 
Neutral Nations Inspection Teams. at the ports of entry 
enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory 
under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the 
Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese 
People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile 
Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the 
general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by 
agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military 
Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile 
Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any 
one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of 
either side on the Military Armistice Commission. 
f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-
paragraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported 
violations of this Armistice Agreement, . including s u c h 
investigations of reported violations of this Armistice 
Agreement as may be requested by the Military Annistice 
Commission or by tlie senior member of either side on the 
Commission. 
g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its 
staff aJ?.d its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive 
marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the 
performance of its mission. 
43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at 
the following ports of entry: 
Territory under the military control 
of the United Nations Conunand 
INCHON 
TAEGU 
PUSAN 
(37'28'N, 126'38'E) 
(35'52'N, 128'36'E) 
(35'06'N, 129'02'E) 
KANGNUNG (37'45'N, 128'54'E) 
KUNSAN (35'59'N, 126'43'E) 
Territory under the military control 
of the Korean People's Army and 
the Chinese People's Volunteers 
SINUIJU 
CHO::-<"GJIN 
HUNGNAM 
MANPO 
SINANJU 
(40'06'N, 124'24'E) 
(41'46'N, 129'49'E) 
(39'50'N, 127'37'E) 
(41'09'N, 126'18'E) 
(39'36'N, 125'36'E) 
These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full 
convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of 
communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).·1'1 
'See footnote 1, ante, p. 23i. 
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3. GENERAL 
44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall 
meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be 
agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on 
twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member. 
45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of 
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded 
to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after 
each meeting. Records dhall be kept in English, Korean, and 
Chinese. 
46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make 
periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, 
observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral 
Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission 
and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be 
deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the 
Commission.. Reports sha_ll be submitted by a Team as a whole, 
but may also be submitted by one or more individual members 
thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more 
individual members thereof shall be considered as informational 
only. 
47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations 
Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice 
Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission 
without delay and in the language in which received. They shall 
not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The_. 
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such . 
reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their 
findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of 
priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take 
final action with regard to any such report until the evaluatioa 
thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervis6lJ 
Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisol')' 
Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance 
before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the 
senior member of either side on the Military Armistice 
Commission, for clarification of any report submitted. 
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48. The Neutral. Nations Supervisory Commission shall 
maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings 
required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is 
authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, 
.records, etc., as may be nece&~ary in the conduct of its business. 
Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the 
above files shall be turned over to each side. 
49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may 
make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission 
with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice 
Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those 
designed to insure a more effective armistice. 
\ 
60. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission., or any 
member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any 
member of the Military Armistice Commission. 
ARTICLE ill 
ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR 
61. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war 
held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice 
Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity 
with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior 
to the signing of this Armistice Agreement. 
a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement 
becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, 
directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of 
war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to 
which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall 
be accotnplished in accordance with the related provisions of this 
Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such 
personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice 
Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of 
personnel to_ be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners 
of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by 
rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) 
and internment or military serial number. 
PEACE AND UNIFICATION IN KOREA AND INT'L LAW 181 
b. Each side shall release all those remaining priscmers 
of war, who are not directly repatria~ from its military control 
and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations 
Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the 
provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral 
Nations Repatriation Commission." 
c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to 
the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner 
of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this 
Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English, 
•• •• " (SONG HW AN) in Korean, and " iii& " 
(CH'IEN FAN) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or 
place of residence of such prisoner of war. 
52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acta of war 
in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and 
repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice 
Agreement. 
53. All the __ sick and injured prisoners of war who insist 
upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as 
possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated 
concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to 
provide medical care and attendance en route. 
54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by 
Sub-paragraph 51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit 
of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes 
effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to 
complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of 
war in its custody at the earliest practicable time. 
55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where 
prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. 
Additional p~ace(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of 
war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, .if necessary, 
by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War. 
56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War 
is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of 
field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the 
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Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) 
of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of 
the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese 
People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general 
supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, 
be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for 
-the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the 
execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice 
Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It 
shall be the duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the 
arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and 
reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of 
both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements 
as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare 
of sick and injured prisoners of war; to coordinate the work of 
the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 67 hereof, 
in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise 
the implementation of the arrangements for the actual 
repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 
and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) 
of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange 
for security at the place(s) of delivery and reception of 
prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions 
as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war. 
b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter 
relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation 
of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the 
Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee 
for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its 
headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military 
Annistice Commission. 
c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War 
shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon 
completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war. 
57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement 
becomes effective, joint· Red Cross teams com.posed of 
representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of the 
countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command 
on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society 
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and represtmtatives 
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of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the 
other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall 
assist in the execution by bo~ sides of those provisions of this 
Annistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the 
prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who 
insist upon repatriation, by the perfonnance of such 
humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the 
welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the 
joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering 
and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) 
of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the 
prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of 
war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort 
and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams 
may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from 
prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception 
of prisoners of war. 
b. The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set 
forth below: 
(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) 
members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red 
Cross Societies of each side, to ~ssist in the delivering and 
receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of 
delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of 
this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the 
Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of 
this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for Repatriation 
of Prisoners of War. 
(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) 
members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national 
Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war 
camps under the administration of the Korean People's Anny 
and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide 
services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner 
of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of 
prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society 
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of tbe Red Cross 
Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chainnan 
of this team. 
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(3) One team shall be composed- of sixty (60) 
members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the naiional 
Red Cross Socii!ties of each side, to visit the prisoner of war 
camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. 
This team 11,1ay provide Services to prisoners of war while 
en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of 
delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a 
Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United 
Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team. 
(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each 
joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) 
members from the team, with an equal number of representatives 
from each side, may be formed as circumstances require. 
(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, 
and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the 
joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be 
furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating 
in the territory under his military controL 
(6) Whenever jointly agreed u.pon by the 
representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team;- the 
size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to 
confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners 
of War. 
c. . The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully 
with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their 
functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel 
of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military 
control. The Commander of each side shall provide such 
logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be 
required by the team operating in the territory under his · 
military control. 
d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon 
completion of the program of repatriation of all the prisoners of 
war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon 
repatriation. 
58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the 
Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later 
than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes 
60h02 0 - ss - 18 • 
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effective, the following information concerning prisoners 
of war: 
{1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of 
war who escaped since the effective date of the data Jut 
exchanged. 
{2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding 
name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date aDd 
cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war wbo 
died while in his custody. 
b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the 
effective date of the supplementary information specified above, 
the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the 
Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data 
pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of 
Sub-paragraph 58a hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-da7 
intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and 
reception of prisoners of war. 
c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the 
custody of the detaining side after the completion of the 
program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be 
delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition. 
59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice 
Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military 
control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, 
arid who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military 
Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, 
if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the 
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,· to return to 
the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all 
civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes 
effective, are in territory under the military control of the 
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the 
Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who, on 
24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line 
established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to 
return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme 
Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander 
of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south 
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of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each 
side shall be responsible. for publicizing widely throughout 
territory under his military control the contents of the provisions 
of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate 
civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all 
such civilians who desire to return home. 
b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this 
Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the 
military control o:f the Supreme Commander of the Korean 
People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's 
Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the 
military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations 
Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of . 
fo~ign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement 
becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of 
the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if 
they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of 
the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the 
Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be pertl_litted 
and assisted to do so. The Commander of each· side shall be 
responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under 
his military control the contents of the provisions of this 
Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil 
authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such 
civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory 
under the military control of the Commander of the other side. 
c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided 
for in Sub-paragraph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians 
provided for in Sub-paragraph 59b hereof shall be commenced by 
both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement 
becomes effective. 
d. (t)· A Committee for Assisting the R~turn of 
Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed 
of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be 
appointed by the Commander- in- Chief, United Nations 
Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by 
the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and 
the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This 
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Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of 
the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for 
coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the 
return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the 
execution by both sides of all of the provisions of thia 
Armistice Agreement relating to the ret urn of the 
above - mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of thia 
Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of 
transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement 
of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) 
through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the 
Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the 
crossing point(s); and to carry out such other functions as are 
required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned 
civilians. 
(2) When unable to reach agreement on any 
matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for 
Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately 
refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for 
decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced 
Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the 
headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission. 
(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of 
Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice 
Commission upon fulfillment of its mission. 
ARTICLE IV 
RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS 
CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES 
60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean 
question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby 
recommend to the _governments of the countries concerned on 
both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice 
Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference 
of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives 
appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions 
of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful 
settlement of the Korean question, etc. 
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ARTICLEV 
MISCELLANEOUS 
61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement 
must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing 
sides. 
62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice 
Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded 
either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by 
provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement 
at a political level between both sides. 
63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other 
than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 1:- 2.. 0 0 hours 
on 2, 7 JULY 1953. 
Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at I 0 0 0 hours on the 
Z 714 day of JULy , 1953, in English, Korean, and 
Chinese, all texts being equally authentic. 
KIMILSUNG 
Marshal, Democratic: 
PENG TEH-HUAI MARK W. CLARK 
General, United States 
Army 
Commander-in-Chief, 
United Nations 
Command 
People's Republic 
of Korea 
Commander, 
Chinese People's 
Vt~lunteers 
Supreme Commander, 
Korean People's Army 
PRESENT 
1 PI~/ 
NAMIL 
General. Korean People's Army 
Senior Delegate, 
Delegation of the Korean People's 
Army and the Chinese People's 
Volunteers 
~·\<-,~ 
WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR. 
Lieutenant General, United States 
Army 
Senior Delegate, 
United Nations Command Delegation 
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APPENDIX II 
JULY 4, 1972, SOUTH-NORTH JOINT COMMUNIQUE 
Recently there were talks held both in Pyongyang and Seoul to 
discuss problems of improving the south-north relations and 
unifying the dividedfatherland. 
Director Hu Rak Lee of the Central Intelligence Agency of 
Seoul visited Pyongyang from 2 to 5 May 1972 to hold talks with 
Director Young Joo Kim of the Organization and Guidance 
Department of Pyongyang. Second Vice Premier Sung Chul Park, 
acting on behalf of Director Young J oo Kim, also visited Seoul 
from 19 May to I June 1972 to hold further talks with Director 
Hu Rak Lee. 
With the common desire to achieve peaceful unification of the 
Fatherland as early as possible, the two sides in these talks had 
frank and openhearted exchanges of views, and made great pro-
gress in promoting mutual understanding. 
In the course of the talks, the two sides, in an effort to remove 
the misunderstandings and mistrust and mitigate increased ten-
sions that have arisen between the south and north as a result 
of long separation, and further to expedite unification of the 
fatherland, have reached full agreement on the following points: 
I) The two sides have agreed to the following principles for 
unification of the fatherland: 
First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean 
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efforts without being subject to external imposition or inter-
ference. 
Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, 
and not through the use of force against each other. 
Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall 
first be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and 
systems. 
2) In order to ease tensions and foster an atmosphere of mutual 
trust between the south and north, the two sides have agreed 
not to slander or defame each other, not to undertake armed 
provocations whether on a large or small scale, and to take posi-
tive measures to prevent ina.dvertent military incidents. 
3) The two sides, in order to restore severed national ties, pro-
mote mutual understanding and to expedite independent peaceful 
unification, have agreed to carry out various exchanges in many 
fields. 
4) The two sides have agreed to cooperate positively with each 
other to seek early success of the south-north Red Cross talks, 
which are under way with the fervent expectations of the entire 
people. 
5) The two sides, in order to prevent the outbreak of unexpected 
military incidents and to deal directly, promptly and accurately 
with problems arising between the south and north, have agreed 
to install a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyong-
yang. 
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6) The two sides, in order to implement the aforementioned 
agreed items, solve various problems existing between the south 
and north, and to settle the unification problem on the basis 
of the agreed principles for unification of the Fatherland, have 
agreed to establish and operate a South-North Coordinating Com-
mittee co-chaired by director Hu Rak Lee and director Young 
JooKim. 
7) The two sides, firmly convinced that the aforementioned 
agreed items correspond with the common aspirations of the 
entire people, who are anxious to see an early unification of the 
fatherland, hereby solemnly pledge before the entire Korean 
people that they will faithfully carry out these agreed items. 
4 July, 1972, 
UPHOLDING THE DESIRES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE 
SUPERIORS 
HU RAK LEE YOUNG JOO KIM 
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APPENDIX III 
SPECIAL STATEMENT REGARDING FOREIGN POLICY 
FOR PEACE AND UNIFICATION BY PRESIDENT PARK: 
CHUNG.HEE, JUNE 23, 1973 
Dear Fifty-million Fellow Countrymen! 
Today, I wish to announce the guide lines of our foreign policy 
for peace and unification to improve substantially conditions for 
the attainment of our long-cherished national aspiration to the uni-
fication of our fatherland. I make this announcement, taking into 
account our experiences in the south-north dialogue and the recent 
developments in international situation. 
At the conclusion of World War II, Korea was liberated, but 
our land was divided and our people were separated against their 
will. 
The 38th parallel, originally known as a millitary demarcation 
line for disarming Japanese forces, turned later into an Iron Cur-
tain. As a result, the south and north were cut off from each 
other in political, economic, social, cultural and all other fields. 
In the meantime, negotiations were conducted at the meetings 
of the US-USSR Joint Commission to remove the barrier of 
the 38th parallel and to establish a unified democratic govern-
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ment. Yet, these negotiations ended in failure due to basic 
differences in the positions of the two parties. The Korean ques-
tion was, then, submitted to the United Nations. 
At the Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
convened in 1947, a resolution was adopted calling for free general 
elections throughout the whole of Korea. The United Nations 
Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was then dis-
patched to Korea to facilitate this objective. 
However, the general elections were held only in the southern 
part of Korea because of the negative attitude on the part of 
north Korea. Thus. the government of the Republic of Korea 
was established on 15 August 1948 and was subsequently recog-
nized by the United Nations as the only lawful government in 
Korea. 
On 25 June 1950, the north Korean Communist forces launched 
an unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea. During 
the Korean War thus caused, an innumerable number of our 
brethren lost their lives and the whole country was subjected to 
destruction by warfare. An armistice was put into effect after 
three years of war, but the country still remained divided and 
the prospect of unification of the country became even dim-
mer. 
In my Commemorative Address delivered on the occasion of 
the 25th anniversary of national liberation on 15 August 1970, 
I called for a relaxation of tension between the south and 
north with a view to alleviating the sufferings of our compatriots 
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arising from the division of the country and also to building the 
foundations for a peaceful unification of the fatherland. On 12 
August of the following year, our side proposed the south-north 
Red Cross talks, and, on 4 July last year, the South-North Joint 
Communique was issued. 
The south-north dialogue was thus started. Yet, the results of 
these dialogues lasting for almost two years since their beginning 
have been far from our expectations. 
In our talks with the north, we have taken the position that 
both sides should endeavor to gradually remove the artificial 
barriers between the south and north by solving easier and more 
practical problems first and to phase out feelings of mutual dis-
trust and replace them with those of mutual confidence through 
concrete results. We further pointed out that such an approach 
would best serve to make the talks productive and would also 
serve as a short-cut to the eventual unification of the country by 
peaceful means. 
The north Korean side, in disregard of the existence of deep-
rooted feelings of distrust between the south and north, insisted 
that military and political problems, which might endanger the 
security of the Republic of Korea, must first be dealt with, as a 
package, in the talks. While the very problem of reunification 
. # 
was being discussed at the talks, the north Korean side was contin-
uously engaged in such external activities as would practically 
perpetuate the division of the country. 
In view of the current status of the south-north relationship, it 
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is anticipated that not only many difficulties lie in the way of the 
dialogue, but a considerable length of time will also be required 
before the results of the dialogue originally expected can be at-
tained. 
Moreover, if the present state of affairs were to be left as it is, 
the existing feelings of distrust might be deepened and even the 
tension between the south and north might be aggravated. 
Now, as for the recent developments in the international situa-
tion, it may be said that the era of Cold War after World Warn 
came to an end. We have embarked upon a new era of peaceful 
coexistence, based on the status quo, through the balance of 
power among the major powers. 
Judging also from a series of events witnessed in this part of the 
world, it seems unlikely that the unification of our fatherland 
can be attained within a short period of time. 
These international trends give riseto a most serious problem 
in the history of our nation. The problem is how to pursue the 
national unification-the supreme aspiration and objective of the 
whole Korean people-in the face of the stark realities of interna-
tional situation. 
My dear Fifty-million Fellow Countrymen! 
We must tackle these realities in an active and positive way. We 
must formulate wise and firm policies for attaining the goal of 
national unification in the face of internal and external realities. 
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Then, we must assiduously implement such policies. 
We should have peace rooted firmly in this land and should 
achieve, without fail, the ultimate goal of peaceful unification by 
our own self-reliant efforts. 
With these considerations in mind, I now declare the following 
policies: 
1) The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task 
of the Korean people. We will continue to exert every effort to 
accomplish this task. 
2) Peace must be maintained in the Korean peninsula by all 
means. The south and north should neither interfere with each 
other's internal affairs· nor commit aggression against each other. 
3) We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience 
to secure concrete results from the south-north dialogue based on 
the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique dated July 4, 
1972. 
4) We shall not oppose north Korea's participation with us in 
intereational organizations, if it is conducive to the easing of 
tensions and the furtherance of international cooperation. 
5) We shall not object to our admittance into the United Na-
tions together with north Korea, if the majority of the member-
states of the United Nations so wish, provided that it does not 
cause hindrance to our national unification. 
Even before our admittance into the United Nations as a mem-
ber, we shall not be opposed to north Korea also being invited 
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at the time of the U.N. General Assembly's deliberation of "the 
Korean question" in which the representative of the Republic of 
Korea is invited to participate. 
6) The Republic of Korea will open its doors to all the nations 
of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equa-
lity. At the same time, we urge those countries whose ideologies 
and social institutions are different from ours to open their doors 
likewise to us. 
7) Peace and good-neighborliness are the firm bases of the for-
eign policy of the Republic of Korea. It is reaffirmed that we will 
continue to further strengthen the ties of friendship existing be-
tweel?- our friendly nations and our country. 
I wish to make it clear that matters concerning north Korea in 
the policies enumerated above are interim measures during' the 
transition period pending the achievenment of our national uni-
fication and that the taking of these measures does not signify our 
recognition of north Korea as a state. 
My dear Compatriots in the South and North! 
Upon an objective and realistic appraisal of the internal and 
external situations surrounding our fatherland, I have a firm con-
viction that these policies are the only short-cut to the achieve-
ment of peaceful unification by our own self-reliant efforts amidst 
international currents of relaxation of tension without impairing 
the dignity and pride of our nation. 
There can be no despair or frustration for a wise and coura-
geous people. 
Let us march together, with hope, courage and wisdom, toward 
the attainment of peace in the Korean peninsula, prosperity of 
~he nation and unification of our fatherland. 
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